Post-War developments in the marketing of cheese by Nicholls, William H.
Volume 24
Number 261 Post-War developments in the marketing
of cheese
Article 1
June 1939
Post-War developments in the marketing of cheese
William H. Nicholls
Iowa State College
Follow this and additional works at: http://lib.dr.iastate.edu/researchbulletin
Part of the Agricultural Economics Commons, and the Rural Sociology Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Iowa Agricultural and Home Economics Experiment Station Publications at Iowa State
University Digital Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Research Bulletin (Iowa Agriculture and Home Economics Experiment Station) by
an authorized editor of Iowa State University Digital Repository. For more information, please contact digirep@iastate.edu.
Recommended Citation
Nicholls, William H. (1939) "Post-War developments in the marketing of cheese," Research Bulletin (Iowa Agriculture and Home
Economics Experiment Station): Vol. 24 : No. 261 , Article 1.
Available at: http://lib.dr.iastate.edu/researchbulletin/vol24/iss261/1
June, 1939 Research Bulletin 261 
Post .. War Developments in the 
Marketing of Cheese 
By WILLIAM H. NICHOLLS 
AGRICULTURAL EXPERIMENT STATION 
IOWA STATE COLLEGE OF AGRICULTURE 
AND MECHANIC ARTS 
AGRICULTURAL ECONOMICS SUBSECTION 
RURAL SOCIAL SCIENCE SECTION 
AMES, IOWA 
CONTENTS 
Introduction 
I. The marketing picture of 1918-20 
Summary. 
II. Developments of 1921-26 
Summary. 
Page 
51 
52 
58 
58 
71 
III. Patent.s, merger and consolidation: 1927-30 73 
Summary. 85 
IV. Cheese marketing and the great depression: 1931-38 86 
Summary. 117 
V. Some theoretical considerations 120 
VI. Economic appraisal 128 
Topical list of literature cited . 135 
Appendix A. Some important patents on cheese 139 
Appendix B. Method of calculating relative importance of 
different channels of distribution 143 
Appendix tables . 144 
37625 
Post-War D evelopments in the 
Marketing of Cheese! 
By WILLIAM: H. NICHOLLS* 
The 20 years following the World War have seen marked 
changes in the marketing of manufactured dairy products. 
Because of this fact, most of the literature on the marketing 
of such products, based largely on conditions before 1918 or 1920, 
is now out of date. In recognition of this gap in our present 
marketing picture, the writer recently published a discussion of 
the developments of the post-war years in butter marketing2 with 
special emphasis on the increasing importance of large business 
units as they relate to marketing channels. This bulletin is a 
similar undertaking with regard to cheese. The aim is to trace 
the development of concentration in the cheese industry since the 
War, the changes which this has brought about in marketing 
channels, and the primary forces responsible for these develop-
ments. It is also hoped that this bulletin will serve as a founda-
tion for a more intensive and thorough study of monopoly ele-
ments in the cheese industry. 
The policy of using individual company names throughout 
the discussion will be followed as was done in the bulletin on 
butter marketing. It has usually been assumed that individual 
companies are of no consequence, only general tendencies or 
principles being of importance. The recent development of the 
theory of imperfect competition, however, has brought increas-
ing recognition of the necessity of studying individual com-
panies, since it is recognized that each has more or less control, 
through consumers' preferences developed by packaging, brand-
ing and advertising, over a segment of the consuming population, 
although this control may be small or great, according to the 
strength of these preferences and the extent of the possibilities 
of substitution. Cheese, for example, is not a homogeneous com-
moditybut is rather "Kraft-Phenix" "Borden's" "Fairmont" 
"Land 0 'Lakes, " or "Brookfield:" -a series 'of commodities 
which, because of the development of consumers' preferences for 
each, are not perfect substitutes even though they are of the same 
basic grade and quality. For this reason, the various business 
1 Project 595 of the Iowa Agricultural Experiment Station. 
" Nicholls. William H. Post-wa r developments in the marketing of butter. 
Jowa Agr. Exp. Sta., Res. Bu!. 250. February, 1939. 
• For the guidance w hich led him originally to undertake research in this 
s ubjec t, the writer is d eeply indebted to Dr. John D. Black of Harvard U ni-
vers ity. He gratefully acknowledges the criticisms of hi s coll eagu es a t Iowa 
State College, especially those of B. W. Hammer, Edward S. Lynch, Margaret 
Reid, T. W. Schultz, G. S. Shepherd, and Gerhard Tintner. He is especia lly 
grateful to Asher Hobson a nd R. H. Froker of the Dept. of Agricultural Eco-
nomics of the University of Wisconsin for their painstaking perusal of the 
manuscript. 
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units should be examined under their actual identity instead of 
under some broad and vague classification such as "processed-
cheese manufacturers," "meat-packers" or "cooperative sales 
agencies. ' , 
Furthermore, all sources used here are available to the general 
public and are in no sense of a confidential nature. The farmer, 
cheese maker or layman, however, does not have the time or 
inclination to go to such original sources to get a better and 
more accurate knowledge of the cheese trade. Conservation of 
research resources, therefore, seems to justify the use of com-
pany names, without which this particular type of analysis is 
unreal and less intelligible. 
Finally, when companies assume the size of those discussed in 
this bulletin, they definitely become vested with a public interest 
and should therefore be willing to subject themselves to public 
scrutiny3. 
The writer recognizes the danger that such an approach may 
cause writings to degenerate into mere company histories, 
while ignoring the broad principles or tendencies4 which are the 
goal of scientific writing. The present study attempts a satis-
factory combination of the two. 
1. THE MARKETING PICTURE OF 1918-20 
"He was the modern business man; one who gave orders to clerks 
and drove a oor and played occasional golf and was scholarly in regard 
to Salesmanship . .. a Solid Citizen."-Sinclair Lewis [Babbitt, Ch. I .] 
In 1918 the largest cheese distributors in the United States 
were four of the dominant meat-packers, with Armour and 
Company leading the other three with a volume of 77.4 million 
pounds. Swift and Company followed closely with 64.1 million 
pounds, while Cudahy and Wilson were considerably below with 
24.1 and 21.1 million pounds, respectively (20a). 
The Kraft Cheese Company, the giant of the morrow, had 
sales of only $500,000 in 1917. By 1919 its sales had increased 
four-fold to $2,000,000 (38a). The founder, J. L. Kraft, was the 
pioneer in processed cheese5 , a form of cheese which came into 
its own only after 1920. It was between 1910 and 1920 that 
"the five-pound loaf American cheese, the first successful pack-
3 Virtually these same arguments were presented in the introduction to the 
writer's bulletin on butter marketing (ibid.) but they apply with far greater 
force to the present study, since concentration in the cheese industry has 
been carried much further tha n in but ter. 
, See below, p. 127. however, for" statement of the difficulties which the 
small number of dominant firms in the industry imposes upon generalizations . 
• Essentially the process of assorting cheese, grinding a nd p asteurizing the 
mixture and, while the plastic cheese is hot, dropping it into the final foil-
lined containers in which it is immediately sealed. Cf. Kraft patents, appen-
dix A, p. 139. 
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aged pasteurized cheese, was developed, although it did not 
appear on the market until after the War" (68) . 
The Phenix Cheese Company was already well-established in 
1918. This company had manufactured its cheese from pas-
teurized cream since 1912 and began in 1915 to mold and wrap 
its product by machinery on which it held the patents. Its 
leading brand was "Philadelphia Cream" cheese. Although 
it started in New York State, Phenix had recognized the trend 
toward production in the West6 and had set up factories in 
Wisconsin shortly after 1910 and in California a few years later. 
By 1918 it had 10 or more factories, half of which were still in 
New York, and had branch offices and warehouses in seven 
important American cities, in Montreal, and in London (38a). 
But it, too, was relatively small in 1918 and still considered itself 
a "wholesale dealer" in cheese7 • 
The years 1914-18 had seen a rapid expansion in the cheese 
business of the four large meat-packers, as shown in table 1. 
Even in 1910, however, their cheese business had been hailed as 
a coming monopoly, with individual country dealers alleged to 
be selling to packers below the prices charged wholesale grocers, 
thereby giving the packers a club which would enable them to 
crush the smaller dealers themselves (21a). At any rate, by 
1914 the packers handled a very large percentage of all Wis-
consin cheese, while the two largest packers, Armour and Swift, 
were important in New York State. All four were distributors 
of cheese and all but Wilson and Company were reported to 
own and control large cheese companies. 
The federal trade commission reported (20b) that in 1914 
only 11.1 percent of cheese factories were owned by corp 01'-
U Wisconsin cheese production passed that of New York State for the first 
time during 1905-1909. 
7 Compare advertisement, Who's Who in the Butter Industry, 1924: "Our 
distribution within a radius of 200 miles of New York City is largely of a 
jobbing character and caters to the best of trade. We also carry spot stocks 
and distribute through our branches in all cities east and west . . . We 
will handle on consignment or on a net basis." Also advertisement of 1906: 
"Phenix Cheese Co., Commission Merchants. Butter, Cheese, and Eggs." 
( 35a) 
TABLE 1. THE LEADING MEAT-PACKERS' CHEESE SALES, 1915-18 
(000 Pounds). 
Year Armour 
I 
Swift Cudahy Wilson 
1915 10,254 
---- -
I 
----- -----
1916 60,710 
----- -----
12,730 
1917 59,668 
----- 15,900 13,164 
1918 77,379 64,072 24 ,100 21,140 
Source: Federal trade commission (20a). 
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ations. "[The] decentralization in the manufacture of cheese 
renders control over the industry by control of the manufacture 
difficult . . . The cheese-dealer, caring for the output of several 
hundred factories, is the key to the packer's dominant position 
in the cheese industry. All of the Big Five [later four] except 
Wilson and Company, were found to be in control, through 
stock ownership and contract or working agreements, of large 
concerns purchasing cheese directly from the factories . . . 
Moreover, ... the packers were such large regular customers for 
the output of still other cheese companies as to make it doubtful if 
they could well be true competitors, even though the packers had 
no financial interest in the companies.' '8 
Since about 385 million pounds of cheese entered trade chan-
nels in 1918, the "Big Four" distributed a total of 48.5 percent 
in that year. Armour led with 20.1 percent, Swift, Cudahy, and 
Wilson following with 16.7 percent, 6.2 percent, and 5.5 per-
cent, r espectively. Swift answered the commission's charges by 
asserting that, while it did distribute" less than one-sixth" of the 
nation's cheese, over 90 percent of its Wisconsin purchases were 
made frpm wholesale dealers in whom it had no financial interest, 
and the remainder direct from cheese factories, none of which 
Swift owned. "We have never tried to influence quotations of 
cheese boards, and have had no agreements with other packers or 
dealers to influence quotations or divide territory" (23). 
The two important farmers' cooperative cheese-marketing 
agencies-in Oregon and Wisconsin-were still of relatively little 
importance in 1918. Tillamook County Creamery Association 
had been formed in 1904 to market the cheese of a number of Ore-
gon cooperative cheese factories. Previous to 1904 the factories, 
being without storage facilities, had been forced to consign cheese, 
immediately after manufacture, to jobbers and commission houses 
on the Pacific Coast. This had brought temporary congestion, 
especially in Portland, with greatly depressed prices as a result, 
so that dealers allegedly had made very large profits on stored 
cheese when the late summer brought a strengthened demand. 
By 1909 this selling agency was handling the output of 16 large 
factories and had a central office with a sales agent in charge. 
In that year the agency sold 2.5 million pounds of cheese. By 
1918 sales had reached 5.0 million pounds (17, 7a). Its outlets 
were still through jobbers and wholesalers, but the sales agency 
made possible improved collections, higher and more uniform 
quality, and better contacts with the markets . 
• -"Tom the fact that more than one-half of Wisconsin cheese factories were 
dependent on packer-owned or controlled concerns for a principal market, 
while nearly one-fo'wth more of these factories sold chiefly to concerns inde-
pendent in ownership of, but dependent on, packer outl e ts, the trade com-
mission concluded that 75-80 percent of Wisconsin cheese was "controlled" by 
the meat-packers. These figures tended to overstress the importa nce of the 
packers in the distribution of cheese, however, a nd undoubtedly underra ted 
the importance of other channels of distribution. 
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The Sheboygan County (Wisconsin) Cheese Producers' Fed-
eration began operations in 1914 as a county-wide organization of 
44 cheese factories. The Federation was the result of "evident 
price manipulation" by organized cheese dealers on the state's 
cheese exchanges. The Federation was forced to build its own 
warehouse since it was not able to buy or rent one "due to 
alleged dealer opposition." Members of the Sheboygan Cheese 
Board went so far as to adopt a rule refusing Federation mem-
bers permission to offer cheese on the Board and penalizing 
dealer members of' the Board who accepted cheese from factories 
in the Federation. By 1918, however, 21 factories had joined in 
another county and the cooperative's name was changed to the 
W"isconsin Cheese Producers' Federation. Between 1914 (the 
first full year of operation) and 1917 cheese receipts had in-
creased from 6.1 to 9.0 million pounds, falling temporarily to 
8.5 million pounds in 1918 (13). 
According to the federal trade commission, "the initial quan-
tity and the continually mounting quantities created the fed-
eration's chief marketing and financing difficulties, because it 
started without market contacts and without market outlets to 
handle a large volume of cheese ... While the sales policy [1914-
22] was in theory to sell directly to wholesale grocers and whole-
sale cheese dealers in the terminal markets and not to assembling 
dealers and to packers, the federation could not wait to put this 
policy in effect because it had to obtain funds with which to pay 
the cheese factories on the settlement dates. Consequently, in 
practice less than 10 percent of the total bulk could be sold to the 
terminal wholesalers and the great proportion of the cheese was 
sold to packers and to other cheese dealers, especially cheese deal-
ers in Chicago" (lOa). Thus, while the Wisconsin cooperative 
agency had shown healthy growth by 1918, it was still fraught 
with the marketing difficulties of a struggling young organiza-
tion. 
The Oregon and Wisconsin cooperatives together were handling 
13.5 million pounds of cheese in 1918, only 3.5 percent of the 
nation's production. And even this small percentage as yet 
moved chiefly through the same marketing channels that had 
received the cheese before the cooperative organizations were 
formed. Since chain store organizations were still small in 1918, 
cheese handled by them moved primarily through the same chan· 
nels as that of the independent grocers previous to the wholesale-
grocer stage. The meat-packers, then, were the only large-scale 
wholesale distritutors in 1918. It is probable that nearly half of 
the nation's cheese still moved from the local assembling dealer 
through the old-line terminal wholesale channels. The important 
marketing channels of 1918 are pictured in fig. 1. 
The country assembling dealer-who might be independent, or 
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Fig. 1. Marketing cha nnels for cheese , 1918 . 
a formal or informal representative of some wholesaler or packer 
-concentrated the output of a number of factories and graded 
and allotted it according to the demands of the markets he 
supplied. His main business was to sell within a short time a 
large volume on a small margin. He either bargained with 
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factories from week to week or had an understanding with them 
that he would buy on the basis of a specified cheese board for a 
certain period of time. He shipped in car-lots whenever possible. 
He had to have paraffining, warehousing, storing and shipping 
facilities and a wide knowledge of the nation's wholesalers to 
whom he sold. 
The terminal wholesaler or packer bought cheese outright for 
resale, chiefly from the assembling dealer, although at times he 
used brokers to contact the dealer or even the factory. In the 
latter case the broker acted as a dealer, although his pay was on a 
commission basis. The cheese wholesaler often owned or con-
trolled several factories and was, therefore, partly a dealer as 
well (e.g . some of the meat-packers, who, in addition, had their 
own refrigerated cars and cold storage facilities throughout the 
country) .9 Except in cities large enough to support a wholesale 
house dealing exclusively in cheese or produce, most of the whole-
salers other than meat-packers were wholesale grocers, who dis-
tributed a wide variety of goods to local retail stores. The whole-
sale grocers usually bought from the large terminal wholesalers, 
who were located in the larger distributing centers. Sometimes 
a broker came between wholesaler and wholesale grocer. Finally, 
the retailer bought cheese in small amounts, usually from the 
wholesale grocer or packer, cutting it up to order in the final sale 
to the household consumer (49). 
The marketing picture in 1918 would be incomplete without 
mentioning the call boards,lO where the price of cheese was 
largely determined. Dairy boards had operated since 1873, and 
this kind of call board came into general use for cheese between 
1896 and 1900, the intention being to bring open competition into 
the cheese market. Less than 10 percent was sold on the board, 
however, and that was bid off largely by dealers having" con-
tracts" (more properly, verbal agreements) for much larger 
quantities of cheese which they were to receive at board prices. 
"The dealer, who knows that every 1/8 cent he bids up the price 
on the board will increase the price on all his contracted cheese by 
the same amount, is not a very enthusiastic bidder" (65).u 
Although the number of cheese boards in Wisconsin had 
reached a peak of 18 in 1898, there were only 8 boards by 1912, 
and the value of those still in existence as reflectors of the true 
• In 1913 New York City receipts of cheese showed a materia l shrinkage, 
partially due to "the growing tendency of many out of town buyers to go 
directly to primary producing points for cheese, r a ther than, as heretofore, 
to New York City dealers" ( 51). 
10 So called beca use of the blackboa rd upon which offerings of cheese are 
placed and bids entered at the weekly meetings. 
11 Cf. federa l trade commission (61a): 'Before 1911 there was competi-
tion on the board as a rule, though it was not always as keen as it should 
h a ve been. Beginning in 1911 the packers bega n to dominate the board, either 
through their own men or through r epresenta tives of other companies which 
they controlled." 
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market value of cheese was already being seriously questioned 
(65). In New York State there were still several so-called boards, 
but attempts to establish call boards in New York failed because a 
few large dealers were in control. The boards were a mere for-
mality. Buyers and sellers met once a week to bargain individ-
ually for cheese offered. At the close of private deals, the buyers 
reported to the secretary of the board the amount exchanged and 
the price paid. The great bulk of the cheese was purchased by 
annual "contract" on the basis of this price-usually at lti cent 
above it-and "the probability [was] that buyers understate [d) 
to the secretary actual prices paid" (50). 
SUMMARY 
In 1918 the four largest meat-packers were the only large-scale 
distributors of cheese. Armour, Swift, Cudahy and Wilson to-
gether handled 48.5 percent of the nation's cheese, practically 
all of it moving direct to retail channels. The two leading mar-
keting cooperatives, although showing healthy growth, together 
handled only 3.5 percent, most of which was sold to the packers 
or regular terminal wholesale outlets rather than direct to whole-
sale grocers or retail stores. The rapidly growing chain store or-
ganizations still depended almost altogether on regular wholesale 
channels. Neither the Kraft nor the Phenix cheese company had 
yet reached a position of importance. About one-half of the coun-
try's cheese probably still moved through independent terminal 
wholesalers and wholesale grocers to retailers. The price was 
commonly based on the quotations established on the small num· 
ber of call boards in Wisconsin and New York State. The cry of 
a cheese monopoly already was being raised-chiefly against the 
meat-packers-and the practices of the dealers operating on the 
cheese boards were such as to cast reflections on their accuracy as 
true barometers of cheese prices. Such was the marketing picture 
in 1918.12 
II. DEVELOPMENTS OF 1921-26 
"Toasted cheese hath no rnaster." 
-Old English Proverb (80b). 
The most important development in cheese marketing in the 
immediate post-war period was the beginning of the rise 
to popularity of packaged processed cheese. This is so clearly 
brought out in the annual summaries of the cheese trade appear· 
'" In 1918 it was reported that "the passing of the free lunch reduced the 
domestic consumption" of cheese during the year (85). The Eighteenth 
Amendment thus. surprisingly enough, had its repercussions on cheese-an 
interesting example of a complementary relationship between this dairy prod-
uct and alcoholic liquor, in spite of the much-heralded competition between 
"milk and beer" for the working man's wages. This may explain the ven-
tures of the well-known brewing company, Pabst, into cheese during the 
'twenties or before. 
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ing in the annual reports of the New York Chamber of Com-
merce between 1921 and 1925 that selections from these sum-
maries are here presented at some length (my italics). 
"A feature of the cheese trade of 1921 worth special mention 
was the large increase in the business in so-called' process' cheese, 
that is, American cheese put through a process of grinding and 
heating and then put out in small sized (usually 5 pound) pack-
ages. These processed cheeses, known variously as sandwich 
cheese, loaf cheese, etc. found a very large place in the distri-
buting trade during 1921, and we believe that they generally 
tended to increase the consumption of cheese in this country. 
The~r large we had an unfavorable influence on st~ch of the 
smaller styles as young Americans, and they hurt, to some extent, 
the demand for all styles of American Cheddar Cheese in original 
condition. But since each package of process cheese represented 
an equal weight of original American Cheddar cheese, their large 
sale broadened the demand for American cheese as a whole" 
(73a ) . 
In 1922 "American buyers, because of a favorable price dif-
ference, ... purchased large quantities of Canadian stock ... for 
[American] consumption. Most of this was bought by the manu-
facturers of 5-pound loaves, who found in the Canadian cheese a 
product excellently suited for their needs .... Several of the 
large chain-stm'e companies in the leading mar'kets made a specu-
lative drive on cheese, keeping retail prices wry close to whole-
sale values. This, with the growing demand for the 5-pound 
loaves, favored a big movement" (73b). 
" There were further changes in the New York cheese trade 
during .... 1923. Some of the large chain-store buyer's discon-
tinued or reduced their purchases on this ?narket, going direct 
to the producing sections for their supplies. TltIC?'e was a fudher 
material expamsr:on in the business of the prepared loaf cheese 
manufacttwC1's, and this also materially curtailed the wholesale 
business in bulk American cheese in New York City. Total 
receipts for the year showed practically no decrease compared 
with 1922, but a larger proportion of our receipts went directly 
to the prepa?;ed cheese manufacturers and the actual quantitll 
handled by regt~lar dealers was probably lighter . . . . [Again] 
some Canadian Cheddar cheese [was important], most of these 
going to the grinders [processors] " (73c). 
During 1924 "the New York trade in American cheese . .. . 
continued to feel th,e effects of the constant expansion in the 5-
pound prepared loaf business. During [this year] more and 
more manufacturers of these prepared loaves came into the 
field, widely advertising their product and pushing it into trad" 
channels customarily using nothing but the bulk cheese. As a re-
sult our dealers in normal American cheese found the demand 
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graduaZZy reducing and our' receipts fO?' the year in consequenc3 
showed some further' decline. 
"Another feature of the 1924 trade was a consistently increased 
demand fO?' m~red cheese. The prepared loaf manufacturers are 
giving cured stock increased preference and most of these distri·· 
butors seem to insist more generally on the well-matured prod-
uct" (73d). 
In 1925 "N ew York City's trade in American cheese ... con-
tinued to shrink . . . because of the . . . prepared 5-pound 
loaves. The number of manufacturers of these prepared cheeses 
increased further during [this year], and N ew York Oity' s r'e -
ceipts of bt~lk goods showed a fuTther decrease. . 'Vis con-
sin cheese made up considerably more than half of New York 
City's total receipts. 'l'he tendency has been towar'd the smaller 
types of do?nestic cheese and Daisies have been getting a larger 
and larger preference each year in this market, while the former 
preference for flat shapes has been less and less in evidence. . . . 
New York City's trade, as a whole, is showing a stronger pref-
m'ence each year for well cured, bulk cheese." Since" loaf 
r cheese ] manufacturers find it neeessary to use a fairly large pro-
portion of cured stock," a considerable increase in total holdings 
at the end of 1925 over the beginning did not prevent a "gener-
ally confident holding of good qualities and there was no dispo-
sition to force stocks on the market since most owners believed 
that the excess was altogether in the hands of grinders who 
would require a larger supply of cured cheese during 1926" 
(73e) , 
These annual trade reports for 1921-25 bring out clearly the im-
portance of the expansion of the processed cheese business among 
the developments of the immediate post-war period. The chief ef-
fects of this new form of cheese, alrp.ady noticeable, may be sum-
marized as (a) a trend away from American cheese destined for 
consumption in original (unprocessed) condition; (b) a result-
ing trend toward direct movement of cheese to processors rather 
than through the old-line terminal bulk-cheese wholesalers; (c) 
an increasing demand for better cured stock for processing with 
an increase in the normal volume in storage as a result;'3 (d) a 
trend toward smaller types of bulk cheese, which, though unfavor-
ably hit by the new product, were better adapted to compete 
with the (largely 5-pound) processed loaves than were the larger 
types. 
The other important development of the early 'twenties brought 
out by these trade reports was the ever-increasing importance of 
the chain stores, resulting in (a) a narrowing of the margin be-
,. '~' hu s Kraft was advertising in 1924 (35b): "Give it Tirne to Cure . . 
[U .S.] cheese is put on the market too soon after it is made. It. would . . . 
greatly . . . benefit the cheese industry as a whole if factories and dealers 
would prevent this by seeing that their product is properly cured before it is 
offered for sale." 
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tween the wholesale and retail prices of cheese, and (b) a marked 
tendency for the chains to discontinue or curtail their cheese 
purchases from the old-line terminal wholesalers, "going direct 
to the producing sections for their supplies." Thus the Great 
Atlantic & Pacific Tea Company, which expanded its number 
of stores from 650 to 9,303 between 1915 and 1924, announced 
in 1924 "the opening of a cheese assembling and storage house 
at Green Bay, Wisconsin. Shipments will be secured direct from 
Wisconsin fact01'ies and forwarded to all western warehouses 
supplying the A. & P. stores with Wisconsin cheese. No switch 
from New York to Wisconsin cheese is contemplated in the east 
and the warehousing and distributing facilities at Cuba, New 
York . .. which supplies the eastern A. & P. stores with 
State cheese, will be continued" (4a) . 
In 1925 this same chain-store organization announced that 
"another 5-pound prepared loaf cheese has joined the rapidly 
growing family. It is being put out by Atlantic & Pacific Tea 
Company at Cuba, N. Y., under the Picadilly brand. It is a 
heated loaf and will be distributed through the A. & P. stores" 
(4b). By 1926 A. &. P. had 14,000 stores. Between 1915 and 
1926 the Kroger chain increased from 198 to 3,400 stores. By 
1926 Piggly Wiggly had 2,000 stores, First National 1,650, and 
American Stores 1,800 (2a). 
The importance of the chain stores and other new direct-
buyers in raising farmers' cheese prices and lowering middle-
men's margins were recognized by the manager of the Wiscon-
sin Cheese Producers' Federation, when he said: " Competi-
tion for cheese is continually becoming keener. New assemblers, 
some of them old operators in the East, are entm"ing this ten"i-
t01>y. Within the year a big chain stoTe system has opened an. 
assembling branch. This competition is causing the dealers to 
pay more liberally than ever before. The competition for cheese 
on the cheese boards frequently results in top-heavy prices which 
means selling on narrower margins" (16). 
A correspondent of the New York Produce Review in the lat-
ter part of 1924 summarized the situation (my italics): " There 
is no question that loaf cheese has played havoc with the retail 
demand for so-called bulk-cheese in the United States. However, 
more and more manufacturers are getting into that end of the 
business, most of them well capitalized and representing large 
interests. Competition in loaves has grown keener and keener 
and undoubtedly . . " [processors'] margin of profit has been 
reduced. The only opportunity now for profitable de-
velopment of such a line lies either in starting on a very limited 
experimental scale and building as returns permit, 01' entering 
the business with la?"ge capital afte?' having proctwed the ?'ights 
to a process which not only gives a popula?" product btd which 
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does not inf1'inge any of the patents under which loaves are now 
being made, 
"Patent rights on the processes under which the Kraft and 
Phenix interests manufacture are held by these concerns, and 
they do not recognize the right of a number of others to use the· 
'cooked cheese '. methods that are now being used. At least one 
[infringement] suit . . . is pending in the courts today. 
"The cooked loaf has the advantage of better keeping quali-
ties than most of the so-called 'natural' loaves that have been 
brought out, though the latter are in some cases being very suc-
cessfully marketed, either ground or unground. B1d to ma1'ket 
loaves on a large scale, either cooked or uncooked, the investment 
necessa1'y is large and the profits modest" (35c). 
Thus the sharp trend toward processed cheese had brought 
a considerable number of manufacturers into the field, although 
the status of the patents on the process-and what constituted 
infringement-were still in doubt. Other manufacturers were 
putting out an uncooked loaf, which had the same advantages of 
small size and style of packaging as the patented pasteurized 
loaf, although its keeping quality was inferior. As the result 
of this competition, the margin of profit had been reduced and 
the costs of entry into the processing business were apparently be· 
ginning to loom large enough to discourage further investment. 
In 1924 four well-known cheese firms-A. H. Barber, A. D. 
Deland, J. H. Whalen and Winnebago Cheese Company-com-
bined to form the Brookshire Cheese Company for the purpose 
of manufacturing 5-pound loaves by their own method and 
patented machinery (35d)14-"a method by which the fine 
bulk cheese is prepared and pasteurized in about 30 seconds as 
against the usual 30 to 45 minutes. That is a vitally impor-
tant factor in preserving the quality, the natural fine flavor and 
the full food value of the cheese" (35e). In June, 1926, the 
company's name was changed to Lakeshire Cheese Company. 
"Within the comparatively short period of three years [Lake-
shire] Cheese Company has developed the sale of its products 
from nothing to a volume representing many millions of dollars 
annually, almost entirely through the medium of trade journal 
and direct-mail advertising-a remarkable growth" (35f). 
By 1924 Kraft Cheese Company was advertising that "85 
percent of all grocers and delicatessens in the United States are 
selling Kraft cheese. They are selling more Kraft Cheese than 
all other brands combined. .. it is one of the best adver-
tised food products on the market and the only nationally ad-
vertised cheese in America" (35g). Between 1919 and 1926 
Kraft's sales expanded from 2.0 to 36.7 million dollars and its 
H Ci. appendix A. p. 141. 
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capitalization from $25,000 to $10,000,000 or more. During this 
period a number of important subsidiaries had been acquired 
(40a). Kraft made heavy use of colored advertisements and at-
tributed its rapid expansion to mass selling as a concomitant to 
mass production. By 1926 it was estimated that 25 percent of 
the country's cheese was processed and retailed as package cheese 
(38). However, Census data (appendix table 8) available for 
1929 and later years indicate that this estimate was much too high 
for that time. Kraft enjoyed a large share of this newly-devel-
oped business. 
By 1922 Phenix Cheese Company had a capitalization of 
$1,500,000, and was selling not only "Philadelphia Cream" 
cheese but also bulle cheddar and imported cheeses, and butter 
and eggs, largely on a jobbing basis. Between 1924 and 1927 
Phenix expanded extensively its manufacturing and distributing 
activities. Additional plants were established or acquired in Wis-
consin, and operating divisions were set up in the Pacific and 
southeastern states and in Canada (through which European mar-
kets were served). Pasteurized and blended cheese now held a 
position of coordinate importance with Phenix's former spe-
cialty, cream cheese. A subsidiary, Sheboygan Cheese Company, 
was manufacturing and selling processed cheese under its own 
brands as well as packing private brands for others (36a). 
In the early 1925 the Review reported that "Horace Davis, 
one of the leading cheese dealers of Plymouth, Wisconsin, . . . 
has inaugurated an interesting innovation in the cheese trade in 
offering to put up package cheese under the buyer's label, a plan 
of operation . . . long . . . followed in the canned goods 
and canned milk trade, but . . . never before . . . in the 
cheese trade. Under this plan wholesale grocers and jobbers 01' 
large retail buyers have [the] opportunity to secure package 
cheese carrying their own special brand" (35h). As we shall 
see, this practice became increasingly important during following 
years, as the concentration of patent rights took place. 
The meat-packers as well as the regular cheese companies were 
meanwhile turning to packaged processed cheese. Cudahy rec-
ognized the trend by noting in 1926 that" in spite of proposed 
legislation unfavorable to loaf cheese manufacture, no laws in-
imical to the business have been enacted and notable progress in 
manufacture and distribution has been achieved" (18a). Ac-
cording to this meat-packer, "the tendency to market the product 
in the branded loaf and package varieties . . . was especially 
marked during 1926. The [increasing] per capita consump-
tion of cheese. . is accounted for largely by the develop-
ment of the various advertised brands and the convenient and 
economical packages in which the product is offered to the con-
sumer" (18b). Swift and Company noted in 1926 that "the 
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most important recent development of package goods is in the 
handling of cheese. Except for fancy cheeses which have been 
sold in individual packages of odd shapes, little cheese has been 
[so] handled until within the last five years . . . Swift and 
Company has made a specialty of selling Brookfield cheese . . . 
in half-pound packages and the demand for [it] . . . is grow-
ing by leaps and bounds " (24) . 
Between 1918 and 1926, the Wisconsin Cheese Producers' Fed-
eration expanded nearly four-fold, selling 33.6 million pounds 
of cheese or 10 percent of American cheese production (7.9 per-
cent of total cheese production ) in the latter year . During the 
same period the number of member factories had increased from 
about 65 to 225. In 1925 the Federation had 12 district ware-
houses, and was selling two brands-" Mello Creme" and" Fed-
eration. " In 1923 the Federation made a marked change in 
policy, recognizing "the permanent place and increasing impor-
tance of the large packers. . Each large packer has a dis-
tributive organization and trade contacts that could be dupli-
cated only after years of effort, and it would be folly 
for any organization handling only cheese to attempt to dupli-
cate it. Therefore, a sound marketing policy will try to build 
up goodwill with the packers rather than antagonize them. 
" The chain-stores are also recognized as having become im-
portant distributive factors, whose purchasing departments, like 
the packers' regional warehouses, are displacing the old-time 
wholesale grocers" (lab) . Since" the demand for package 
cheese [was] increasing rapidly, a dealer [had] now 
to be able to supply package cheese in order to sell bulk cheese. " 
Hence, the Federation, prevented from entering the processing 
business by patents, was forced to remain largely a mere assem-
bler of bulk cheese. Packers, chain stores, and processors were 
its chief outlets, although a large number of wholesale grocers 
were buying in relatively small (often I.c.i. ) amounts, many 
directly through the Federation 's own sales staff. A larger pro-
portion of these wholesale grocers, however, were buying from 
brokers to whom the Federation consigned cheese in carload lots. 
In 1926 a court decision was laid down restraining " the cheese 
federation from infringing upon . . . patents covering a cm'-
tain method of making uncooked loaf cheese." For some time 
the Federation had been paying a royalty of 1 cent a pound on 
cheese made by the formula and machinery of the Popper Com-
pany. As its output of this product increased, the Federation 
began using machinery other than that which the Popper Com-
pany had put on the market, and the case was brought into 
court "partly to test the validity of the patents involved." A:,; 
a result of the decision the Federation had to pay back royalties 
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and costs (14a) .'5 Thus the fj'ee use of a process of producing 
even uncooked loaves was denied the Federation. 
Tillamook of Oregon was selling 7.5 million pounds of cheese 
in 1926 (a 50 percent gain over 1918), chiefly through the jobbing 
trade or brokers in the leading California and Washington cities. 
Tillamook had no exclusive sales agencies, but sold to all jobbers 
having the required financial standing. Between 1918 and 1926 
the Tillamook price averaged 6 cents more than the Wisconsin 
price, partly a reflection of the freight charges on eastern 
cheese. During this period the cooperative's brand name was 
advertised extensively in the newspapers of the siX: largest Pacific 
Coast cities (12). Wholesale and storage expenses were elim-
inated by making direct shipments to the markets from the 
cheese factory. . 
A third producers' cheese agency of some importance was 
formed in 1920-21 in St. Lawrence County, New York, when 
seven local cooperative associations were formed, one of their 
number acting as sales agent for the others. Early in 1924, 17 
more local associations joined the original group in organizing a 
central sales agency. The local associations contracted with the 
owners of local factories to manufacture cheese at so much a 
pound. The product was the property of the local and was 
turned over to the central association for sale. In 1925, an ex-
perienced salesman was hired to manage the agency. Repre-
sentation at the Gouverneur Cheese Board was obtained. This 
cooperative agency was handling 2.9 million pounds of cheese in 
1926. Because of the quality of product and the volume of busi-
ness, the association " had a very favorable effect on northern 
New York cheesel prices" (67b). 
These three cooperative agencies were selling 13 percent of 
American cheddar cheese (10.3 percent of total domestic cheese 
production) in 1926. 
A bill was submitted to the Wisconsin legislature in 1925, seek-
ing to impose certain branding requirements and a tax of 3 
cents a pound on processed cheese.' 6 In its editorial column, the 
New York Produce Review stated th'1t it "can see no possible jus-
tification for the belief that the loaf cheese business has injured 
the [cheese] industry. . . . Its development has been a direct 
benefit to the dairyman and a factor in stimulating a larger do-
mestic use for cheese. The statements concerning the unwhole-
someness . . . of prepared cheese have . . . no foundation 
in fact. . We put little credence in the claim that the 
16 For a description of the Popper patent as well as of those of Kraft, 
Phenix, et al., see appendix A. 
16 In February. 1925. Green County (Wisconsin) farmers met to "consider 
the possibility of curbing what was called the 'exploitation of the natural 
c heese' by the prepared loaf cheese manufacturers . . . a r esolution was 
passed . . . [to] 'force it to t ake its rightful place under t ax and la bel''' 
(74b). 
66 
, grinders' are less discriminating buyers than the bulk cheese 
buyers. Our observation has been that with increasing compe-
tition in the industry the effort has been to purchase for loaf use 
a finer and finer bulk cheese, the tendency being toward a larger 
and larger use of fancy cured cheese for this purpose. 
There is no evidence that the development of the loaf cheese 
business has had a depressing influence upon cheese values. 
"We look upon the prepared loaf industry as a legitimate in-
dustry, adding to the forces at work up building the cheese busi-
ness of the United States, increasing competition for bulk cheese, 
and increasing the milk producers' profits. As long as the loaf 
cheese is made from wholesome whole-milk cheese, and meets our 
prevailing composition standards as to butterfat and moisture, 
it seems ridiculous to talk of compulsory branding and taxa-
tion" (74c). 
A later editorial viewed it unreasonable "to put the product 
[processed cheese] in the same class as process [renovated] but-
ter, oleo and filled milk. . . . The so-called 'processing' of the 
prepared loaf, the shredding, heating, and blending of the cheese 
is carried out to make a uniform product of superior keeping 
quality which will meet popular taste. There is no question of 
covering up inferiority, renovation, or deception involved" 
(74d) . 
The manager of the Wisconsin Cheese Producers' Federation, 
however, stated that" the cooking process . . . makes possi-
ble the utilization of some indifferent quality product. Cooking 
can be made to cover a multitude of cheese sins. While unques-
tionably some manufacturers are guarding their quality with 
jealousy, others are not so careful" (77). Although it was his 
opinion that the "processed article [is] admittedly inferior in 
quality and palatability to the best straight-from-the-vat 
cheese, " he recognized that" th e merchandising la ti tude and 
convenience of the product in process form. . appeals es· 
pecially to the small grocer and the eating stand operator, 
replacing . . . [bulk cheese] in thousands of places of busi-
ness. Its convenient shape and size and ability to slice without 
waste bespeak its favor with the little grocer and the sandwich 
man. This has resulted in many wholesale grocers practically 
discontinuing the handling of bulk styles, while others who 
[once] handled scores of carloads now buy but a very few car-
loads annually." 
What were the important factors leading to the rise in popu-
larity of processed cheese? Packaging cheese was part of a 
wider trend toward packaging all food products. There was an 
increased demand for food free from contamination during stor-
age and distribution. Furthermore, apartment living was chang-
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ing family habits from larger bulk purchases to more frequent 
purchases in small quantities. 
The grocer also favored packaged goods, since his losses on 
overweight were less and time was saved in waiting on custom· 
ers. Since bulk cheese often "huffed up" or molded in the 
summer, many groceries in the central and southern states re-
fused to handle it during warm weather. Cheese in foil-covered 
loaves packed in tight boxes remedies these conditions in spite 
of poor refrigeration. Unlike bulk cheese which dried up, 
cracked and crumbled, causing waste to both dealer and consum-
er, packaged cheese was not exposed to the air in the retail 
store, and the consumer could keep it without deterioration for 
a considerable time (75) . 
From the manufacturer's standpoint packaged cheese lent it-
self for the first time to extensive product differentiation through 
style of package, branding and advertising. 
The result of this trend was to make a large part of bulk 
cheese a raw material for the processor rather than a consumers' 
good, removing the local factory even farther from the consumer. 
The widespread acceptance of processed cheese during the 
early 'twenties, in spite of what was often a rather pasty body 
and cooked flavor, is to a large degree a testimony of the hope-
lessly inefficient marketing of bulk cheese at that time. Manu-
factured in hundreds of small crossroad factories, the bulk cheese 
was largely thrown on the market in a "green" state, because 
local organizations could not afford to hold it until-it was prop-
erly cured. As a result, it frequently reached the consumer in 
a tasteless, rubbery condition.· On the other hand, if an en-
deavor to cure it was made, it seemed-especially in contrast-
too strong. All in all, it was extremely lacking in uniformity. 
Processed cheese, however, made by a careful blending of cured 
and green cheeses (76)/7 was a uniform product, further suited 
to the American consumer's taste since pasteurization or cooking 
nearly always arrested further bacterial action, an assurance 
ngainst strong cheese. 
One interesting result of the increased use of cheese for process-
ing was that there was again a demand for large-sized cheeses for 
"grinding" purposes. Forty years earlier most factories had. 
made the larger size twin and cheddars but in later years they 
had turned to smaller styles such as daisies, young Americas, and 
10- and 5-pound prints. However, between 1920 and 1925, the 
processors began to demand larger cheeses again, because there 
was less loss when they were stripped and cleaned for' , grinding' , 
17 A typical blend might con s is t of 40-50 percent of mild-flavored medium-
aged c h eese. 10 percent of high-flavored old cheese, a nd the remaining 40- 50 
percent younger cheese (76). 
68 
(75). For cheese intended to reach the consumer in bulk, the 
smaller styles were still in demand. 
The continued expansion of the processed cheese business, as 
we have seen, brought a standardized product, easily adapted to 
packaging, branding and advertising, instead of a bulk product 
notoriously variable in grade, flavor, color and character of 
texture and body. 
One natural result was the elimination of the need for the 
terminal wholesaler's and wholesale grocer's once-vital functions 
of grading and standardization, reinspection and reselection, in-
sofar as processed cheese replaced bulk cheese in final consump-
. tion. Another result was that more direct buying by the large 
processors through their own subsidiaries was favored at the ex-
pense of independent assembling dealers and terminal whole-
salers. 
As the chain stores grew large they tended to buy direct from 
primary points, grade their purchases, and move the cheese 
direct to their chain stores, diverting large volumes destined for 
consumption in bulk form from t.he old-line wholesale chan-
nels. However, the rapidly increasing demand for processed 
cheese prevented the chain stores from integrating backward 
toward the local factory to the extent they probably would have 
done had processed cheese never developed. Since the chains had 
to depend on processors for their supply of processed cheese or 
enter the processing business themselves, and, since possible vol-
ume was thus cut down, they depended more upon processors and 
packers for their bulk supply than they would have otherwise 
done. The development of marketing cooperatives added to 
the pressure on wholesale channels, especially upon the country 
dealers whose place they took. Finally, the meat-packers' vol-
ume of cheese continued to expand, moving through their well-
integrated, direct channels. 
'Vhile a considerable amount of processed cheese was still 
moving through the terminal wholesalers and wholesale grocers 
in 1926-since none of the processors had yet attained large 
volume-it was only a matter of time before the desire to 
"push" their branded products exclusively brought more direct 
distribution on the part of the processors. 
Faced with a declining volume of cheese, the wholesalers, 
many of whom dealt in butter as well, were already suffering 
during this period from the marked tendency toward direct dis-
tribution of butter-a development which (except for the pack-
ers) preceded that of cheese by several years. In general, the 
same forces were responsible for the tendency toward more direct 
distribution of both butter (53a) and cheese, a tendency acceler-
ated by the possibility of using the same integrated facilities for 
both products. 
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These pressures brought a "tendency toward reduction in 
the number of wholesale receivers "-either through combina-
tion or business failure (52a) . The leading trade journal ex-
pressed the view in 1926 that the unprofitability of the whole-
sale trade was" the result of an undue competition to hold in 
the general wholesale market standardized goods which are fit 
for more direct outlets" (52b). A survey of the trade journals 
of this period reveals that the middle 'twenties were marked 
by reports of failures of a number of (often well-known) 
wholesale houses and consolidations of other long-established, 
substantial firms. 
In 1926 only four cheese boards were left in the United States, 
the Wisconsin Cheese Exchange and the Farmers Call Board, 
both at Plymouth, Wisconsin, and the Gouverneur Dairy Board 
and the Watertown Produce Exchange in New York State. 
The last two were relatively inactive as cheese boards (59a).18 
The two Wisconsin boards were all that remained of the 12 
boards in existence in that state in 1912. In fact, the Farmers' 
Call Board was not organized until 1921, purportedly at the in-
stance of farmers dissatisfied with the Wisconsin Cheese Ex-
change, on which they had never been represented. The Board, 
however, had factory representatives as regular members and 
cheese dealers as "buying" members, who might attend the 
meetings and bid on the offerings and purchase cheese but had 
no vote. This board met each Friday afternoon immediately 
after the Wisconsin Cheese Exchange. Members of the Ex-
change, made up chiefly of cheese dealers, held" buyer's mem-
berships" on the Farmer's Call Board. 
The federal trade commission reported in 1928, however, 
that "it is obvious that neither cheese board really 
functions as a market for surplus cheese. Nor are the prices 
established on them determined in a process of competitive 
bidding, for with rare exceptions, each offered lot receives one 
bid and only one bid" (61b). In fact, it has been said that 
"the dealers· and not the farmers conceived the idea of the or-
ganization of the board in the first place, and certain farmers 
lent their names, then and since. The Farmer's Call 
Board was organized to meet the growing dissatisfaction by 
producers with prices fixed by the dealers between themselves 
in their own organization, the [Wisconsin] Cheese Exchange, 
and to make it appear that the farmers had set up their own 
market to which the dealers have to go to get their cheese. 
The fraud of the name of the board is aggravated by its pre-
tended farmer operation and control and by the insistence of 
the dealers that it is in fact a farmers' organization, and the 
18 This reference contains a good discussion of country cheese boards. 
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persistent representation and advertisement of it as such. 
The prices follow quite faithfully the base price fixed between 
dealers on their own exchange each week, just an hour earlier" 
(62a) .19 
The leading trade journal had many editorials on the call 
boards during the early 'twenties. In 1924 it expressed the 
opinion that "neither New York state nor Wisconsin needs 
more country cheese boards, but we believe that in each state 
there is need of improvement in those now functioning, and 
need of more direct interest in them by the cheese factories 
selling their product on the basis of the ruling Board prices 
It is in the interest of every factory contracting its 
make to support country boards used as a contract basis by 
offering at least a part of their make there for sale. These 
offerings will attract buyers and will promote a fair 
and comprehensive reflection of the current value of cheese. 
"In [northern] New York State ... there is still room 
for one good live call board . . . so operated that the ruling 
prices represent facts and not, as has sometimes been the case, 
pure fiction " (64a). 
The Gouverneur Dairy Board in New York established price 
quotations, not by the Wisconsin boards' system of bids and 
offers but by a committee of two buyers and three factory sales-
men who met and decided what the prevailing price should be. 
Disagreements frequently arose demonstrating "the difficuty 
of reaching a sound conclusion as to prices when there is noth-
ing more definite to tie to than the vote of a committee." The 
Review felt that "values are best developed by a definite ex-
pression of willingness to buy and willingness to sell and the 
call board is the logical medium for this expression. [In spite 
of much criticism], the prices [the Plymouth] boards develop 
are based on actual sales, and clearly express the willingness of 
competing manufacturers or dealers to buy or sell" (64b). 
During 1924 the two Wisconsin boards sold 8.7 million pounds 
of cheese or 2.5 percent of Wisconsin's American cheese in that 
year. ' 'In terms of percentage of the State's total output, 
this amount may seem insignificant, but it is large enough to 
give a very clear picture of the basic figures at which buyers 
and sellers of the unsold or uncontracted surplus are willing to 
meet" (64c). 
Several quotations were being used as a contract basis in the 
east, among them" . . . the ruling prices on twins announced 
by the Gouverneur and Watertown boards and the quotation for 
'average run' New York State flats as issued in New York City by 
l' Quoting s tatem ent of Fred M. Wylie, D eputy Attorney General of Wis-
consin (19 32). 
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Urner-Barry. Formerly the New York City quotation 
was based on a relativcly large volume of business, since this 
market received a large share of the State's make." But this 
volume had dwindled because of an expanding demand for mar-
ket milk and "heavier di1'ect contracting by int61'ests formerly 
buying in this market." 
, 'In view of this tendency the question of the suitability 
of [this] quotation as a . .. basis of contract again arises. 
It is certain to be based on a diminishing volume of trading 
whereas the local quotation for Wisconsin Daisies is as certain 
to find a broadening volume of business for its foundation. 
Selling or buying State cheese on the basis of a Wisconsin 
quotation may appeal to neither seller nor buyer, but if recent 
tendencies continue, the change seems logical if New York City 
quotations are to be used. 
"The alternatives are the price rulings of our up-State 
boards, which certainly could with advantage be more gener-
ally used if the machinery is provided in the form of open calls, 
to make their rulings a fair reflection of prevailing values" 
(64d) . 
Thus the value of the single important terminal-market quo-
tation was being questioned by its makers, the Urner-Barry 
Company, because of the very great declines in trading in New 
York as direct contracting by dealers and chain stores diverteo 
more and more cheese from the New York market. 
SUMMARY 
The years 1921-26 saw the beginning of the rise of processed 
cheese to a position of importance. As consumption shifted 
from bulk cheese to various forms of packaged loaves, the 
original cheese moved in ever-growing quantities direct to 
large processors rather than through the old-line wholesalc 
channels which had previously been important. Better cured-
stock was reported to be in strong demand by processors. The 
smaller types of bulk cheese gained favor over larger types as 
competitors of the new product. By 1926 the percentage of 
the nation's cheese reaching the consumer in processed form was 
assuming significant proportions. 
Chain-store organizations were growing rapidly and helped 
to bring about a narrower margin between wholesale and retail 
prices. Some of the chains, as they attained great size, began 
to discontinue or curtail their purchases of cheese from old-
line wholesalers, going directly to the producing areas for their 
supplies and setting up their own direct-buying departments. 
The increasing importance of processed cheese, however, prob-
ably prevented this type of integration from proceeding as far 
as it would have had processed cheese not developed. The re-
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sult was that the chains still depended a great deal upon 
processors and packers for their supplies. 
The marked trend toward processed cheese brought a num-
ber of processors into the field, the status of the patents on the 
process still being in doubt. This relatively competitive situa-
tion was serving to reduce the margin of profit and discourage 
further entry. Kraft Cheese Company and Phenix Cheese Com-
pany were the chief contestants in the race for supremacy, both 
companies showing remarkable growth between 1918 and 1926. 
The leading meat-packers were also beginning to recognize the 
opportunities in packaging and branding their cheeses. 
The two main cooperative marketing agencies had shown 
marked growth by 1926. Neither performed many functions 
beyond the assembling stage, however. The large Wisconsin 
federation found its chief outlets among the large-scale pack-
ers, processors and chain stores. The cooperatives were handi-
capped by the trend toward processed cheese, since the uncer-
tainty of the patent situation and inadequate financial facilities 
kept them out of this promising field. Three marketing coop-
eratives, including a new one formed in New York in 1921, 
handled 10.3 percent of the nation's cheese in 1926. 
Processed cheese was successful in establishing itself because 
of the general trend toward packaging and smaller purchases 
of food products, the greater economy of handling in the retail 
store, its better keeping quality and its merchandising possi-
bilities in the form of packaging, branding and advertising. 
The old-line wholesalers, already facing great difficulties as a 
result of declining volumes of butter, were beginning to feel 
additional pressure due to the similar marked trend toward 
direct-buying of cheese, especially by the processors and chain 
stores. In the sale of bulk cheese, chain stores were now divert-
ing large amounts from the old wholesale channels, which had 
always been of considerable importance to the independent 
retail trade. Processed cheese still moved to an important 
extent through wholesalers, although the development of a 
standardized, branded product foretold the decreasing need 
for the wholesalers' once-vital functions of grading, standardi-
zation and reselection. The result of these forces, in both but-
ter and cheese, was the reduction in the number of wholesale 
houses. 
The price was still based on call-board quotations, of which 
only four were made in 1926, compared with 12 in 1912. Opinions 
on the validity of the Wisconsin quotations differed, but the 
quotations of the" committees" on the two New York boards 
were generally questioned. Declining wholesale receipts of 
cheese at New York City were forcing Urner-Barry to ques-
tion its quotation on New York State cheese. 
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III. PAT'ENTS, MERGER AND CONSOLIDATION: 1927-30 
"So econornists observe, a firm 
Has larger finns that on it prey; 
And these firms have larger still to bite 'em, 
And so proceed, ad infinitum.""o 
----{Lfter Jonathan Swift. 
We have already noted that more and more cheese companies 
were going into the processed-cheese business during the early 
'twenties and that the competition was apparently leading 
toward a wtrrower margin. Certain questions of patent in-
fringements and patent rights on processing cheese were soon 
to be raised. These questions came to a head in 1927. 
In that year Kraft was very successful in establishing that 
competitors were infringing the patents which it held. 
In March the press reported that : 
"[the] Judge . . . of the U. S. District Court for the Eastern 
District of Wisconsin filed his decision in the case of the 
Kraft Cheese Company vs. Pabst Corporation, February 23, 1927. This 
decision of 35 pages sustaining the patents owned by the Kraft Cheese 
Company, covering the sterilization, pasteurizing, and packaging of 
cheese as employed by the Kraft Cheese Company finds the Pabst Cor· 
poration guilty of infringement of all of the patents. 
"The next step in a case of this kind is for the owner of the patents 
to be granted an injunction and an accounting of all profits made by 
the defendant, unless the defendant corporation files bonds covering the 
possible amount of the damages and appeals the case .... There is a 
probability that [,p<Lbst] may elect to continue manuf'acture under' a 
royalty agreement. The case was submitted to the Judge in October 
1925. 
"The inventions covered by the patents have become of great im-
portance in the cheese industry since the time of their initial appli-
cation and at the present time probably one-fourth [ estimat e prob'ably 
too high] of aN the cheese produced in the United States is pasteurized, 
repackaged, and so ld in for'Yns w hich corne under the patents. Many 
firms Of various sizes are affected by the decision as there has been in the 
last two or three years widt'~pread infringement. The Kraft Cheese Com· 
pany has cases pending against Swift Packing Company in Chicago and 
the Shefford Cheese Company in New York. . . . 
"The Phenix Cheese Company, one of the early pioneers in the field, 
is not adversely affected by the decision, in fact it is understood that 
Pheni.v is equally benefitted by the sustaining' of the patents. Others 
that are not affected by virtue of their manufa;cturing arrangements 
are Lakeshire Cheese Co .. F. X. Baumert and Company, and certain of 
the large packers" (7 4e) (italics added). 
20 Parody on poe m concerning "a flea" (80c). 
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In September the suit ,for patent infringements brought 
against Swift and Company by Kraft and Phenix was amicably 
settled without trial. "Swift and Company will continue the 
manufacture of the pasteurized loaf under a royalty working 
agreement with the two owners of the basic patents" (74f). 
Swift's willingness to settle out of court was no doubt based to 
a considerable degree on the decision against Pabst Corporation 
earlier that year. It is believed by some persons well acquainted 
with the cheese industry that this out-of-court settlement may 
have been mutually agreeable to the three large companies in-
volved, since the fact that Swift and Company, with its power-
ful financial resources and competent legal staff, was apparently 
forced to recognize Kraft and Phenix patent rights without a 
court fight was no doubt highly effective in frightening off other 
attempts at "infringement" by the many smaller companies 
which had been entering the processed-cheese business. Whether 
such was the case or not, the Swift settlement no doubt had a pow-
erful effect in this direction. 
" After the issue of the basic patents held by Kraft and Phenix, 
a number of other patents had been granted on virtually the same 
process to several other individuals or corporations. Among 
these were four interrelated patents granted to Swift and Com-
pany on January 6, 1925 (25a).21 In spite of these Swift was 
sued for infringement by Kraft. This possibility is the result of 
certain anomalies of the patent system of the United States, 
which may be summarized from a study by Vaughan as follows: 
"One of the primary functions of the Patent Office, namely, that of 
refusing patents, cannot be properly exercised owing to an insufficient 
force of men in the employment of the Patent Offke. A slight im-
provement or a somewhat different way of accomplishing a particular 
result, may be patented in the United States. Moreover, the typical 
United States patent contains several claims that overlap each other 
conSiderably, and each claim is a permit for a lawsuit. . . . The abili-
. ty to secure patents covering inventions which are slightly distinguish-
able in, the function perf6rmed necessitates 'alternate' or 'blocking' 
patents . . . covering all the ways of accomplishing a particular re-
sult . . . in order to protect the essence of the invention. . . . An 
enormous number of patents, the average one containing several 
claims, whatever the reasons for their existence may be, increases the 
likelihood of litigation. 
"Another cause of litigation is the number of invalid patents. A 
patent covering an ' alleged invention may be invalid because of prior 
public use of which the Patent Office has no record; disclosure in some 
prior patent overlooked by the patent office examiners; or difference 
21 See a ppendix A. 'p. 142. 
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in judgment between the courts and the Patent Office as to whether the 
patented matter is such a departure from what was known to be old 
as to constitute invention. . . . . It is no exaggeration to say that at 
present we have only a one-half examination system; the other one-half 
is mere registration" (91a ). 
"An individual or company may control the basic and pioneer inven-
tion to which an improvement relates. The improvement cannot be 
used legally in conjunction with a patented basic invention without the 
consent of the patentee. In other words, those who improve basic in· 
ventions protected by patents must depend upon the latter in order to 
derive any return from their inventions" (91b). 
"At present one part of the Federal government, the Patent Office, 
grants patents to alleged inventors, whereas another branch of the 
government, the Federal court system, declares many of them invalid. 
In effect, the United States repudiates through its courts its action 
taken through the Patent Office" (91c.). 
From these selections, it may be seen that Swift may have had 
still another reason for settling out of court. Not only did it avoid 
the expenses of extensive litigation, but by recognizing the 
validity of the Kraft patents, Swift made possible the legal use 
of its own patents which were dominated by those of Kraft. 
The outcome of these legal tests was to establish the basic nature 
of the Kraft and Phenix patents. 
Kraft pointed out to its stockholders in March, 1927, that 
" [our] basic patents covering the pasteurization and blending 
of cheese have always been regarded as a valuable asset .... 
although carried on the balance sheet at only one dollar. Dur-
ing the recent flood of infringement and imitation the delays of 
legal procedtwe have prevented the realization of the benefits of 
st~ch patents" (italics mine). The company went on to report 
its current victory in the Pabst case, no doubt anticipating gains 
soon to come (31). In December, Kraft stated that" a substan-
tial revenue will be received this year from royalties" on its 
basic patents (32). 
The three important patents involved were those on the pas-
teurizing process as applied to cheese, on the tinfoil-lined box 
and the continuous process cooker which were held by Kraft, 
Phenix, and the Lakeshire Cheese Company, respectively. These 
patents precluded the entry of other firms without paying 
royalties to these companies" until 1936 or possibly 1942" (72).22 
That Kraft should acquire Phenix- as it did in 1928-seems 
a most natural outcome of the patent situation. With all other 
would-be competitors forced to pay them a royalty on every 
pound of cheese processed, Kraft and Phenix alone (except for 
"2 Lakeshire had successfully withstood a patent suit brought agains t it in 
la t e 1924 by both Kraft and Phenix. Cf. appendix A. 
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Lakeshire) were free from royalty costs. Since each of the 
two held a patent the other needed, it was only logical for them 
to combine their patents to enhance their individual competitive 
advantages. 
The "activities of their respective companies have been united 
through the acquisition by Kraft Cheese Co. of the assets of Phenix 
Cheese Corporation. It is expected that the resulting enlarged 
business will require the continued services of the present personnel 
of both organizations. 
The merger appears to be in the interest of economy in 
operation, bringing the two contpeting' organizations under one man-
agernent, reducing overhead by combining branch plants and bringing 
the patent interest of both under one control. The two interests when 
united will represent a tremendous finan'Cial investment and an enor-
mous volume of business" (35k) (my italics). At about the same 
time Kraft acquired A. E. Wright, "the second largest maker of mayon-
naise . . . in the country" (35l). 
As strong evidence that the monopolistic gains were the pri-
mary consideration in the merger rather than economies of oper-
ation, the following quotation from a prospectus of the newly-
merged corporation is presented (italics added) : 
"Besides the fact that the Kraft Cheese Co. is a pioneer in the indus-
try as it is carried on today, the consolidated organization, which 01 
itself reduces competition, is in a don1inating position through control 
of the, basic patents for pasteurizing and preserving cheese of uniform 
quality. Important court decisions have confirmed this and practically 
all manufacturers usi ng these methods are now operating or will shortly 
be operating under licenses. A substantial revenue will be received by 
the company this year from royalties. The company has placed in ef-
fect a system of so-called controlled distribution Of its products which 
will reduce the substitution of other brands of cheese" (35m).'" 
One of the most common means of solving the patent problem 
has been the merger of former competitors. As Vaughan has 
said: "One corporation, according to this plan, acquire [s] com-
pletely the plants, patents, etc., of competitors. Without patents 
the result would [be] monopolistic in character; with patents, it 
[is] assured of the strength of its position. Competition [can] 
not appear readily because a competing line of inventions as well 
as a large supply of capital [is necessary] " (91d). 
The dangers of such a consolidation of patents were recog-
nized by the Committee on Patents in the House of Representa-
tives in 1912: "Capital seeking to control industry through the 
medium of patents proceeds to buy up all important patents 
"" Quoting from prospectus of Tobey and Kirk, of the N. Y. Stock Exchange. 
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pertaining to the particular field. The effect of this is to shut 
out competition that would be inevitable if the various patents 
were separately and adversely held. By aggregating all the 
patents under one ownership and control, using a few and 
suppressing the remainder, a monopoly is built up that is out-
side of and broader than any monopoly created by the patent 
statutes. It is 'monopoly of monopolies' and is equivalent to 
a patent on the industry as such.' '24 
Among the large corporations which gained a dominant posi-
tion through patent consolidations were the American Tobacco 
Company, American Steel and Wire, United Shoe Machinery, 
Eastman Kodak, Standard Oil, General Electric, Westinghouse, 
and Bell Telephone (91£). Kraft-Phenix undoubtedly may be 
added to this list, since the basic nature and broad claims of the 
patents these two companies held was enough to give them, when 
combined, a virtual monopoly on processed cheese, at least for 
the duration of their present patents. 
Product differentiation and advertising, of course, played an 
important role in Kraft's rapid rise to dominance. Branding and 
packaging were given strong emphasis : ' 'During the past two 
years real progress has been made in the effort to overcome the 
practice of substituting inferior brands of the five-pound loaf 
cheese for Kraft . . . . subterfuges such as removing the label · 
and insisting it was Kraft, claiming it was made by Kraft under 
another name, etc., etc. Aside from the legal phases of this con-
dition, it is being rapidly overcome competitively by a greatly 
increased production and sale of our product in small quarter-
pound and half-pound jars and packages, plainly ma.rked with 
the Hraft label . ... In January 1926 about 20,000 of these 
small packages were made per day, but by January, 1927, this 
output had increased to an average of 160,000 per day . . . and 
will [probably ] increase this year to over 300,000 per day. 
"During the development and consolidation of the Kraft 
Cheese Company various different brands of cheese were ac-
quired, such as MacLaren, Sharpless, etc. The continuation of 
all these brands developed a difficult sales and advertising prob-
lem and efforts were directed towards the consolidation of all 
these brands under one label. The Saturday Evening Post of 
February 5 carried a full page in actual colors showing some of 
the most important Kraft products . ... This unification of labels 
will greatly increase our sales and profits. " (31) 
The acquisition of a number of important cheese companies in 
1926 and 1927 introduced a problem of duplication of plants 
and activlities. However, "the consolidation of the variou& 
manufacturing and distributing plants of [these acquired] com-
.. H. R. No. 1161, 62d. Cong., 2d Sess., pp. 2-3. Quoted In Vaughan (91e). 
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panies" was reported to be well underway. "Some manu-
facturing plants and branch houses that were duplicating activi-
ties are now being operated as single units and others have al-
ready been discontinued" (32). 
What was the method of distribution for Kraft products by 
now? In 1927 the Company reported: 
"Kraft products have been handled and successfully distributed by 
wholesale grocers and produce dealers in all parts of the world. How-
ever, as our line has enlarged and the varieties increased, it has become 
evident that it was necessary to suppler/tent the work of jobbers already 
in the field. With this thought in mind we have encouraged the estab-
lishment throughout the country of what is known as 'wagon distribu-
tors.' This class of distributor operates today with motor trucks. An 
adequate supply of cheese is carried and the driver calls regularly upon 
his customers once or twice a week. These distributors are uniformly 
successful and furnish a 8'ales outlet which cannot be had in any other 
way. They also result in reducing the retail sales force of the com-
pany. Substitution is avoided and regular jobbers in the territory are 
helped to sell more Kraft cheese. There are now some 900 trucks cov-
ering regular routes selling Kraft products exclusively" (31) (my 
italics) . 
In the following year (1928) , having greatly increased its 
size by the acquisition of Phenix, Kraft reported that "the 
Kraft-Phenix Cheese Corporation owns and controls a number of 
distributing companies that serve the retail trade directly_ Since 
the consolidation of Kraft .... and Phenix .... the distribution 
of our products has been put on a very satisfactory basis. Our 
interests in a good many of these distributing companies, how-
ever, have been taken: over by the distributors _ ... with the 
understanding that they will continue to distribute our products. 
There are over 2,000 automobile trucks distributing Kraft-
Phenix .... products. This method of distribution is of great 
value in the introduction of new articles and in maintaining sat-
isfactory conditions in the retail trade." (33). Thus, the desire 
to "push" branded products to the utmost, combined with 
enormous volume, had finally caused the leading processors to 
take over the dispersing as well as the assembling services of 
the old wholesale channels. 
In 1928 Kraft-Phenix began an extensive program of diversi-
fication. As it explained it (italics added) : 
"[The] company has always occupied an advantageous position con-
sistent with the growth and expansion of the dairy industry. This in-
dustry is rapidly being developed by large interests. Successful devel-
opment on a large business basis requires dealing in a well diversified 
line of dairy products. The Kraft-Phenix Cheese Corporation has 00-
79 
t-renched itself securely as the outstanding fa,ctor in the cheese business. 
In addition, activities have been extended in connection with other 
important dairy products to such a point that future prospects are ex-
ceedingly favorable. 
"During . . . 1928, 26 new business operations were brought into 
the organization, in addition to which controlling interest was acquiren 
in the Southern Dairies, Inc. The operations of all plants of 
the parent company, as well as subsidiary companies, have been studied 
with a view to increasing their capaCity for the production of dairy 
products to meet the diversification of the business done by the or-
ganization. 
"The phenomenal growth of Philadelphia Cream Cheese sales has 
necessitated rapid plant expansions. Tributary to these factories are a 
number of plants supplying tested, high-quality sweet crea11t which is 
used for Philadelphia Cream cheese. It is a perfectly natural 
development that we should be called upon from time to time during 
periods of scarcity to furnish other large users of sweet cream from our 
supply. The possibilities for substantial profit on this product became 
evident during the past year to the degree that a special department 
has been opened for the purpose of buying and selling cream. Our cus-
tomers include some of the best known dairy companies throughout 
the country. 
"The expansion of our activities in many localities has made neces-
sary the manufacture of butter. As Southern factories were established, 
it became evident that a suffi'cient amount of butter must be made to 
make use of surplus cream . . . [therefore], a controlling interest in 
a very substantial butter company . . . was acquired." 
Kraft-Phenix also announced "the purchase of International Wood 
Products Co., [which] supplies all the wooden boxes used in packing 
our various cheese products. The price of our boxes has been 
reduced about 30' pel'lcent, and a finer, more uniform material has been 
secured . . . the Wood Products Company has among its customers 
some of the largest corporations in the country. 
"The Southern Dairies, Inc., is a leading factor in the dairy industry 
in the Southern States. In the course of establishing cheese factories in 
the South and in carrying out our policy of completely diversifying our 
dairy business to include ice crearn and fluid milk distribution, we nat-
urally came in contact with the Southern Dairies organization. As a 
result, we discovered a certain parallel of effort and ambition for de-
veloping the dairy industry in the Southern territory. We have there· 
fore acquired a controlling interest in the Southern Dairies 
(33) . 
Thus by the end of 1928, Kraft-Phenix was producing and dis-
tributing not only cheese, but also sweet cream, butter, ice cream. 
fluid milk and mayonnaise. In 1928 Kraft-Phenix sales amounted 
to 75.6 million dollars and in 1929, 86.4 million dollars, corn-
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pared with 36.7 million dollars in 1926. According to Moody's, 
profits per dollar of sales for Kraft-Phenix and wholly-owned 
subsidiaries were 5.1 cents in 1929, compared with 3.8, 3.1, and 
1.8 cents in 1928, 1927, and 1926, respectively. 
Meanwhile, other large dairy corporations had been develop-
ing during the 'twenties, particularly the National Dairy 
Products Corporation, the Borden Company, Beatrice Creamery 
Company and Fairmont Creamery Company. These companies 
showed their most rapid period of expansion in the period 1928-
30, when, like Kraft-Phenix, they set out on programs of diver-
sification of product and location. National Dairy Products, 
starting as a holding company in 1924, first reached a place 
of importance in ice cream; Borden had already made its name 
between 1890 and 1920 in condensed milk and then in fluid milk; 
and Beatrice and Fairmont had long been leading butter com-
panies, but all four were in every conceivable dairy product by 
1930 (37a). 
And finally, Kraft-Phenix, having absorbed 50 or more other 
companies between 1926 and 1930, was itself acquired by National 
Dairy Products Corporation (36b). National Dairy Products 
was already one of the country's largest butter, milk and ice 
cream distributors in 1929, but distributed only 25.7 million 
pounds of cheese, 5.3 percent of United States production. Kraft-
Phenix, in 1929, the last full year prev,ious to its purchase by 
National Dairy Products, distributed 205.1 million pounds of 
cheese, or 42.4 percent of the nation's production (30a). National 
Dairy's most important acquisition in the cheese line previous to 
1930 was that of Breakstone Brothers in 1928. Breakstone sold 
9.3 million pounds of cheese in 1927 (36b). In 1930, however, 
with Kraft-Phenix added, National Dairy's cheese sales amounted 
to 236:8 million pounds or about 47.3 percent of the nation's 
cheese production. At one move this large dairy corporation took 
a commanding lead in the cheese industry. 
The National Dairy Products Corporation got control of Kraft-
Phenix from an investment trust which, unknown to Mr. Kraft, 
president of the cheese corporation, held a large block of Kraft-
Phenix stock which it was willing to trade for National Dairy 
Products stock. Only a small proportion of cash was involved in 
completing the deal. For all operating purposes, the Kraft-
Phenix Company continued in the hands of the Krafts (34a), 
Borden, meanwhile, had acquired a number of smaller but 
well-known cheese companies, including the Lakeshire Cheese 
Company, which was selling about 6 million pounds of loaf 
cheese in 1928, the year it became a part of Borden. Of the 
three companies holding the basic patents on the processing of 
cheese, by 1930 two had combined later to become a part of the 
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nation's leading dairy corporation, and the third, a member of 
the second largest corporation. 
Other important cheese acquisitions by Borden included 
Schmitt Brothers, handling over 20 million pounds of bulk 
cheese; A. H. Barber and Company, with a volume of 13 million 
pounds; F. X. Baumert and Company, Monroe Cheese Company, 
Hasselbeck Cheese Campany and Anona Cheese Company (36c). 
Thus, Borden, too, was an important factor in the cheese trade 
by 1930. 
-While the third largest dairy corporation, Beatrice, had ex-
panded and diversified very rapidly between 1928 and 1930 
(37a), it turned from its original product, butter, principally to 
ice cream, fluid milk, eggs and cold storage. Even as late as 
1931 its cheese business was still well under 1 percent of the 
nation's production (40b). 
The leading meat-packers were continuing meanwhile to hold 
an important place in the distribution of cheese. In 1928 the 
federal trade commission reported that "Swift and Company 
have divided the United States into a large number of sales .... 
areas and maintain extensive storage facilities in each. Not only 
dressed meats but various kinds of produce ... are shipped in 
carload lots to these regional warehouses. Cheese has been added 
to tJve list in greater and greater proportions in recent years. 
The regional branches function as terminal wholesalers. Refrig-
erator carloads of mixed produce are made up at the branches, 
rolled to the retail destinations, and distributed to the retailers. 
This gives the advantage of refrigeration in transit without the 
necessity of moving the particular variety of produce in carload 
lots to the retailers. In conseq1£ence, it is claimed, the wholesaling 
of much perishable prod1~ce is passing rapidly O1d of the hands of 
the old-style terminal wholesaler into the hands of the large pack-
er organizations. Hence more and more of the sales of cheese by 
assembling dealers are made to packing companies. The large 
packers have their own subsidiary cheese-buying and cheese-as-
sembling companies" (19) (italics added). In 1929 Swift was 
distributing 12.0 percent of the nation's cheese production (22), 
about 58.1 million pounds. 
By 1928 Cudahy Packing Company had established a num-
ber of cheese factories "in Missouri and Nebraska and in some 
of the Southern States. These factories were largely experi-
mental and it was found that cheese of fairly good quality could 
be made in these sections. However, ... the supremacy of .... 
Wisconsin .... is not to be challenged, at least for some years to 
come .... The development of the pasteurized loaf cheese busi-
ness during the past few years points to a more general use of 
this commodity" (18c). Although Armour was probably the 
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leading packer in the volume of cheese sales, no information con-
cerning it is available for this period. 
In 1927 the Wisconsin Cheese Producers' Federation began to 
handle foreign-type cheese for a group of Dane and Iowa County 
(Wisconsin) factories, and in 1928 its name was changed to the 
National Cheese Producers' Federation, since its membership 
included a number of Minnesota factories. "Increased interest 
among the foreign-type producers resulted in adding 150 of 
these factories in 1929 in two other Wisconsin counties." In 1929 
over 50 percent of Wisconsin Swiss cheese was marketed through 
the Federation. Largely as a result of the addition of foreign 
type cheese to its business, the Federation, as we shall see later, 
suffered a severe setback in 1931 (13, 15). In 1930 it reached an 
all-time peak volume of 42.2 million pounds, a gain of 25 percent 
over 1926, and 8.4 percent of the nation's cheese. 
The Federation's "capital and surplus [were] so small [in 
1928] that the loss of a single large account would cause serious 
financial embarrassment .... Lack of sufficient working capital 
also prevent [ed] the federation from performing a very import-
ant function .... storage of the excess production of May, June, 
and July . " . Putting it all on the market at once tends to 
depress the price to the factories and probably all along the line 
... Practically, however, the member factories [had to] be paid 
without such delay .... as [necessary working] capital [had] 
not been available; the federation [had] not been able to perform 
its policy as a price stabilizer" nor to develop by-product lines 
(10c) . 
"With the exception of ... 'twins', the federation's prices to 
the factories did not compare unfavorably with the prices paid 
by its competitors, but .... on the whole its sales prices were 
less than those of the other dealers. The federation oper"ated on 
a na1TOWC1' margin." The Federation's large proportion of sales 
to chain stores, processors and packers made for a small selling 
expense, of course. The Federation paid a relatively low price 
for "twins", largely a result of the fact that "this style of 
cheese [was ]no longer popular with retail grocers, but, next to 
mammoth Cheddars, is the most economical style to serve as raw 
material out of which to make pasteurized package cheese .... 
Selling most of its' twins' in carload lots, the federation exacts 
a relatively small margin over the current board price" (10d). 
In 1930 the Federation was recognized by the Federal Farm 
Board as a regional marketing association for cheese, and was 
thereby made eligible to borrow money from the Board. The 
Farm Board then loaned the Federation $450,000 to advance up 
to 75 percent of the market value of its cheese receipts and assist 
the organization in providing facilities for storing and merchan-
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dising-functions which a shortage of working capital made im-
possible previously (15). 
Tillamook's volume was still around 7 million pounds in 1930 . 
. It was advertising extensively in Pacific coast newspapers, fea-
turing copy that promoted cheese as a food and informed the 
public-to combat the competition of processed cheese-that Til-
lamook cheese was never "recooked or reworked." The bulk of 
its cheese was sold in California, and all of it on the West Coast 
(7c). The small New York cheese cooperative had also shown 
little change in volume, with 3.1 million pounds in 1928 (7b). 
These three cooperatives combined handled 10.4 percent of the 
nation's cheese in 1930, as compared with 10.3 percent in 1926. 
In 1930 the A. & P. chain had 15,418 stores, slightly less than 
in 1928 but 10 percent more than in 1926. It now owned three 
cheese factories. Kroger had 5,165 gtores, a 50 percent gain over 
1926 but about 8 percent below the peak reached in 1929. Ameri-
can Stores and Safeway had 2,644 and 2,691 stores, respectively, 
while First National had 2,548 units. All had shown consider-
able expansion in sales (2b). Their chief sources of supply for 
both processed and bulk cheese probably continued to be pro-
cessors and packers, however, since patents prevented them from 
entering the processing business themselves and the growing 
preference for processed over bulk cheese made it necessary 
to handle both kinds. The result was that chain-store country-
buying facilities could be used only for cheese to be consumed in 
bulk form, and this necessarily smaller volume doubtless pre-
vented most chains from integrating backward as frequently or 
as far as they had done in butter. There would probably have 
been more integration in their buying facilities had processed 
cheese-protected by patents-not been introduced. 
The Census of Manufactures first reported production of 
processed cheese in 1929 (appendix table 8). In that year, the 
Census reported a production of 51.4 million pounds of blended 
cheese and cheese spreads-13.9 percent of all American cheddar 
cheese and 10.6 percent of total cheese (excluding cottage, pot, 
and bakers'). This cheese had an average selling value, f.o.b. 
factory, of 30.5 cents per pound. The comparable figure fOT 
cheddar (bulk) cheese was 20.5 cents, or 67.2 percent of the 
processed cheese price. The processing margin was thus very 
wide. No data are available for the distributing margin. 
By 1930 the marketing channels for cheese depended a great 
deal on whether the cheese was to reach the consumer in processed 
or bulk form. Even of bulk cheese, however , the old-line wholesale 
channels had lost a large part, espeeially to packers and, to some 
extent, chain-stores. Bulk cheese was purchased from many small 
factories by cheese dealers or was assembled by one of the coopera-
tive cheese marketing ageneies. Some of the so-called cheese deal-
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ers were merely subsidiary cheese-buying and cheese-assembling 
organizations of packing companies or subsidiary buyers and as-
semblers for processors. "However, a large proportion of the 
assembling dealers [were] independent direct distributors [in 
1928] .... There has been considerable change during the last 
15 years in the diskibutive machinery that follow s the assem-
bling dealers' function . Formerly sales were made largely to 
wholesale grocers in the terminal markets, and these in turn sold 
to retail grocers and delicatessen stores .... Many wholesale 
grocers did not care to buy in carload lots, however, nor to buy 
in such quantities during the season of heavy production .... 
as to take the entire production. Yet they desired quick service 
when they did want cheese. Consequently, the storage ·function 
had to be performed in large part by the assembling dealers. 
"In order to retain the advantage of forwarding in carload 
lots and also to give the quick and satisfactory service demanded 
by terminal wholesalers, the assembling dealers resorted to the 
practice of consigning cheese in carload lots to strategically 10' 
cated brokers, who received the cheese, placed it in cold storage, 
and sold it in smaller lots, as required, to the wholesalers in 
various nearby cities. Such cheese was sold at a price f.o.b . con-
signment point, that was named by the consigning assembling 
dealer . ... With the growth of the pasteurized package cheese 
business and the passage of terminal distribution more and more 
into the hands of the large packers, the proportion of bulk cheese 
marketed through storage companies had [by 1928] diminished 
greatly." One dealer's consigned sales, for example, dropped 
from 60 to 20 percent between 1925 and 1927. "Thc old-style 
terminal wholesale1's [were] being displaced more and more [not 
only by the packers but] by the pt£1'chase departments of chain-
st01"e campanies. 
"Finally, bulk cheese [was] rapidly giving place to pasteurized 
package cheese in the sales of retail grocers .... So rapidly [had] 
the demand for . . .. package cheese increased in recent years 
that .... an assembling dealer who [could] not include such 
cheese in his shipments [was] .... distinctly at a disadvantage 
in obtaining orders for bulk cheese. 
"Consequently, more and more of the bulk cheese [was] going 
to the processors and pass [ed] to the later distributive mechan-
ism as package cheese. In certain cases several dealers [had] 
associated themselves together to organize and control processing 
companies, so as to assure themselves both sources of supply of 
package cheese and sales outlets for certain styles of bulk cheese. 
In other cases, processing companies [had] organized or acquired 
control of bulk-cheese assembling companies in order to assure 
themselves of sources of bulk cheese. Most of the processors 
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market bulk cheese as well as convert it into pasteurized cheese" 
( 48a) (my italics) . 
Not only had the development of processed cheese brought 
greater concentration in the cheese industry and violent changes 
in cheese distribution but the validity of the Wisconsin Cheese 
Exchange quotations was even more seriously questioned. As 
the trade commission expressed it, "A remarkable feature of the 
offerings on the Wisconsin Cheese Exchange is that certain 
[p1'OCeSS01's 1 .... regularly make offers . . .. These offerings are 
remarkable because the processors would naturally be purchasers 
rather than sellers of the large style of bulk cheese, such as 
daisies and twins, the kinds dealt in on the exchange . . . A 
price established by a purchase of a dealer who also regularly 
receives cheese from the bulk-cheese factories might be considered 
as applicable to cheese received from such sources, whereas a 
price paid by a processor to a dealer would more logically be 
interpreted as a dealer 's resale price. Therefore, to do his 
part in the price-establishment procedure, the processor must. 
be an offerer rather than a purchaser" (61c). 
SUMMARY 
The years 1927-30 were the most important of the post-war 
period, for during these years the problem of patents came to a 
head, bringing widespread combination and concentration of 
distribution in its wake. The Pabst case established the validity 
of the Kraft and Phenix patents in 1927, and their legal right to 
exact a toll in the form of a royalty from all competitors who 
produced and sold processed cheese. EV6n the mighty forces of 
Swift and Company had to bow to these claims. These patents 
were no doubt instrumental in preventing the chain stores 
from doing their own processing and integrating to an even 
greater extent from country to consumer in the assembly and 
distribution of both processed and bulk cheese. Kraft held the 
basic patents on the pasteurizing process as applied to cheese, 
Phenix those on packaging the plastic material, and Lakeshire 
those on the continuous process cooker . . The natural result was 
the merger of Kraft and Phenix in 1928, a merger in which the 
monopolistic motive apparently far outweighed any possibilities 
of economies of large-scale operation. 
Branding and packaging were strongly emphasised. Large-
scale advertising brought increased sales. In 1927 Kraft was 
already supplementing the work of wholesale grocers and jobbers 
by establishing its own wagon distributors to prevent the sub-
stitution of other brands and to help independent jobbers to sell 
more Kraft cheese. With the merger of Kraft and Phenix, the 
new-born Kraft-Phenix Cheese Corporation acquired a number 
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of distributing companies and began to serve the retail trade 
directly. While exercising rigorous control over those inde-
pendent jobbers through whom they continued to distribute, 
their own wagon distributors became still more important. . 
In 1928 Kraft-Phenix began an extensive program of diversi-
fication, and by the end of the year was producing and distri-
buting sweet cream, butter, ice cream, fluid milk and mayon-
naise in addition to cheese. In 1930 Kraft-Phenix was in turn 
bought by National Dairy Products Corporation, which wanted 
this extensive cheese business to round out its position as lead-
er in the field of dairy products. The Borden Company bought 
the only other basic patent holder in the processing of cheese, 
Lakeshire. By 1930, then, all the basic patents were in the 
hands of the two largest dairy corporations of the country, after 
a 3-year period of phenomenal expansion and concentration in 
the dairy industry. Finally, the large meat-packers were still 
holding a place of major importance in the distribution of cheese. 
The Wisconsin Cheese Producers' Federation had grown con-
siderably by 1930, handling 7.4 percent of the nation's cheese 
in that year. It was financially weak, however. and still fonnd 
its chief outlets with chain stores, packers and processors. In 
1930 the Federal Farm Board recognized it as a regional sales 
agency and granted it a large loan to enable it to finance storage 
and merchandising operations. The Tillamook and St. r~awrence 
County cooperatives had shown little further growth. The three 
handled 10.4 percent of the nation's cheese in 1930, compared 
with 10.3 percent in 1926 . 
By 1929 about 14 percent of all cheddar cheese reached the 
consumer in processed form, and the processing margin was ap-
parently quite wide. As increasing volumes of cheese reached the 
final consumer in packages, the old-line wholesaler-wholesale 
grocer channel of distribution was rapidly declining in impor-
tance. Most of the cheese which moved this way reached the con-
sumer in bulk form as of old. but (wen here the increasing vol-
umes handled by packers, chain stores and cooneratives diverted 
an enormous share from the old channels. With the increasing 
concentration of interests in the cheese industry, the validity of 
the Wisconsin Cheese Exchange quotations was still more in 
doubt as the period closed. 
IV. CHEESE MARKETING AND THE GREAT DEPRES-
SION: 1931-38 
"He should, as he list, be ab le to prove the moon made of grene 
cheese."-Sir Thomas More (80d). 
The program of the Agricultural Adjustment Administration 
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played a relatively small part in the cheese industry, as Black 
has shown: 
"A proposed national cheese agreement, designed to cover all the 
leading commercial varieties of cheese, was submitted early in October 
1933 for the preliminary review of the Dairy Section. It was sponsored 
by the National Cheese Institute, the National Cheese Producers Fed· 
eration, and other allied interests. A national control committee of 
ten members was proposed, five of whom were to be named by the 
Federation and five by proprietary interests representing the principal 
types of cheese. So much difference of opinion developed within the 
industry that no hearing was ever held. 
"The first relief purchase contracts were let in January 1934, and 
by the date of the last report [not later than August, 1935] the relief 
agencies had taken 14 million pounds of cheese. In the original pur-
chase program of the AAA, Secretary Wallace had agreed to buy cheese 
as well as butter. Dairymen in the cheese· producing areas had been 
inclined to criticize their industry leaders for failure to develop a 
production control program. An illustration of the discontent appearing 
in the cheese industry was the precedent set on August 17, 1934, at 
Plymouth, Wisconsin, when for the first time in the history of the 
Wisconsin Call Board every cheese factory in the state refused to 
accept the prices offered by dealers. Dealers insisted that cheese prices 
would have to drop if the large stocks in storage were to be moved, 
but the concerted action by the factories resulted in all bids being 
refused. 
"Recognizing the large accumulated surpluses in the domestic Swiss 
cheese industry, the Swiss cheese makers on August 6, 1934, declared 
a 30-day holiday throughout southern Wisconsin wherel over 80 percent 
of the domestic Swiss cheese is made. The Federal Surplus Relief 
Corporation took steps to relieve this situation by awarding contracts 
for 2,805,000 pounds of Swiss cheese, to be prepared as half-pound 
packages of processed cheese" (78). 
Between 1929 and 1931 the production of processed cheese 
increased three-fold to 151.7 million pounds (appendix table 
8) . This represented an increase in the percentage of pro-
cessed cheese to domestic cheddar cheese production from 13.9 
to 40.5 percent, and from 10.6 to 30.8 percent relative to total 
cheese production (excluding cottage, pot and bakers' cheese). 
It was in these 2 years that processed cheese production showed 
its most marked increase. In 1931 the average selling values. 
f. o. b. factory, of processed and bulk cheese had dropped 
sharply from 30.5 and 20.5 cents a pound to 19.2 and 13.0 cents, 
respectively. The factory value of bulk cheese was still about 
the same relative to processed cheese, however-67.7 percent. 
Thus, there had been practically no change in the processing 
margin (the difference between the factory values of processed 
and bulk cheese) in percentage terms despite the rapid increase 
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in volume. In absolute terms, however, the processing margin 
fell from 10.0 to 6.2 cents. 
No data for processed cheese are available for 1933. In 1935, 
however, processed cheese production was 198.7 million pounds 
-45 percent of domestic cheddar production and 32 percent of 
total cheese production. By 1937 comparable figures were ·256.4 
million pounds, 51.6 percent and 39.5 percent, respectively. 
Thus the equivalent of over half of all American cheddar 
cheese now reaches the consumer in processed form. 
The few years 1931-37 saw a considerable further drop in 
the processing margin from 6.2 cents in 1931 to 4.3 cents in 
1935 and 3.5 cents (estimated) in 1937. In 1937 the selling 
values, f. o. b. factory, of processed and bulk cheese were 19.2 
and 15.7 (estimated) cents per pound, respectively. In percent-
age terms, the factory value of bulk cheese increased from only 
68 percent of that of processed cheese in 1931 to perhaps 81 
percent in 1937. Thus the increases in processed cheese sales 
since 1931 have been made only at the expense of lower proces-
sing margins. Too much significance, however, must not be given 
these margin data-based as they are on crude averages of 
industry-wide aggregates from the Census of Manufactures-
since data on the very important distributing margins are not 
available. 
In 1932 National Dairy Products Corporation, largely through 
its Kraft-Phenix subsidiary, was distributing 47.0 percent (227 
million pounds ) of the nation's cheese production. In 1933 
and 1934 the comparable figures (exclusive of the soft cheeses) 
were 40.0 and 32.1 percent , or 217 and 186 million pounds, reo 
spectively (30h, 34b) . Between 1930 and 1934, therefore, Na-
tional Dairy's share of total production fell about one-third 
from 47.3 to 32.1 percent. Most of the fall occurred in the years 
1932-34. 
Part of this drop is spurious since the base used in calculating 
the company 's share of the nation's cheese was domestic pro-
duction, exclusive of net imports, although Kraft-Phenix un-
doubtedly distributed (an unknown amount of) imported cheese 
as well. Net imports fell from 56.3 to 47.1 million pounds be-
tween 1930-31 and 1934-35 while domestic production was 579.2 
million pounds in 1934 compared with 500.4 million in 1930. 
If domestic consumption (appendix table 2) is used as a base 
(including domestic production, net imports, and domestic 
stocks ) Kraft-Phenix's shares were 41.7 percent, 41.4 percent, 
38.3 percent, and 30.2 percent in 1930, 1932, 1933, and 1934, 
respectively, in which case the drop between 1930 and 1934 was 
28 percent instead of 32 percent. The major part of the decline 
still remains even after allowing for imports. 
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A more important factor, therefore, is the striking increase 
in domestic production between 1933 and 1934 (and continuing 
through 1937), accompanied by a correspondingly increased con· 
sumption, and perhaps by increasing demand as a result of im· 
proving business conditions, especially marked in the South-· 
a large consumer of bulk cheese. Between 1933 and 1934 do-
mestic consumption increased 11 percent. Since Kraft-Phenix 
cheese sales fell about 14 percent, it lost ground instead of shar-
ing in the increase in total consumption. The reasons for this de· 
cline are not known. The fact that foreign-type (and "other") 
cheese production increased 27 percent between 1932 and 1934, 
while cheddar cheese production-from which most processed 
cheese is made-increased only 17 percent, may be a partial 
explanation of Kraft-Phenix's relative decline. Lack of pro-
duction data for processed cheese in these years prevents verifi-
cation of this explanation. Increasingly complete reporting 
of production in more recent years may also be a factor.25 
In 1933 cheese composed about 20 percent of National Dairy's 
total sales, while milk, ice cream and butter made up 50, 20, 
and 10 percent, respectively (34). 
In 1936 it was estimated that Kraft-Phenix "purchased bulk 
cheese to the extent of about 85 percent of its requirements in 
the manufacture of the finished product, and produced in its 
own plants, from raw milk, about 15 percent of such require-
ments" (29a). In 1933 Kraft-Phenix bought the cheese division 
of Premier-Pabst, against whom they had once won a patent 
suit. 
By the middle of 1936 National Dairy Products had acquired 
358 corporate entities since its origin in 1924, 240 of them be-
tween 1928 and 1930. Of the 62 companies added between 
1930 and 1936, 22 were included in its cheese division. The 
federal trade commission found in 1936 that Kraft-Phenix 
"kept close check on chain-stores handling its product in an 
effort to see that prices were maintained. Sales were discon· 
tinued to customers who did not maintain resale prices" (30a). 
Borden was the fourth largest cheese distributor in 1934 with 
a volume of 53.6 million pounds (28a), 9.3 percent of the na-
tion's cheese. It was probably second in processed-cheese sales. 
That Borden "cooperated" with its closest competitors is re-
vealed by correspondence which the federal trade commission 
found in the files of that company recently (30b), a few ex-
cerpts of which follow: 
'" Of possible significance is the fact that National Dairy Products was be-
ing investigated on a number of points by the federal trade commission in 
1933 a nd 19 34. Since its c heese division (Kraft-Phenix) bulked so large In 
th e trade, this giant corporation may have felt it expedient to show a d e -
clining share of the nation's cheese sales in the hope of preventing legal 
action for violation of the a nti-trust laws. 
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"You can save us a lot of trouble if you will go out of your way a 
little and talk to Kraft's man in that market once in a while. Just a 
little sane and civil cooperation between manufacturers' representative~ 
will go a long way toward keeping harmony in a market ..... Success· 
ful handling of a market makes it imperative that you cooperate with 
your c01npetitor to a certain extent . . . . . Under no circumstances do 
we want you to discuss or agree to anything that may be termed 
illegal, but sit down and talk your problems over. The chances are that 
Kraft's man up there is very human like yourself, and each of you can 
be a big help to the other without revealing any professional secrets 
and without incurring any criticism from headquarters" (my italics). 
That each of the leading companies was too large to ignore 
its own influence on cheese prices is clearly indicated by the 
recognition of the necessity of "sane and civil cooperation." 
'rhis was probably especially marked in packaged-loaf cheeses 
since Kraft-Phenix and Borden, between them, held a great 
competitive advantage as the sole patent-holders of the process 
from which such loaves emerged. Such" cooperation" requires 
strict retail-price maintenance, since the retailers make the 
final sale to the consumer. 
In the summer of 1935 a flurry appeared in the loaf-cheese 
market that apparently made the leaders in the industry realize 
the futility of price competition. A Borden memorandum clearly 
reveals this (30c): 
"We are determined to do our part in correcting the loaf·cheese 
selling situation and we want every distributor followed very closely 
and instructed to hold strictly to our r etail selling schedule. We must 
go out of our way to control our distributors' loaf-cheese selling prices, 
as under the new plan arranged in Chicago last week it gives everybody 
an opportunity, to· live and at the same time do business, and if we do 
our part and the other members of the industry do their part it is 
going to make a nice picture of loaf cheese" (italics mine). 
Thus" live and let live" was the rational order of the day. 
One effective method of price maintenance was the threat 
of withdrawing the manufacturer's line. "All distributors have 
been cautioned that the n ext time a retailer cuts the price of 
Chateau that he will have to automatically be forced to dis · 
continue service on that item. This does f01·c e much of the 1·e-
sponsibility 101· 1·esale price maintenance upon the distributor." 
One of Borden's specialty jobbers told the merchants in his 
territory that "if they cut the price below two for 29 cents, 
I not only would not sell them any of our line, but would not 
come inside their stores as long as they were in business" (30d). 
Kraft-Phenix used similar methods, discontinuing to sell to 
distributors who would not "stay in their own territory on 
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[salad] dressings," and who failed to maintain Kraft's list 
price on cheese (30e). Packaged cheeses were in the hands of 
so few manufacturers that they could use the threat of with-
holding their well-advertised lines to enforce resale price main-
tenance. 
That advertising was the chief instrument of competition IS 
shown by the following statement from Borden's files: 
"It is easy to follow Kraft's successful markets by the amount of 
money they spend ... in Louisville they buy plenty, while in a market 
like Cincinnati, where Kroger rules the roost, they spend very little 
... concentrated effort should be made on everyone of these outlets 
in that Louisville territory, ... [using] cooperative advertising money 
to buy our way in, if necessary" (30f). 
The monopolistic elements in resale price maintenance have 
been pointed out very clearly by Galbraith (42) : 
' ''The extent to which monopolistic competition involves a compli· 
cated structure of resale price maintenance is a phase of this problem 
which has, perhaps, been somewhat neglected. The manufacturer 01' 
producer of an unadvertised and undifferentiated product has no con 
cern with the margin absorbed by the retailer so long as retailing is 
a competitive enterprise. He would lose equally by insisting on a 
margin for his own product either above or below that which the com-
petition of retailers has established for the commodity in the particular 
market area. When the product is differentiated, however, the retail 
price becomes a matter of concern. It is in part to avoid price com-
petition that he expends money to differentiate his product. If the 
retailer-his usual contact with the consumer-cuts prices a number 
of things go wrong. If the differentiation is largely psychic, as the 
result of advertising, the consumer is educated to ignore brands as 
price attractions lead him to shift from one to another which he finds 
equally . good. The differentiation is broken down and a part of the 
advertising expenditure is wasted. If the price cutting is incipient it 
will still result in some aversion by the retailer to the product or brand 
in question and perhaps a tendency to press a brand on which the 
margin is somewhat wider. If the price competition becomes severe, 
and particularly if consumer preference in the matter of brands is 
thereby weakened, the manufacturer will b3 forced to cut his prices to 
the trade. Should he not do so it is apparent that he will find his 
retail outlets drying up as retailers press the brands on which their 
margin is more satisfactory. But when price cutting to the trade be-
comes necessary monopoly power is much weakened. The manufac-
turer's problem is no longer one of achieving the optimum adjustment 
to his individual demand curve. His product is marketed in volume and 
at prices that are subject to the vagaries of retailer competition. 
"In the case of oligopoly, and the probably more common one of 
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oligopoly merged with monopolistic competition, a similar situation 
obtains. If retailers engage in price competition, prices to the trade 
cannot be maintained except where consumer preference or brand dif-
ferentiation is powerfully intrenched. These cuts, of course, will bear 
no necessary relation to adjustments in price which maximize the pro-
ducers' gains. 
"It is no matter for wonder that trade journals devote so great a 
lineage to problems and techniques of resale price maintenance. For 
the present purpose, however, it is sufficient to notice that resale price 
maintenance is greatly aided by a policy of rigid prices. It may be 
difficult at times to keep an army of retailers in line under any cir-
cumstances. The task is vastly more complex, however, if it involves 
guiding them over a series of price decreases and price increases. The 
price increase is again in this case a particularly difficult matter. 
As with oligopoly, a substantial degree of unanimity is necessary in 
each market. Yet there is again a positive reward for the person who 
destroys this unanimity by lagging behind. The task of reducing resale 
prices is undoubtedly more simple. Yet the evil day, when optimum 
returns make an increase necessary, casts its shadow before. In the 
case of the present depression it may be repeated that so far as many 
people were convinced of its temporary character so the temptation 
was great to let predepression prices ride out the storm. Or again a 
compromise was made with the day when prices 'must' be increased 
and the decrease kept well on the conservative side." 
In spite of the Borden Company's strong position in packaged 
cheese, it was faced with some important outlets which were 
also in a strong bargaining position-the national chain-store 
systems. In 1936 a member of that company wrote that" ap-
pl-oximately 80 percent of O'l~r total package-cheese business 
in the country is done with chain stores." Another intercom-
pany letter stated that" national chain stores will not let us 
put different distributors in their stores in different markets; 
hence it is compulsory for a national manufacturer to have 
a national set-up for delivery to chains and that set-up must 
be one that is already delivering something to their stores, for 
they have been very hard-headed about putting additional dis-
tributors in their stores over the last few years. 
"Think wluat you may of chain-stor'e business, it is still abso-
lutely indispensable from a manufactul-er 's standpoint. Theil' 
pC1'centage of total l-etail volwYl1Je is so gl-eat that no mant~fac­
turer can exist without them" (30g) (italics added), 
Borden blamed a poor financial showing in 1935 on "current 
operating losses of the Produce Division, together .with the 
losses attending the liquidation of certain of its operations, . , 
[however] , , , the scope of this division's operations have 
[now] , , , been greatly curtailed, policies and methods changed, 
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and certain of its unprofitable operations discontinued and 
liquidated" (27 a) . As a result of this action they reported in 
1936 a "profit in that division for the first time in five years" 
(27b ). This division included not only cheese but butter, 
poultry and eggs, however. 
In 1934 the three dairy corporations most important in 
cheese distribution-National Dairy (Kraft-Phenix), Borden, 
and Fairmont Creamery Company-handled 42.7 percent of 
the nation's cheese. Fairmont-fourth largest dairy products 
corporation-handled an estimated 7.7 million pounds. Beat-
rice's cheese sales fell somewhere below Fairmont's low figure. 
The nine leading dairy companies (excluding packers) dis-
tributed 43.9 percent, indicating the very striking concen-
tration of the cheese business in the hands of Kraft-Phenix and 
Borden, so far as the strictly-dairy corporations are concerned. 
The meat-packers handled most of the remainder of the 
country's cheese (28b). Four meat-packers were among the 
country's six largest cheese distributors in 1935. Armour and 
Swift ranked second and third only to Kraft-Phenix. Armour 
sold 92.3 million pounds of cheese or 14.9 percent in that year. 
Swift followed with 85.8 million pounds or 13.8 percent (28a). 
In 1937 Armour had 15-20 cheese factories, largely in the 
South (26). After Borden's position in fourth place were 
Kingan and Company, one of the country's largest "indepen-
dent" meat-packers, with sales of 31.4 million pounds (5.1 
percent), and Cudahy, with a volume of 27.1 million pounds 
(4.4 percent) (28a). 
The three meat-packers most important in cheese distribution 
handled 33.8 percent of the country's cheese in 1935, while the 10 
most important meat-packers sold 42.7 percent. Only 28.4 
million pounds or 4.6 percent was distributed by Wilson and 
the other five smaller packers (28b). 
The largest cooperative, the National Cheese' Producers' Fed-
eration, reached its peak volume of 42.2 million pounds of 
cheese in 1930 and dropped to 35.5 million in 1931. It suffered 
a severe decline to 18.0 million pounds in 1932, largely a result 
of its venture into foreign-type cheese. The Federation paid for 
this cheese on the basis of the current price soon after it was 
manufactured-but before much was sold. Following the pur-
chase of this foreign-type cheese, the price declined greatly 
and the Federation lost $600,000 on the transaction. 
At the encouragement of the dealers, many of the American 
cheese factories withdrew from the Federation when the news 
of overpayment was announced in August, 1931, fearing they 
would be forced to help make up these losses. The membership 
dropped from some 400 to 110 factories. Although the courts 
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upheld the Federation's right to recover overpayments to its 
members, this financial difficulty meant a tremendous setback 
to the organization's development (13) . 
L'ate in 1934 the Federation became a member of Lann 
O'Lakes Creameries, Inc. Most of its cheese is now marketed 
through this sales agency, probably more directly than formerly 
since Land O'Lakes has its own integrated sales facilities (53d). 
In 1936 Land 0 'Lakes sold 24.0 million pounds of cheese. 
"Cooperative cheese factories in other sections have also 
affiliated with overhead sales organizations for more efficient 
marketing. Each of the large-scale, regional cooperatives on 
the west coast is now marketing considerable quantities of 
American cheese. In addition to its sales of American-type 
cheese, the Challenge Cheese and Butter Association markets 
the products of a small group of cooperative cheese factories 
in Wyoming making Swiss cheese" (l1a) . In 1935 Challenge 
sold 3.0 million pounds of American and nearly a million pounds 
of Swiss cheese (8). In 1934 Tillamook's 18 member factories 
manufactured 7.6 million pounds. "Tillamook ... has enjoyed 
an enviable reputation in the markets on the West Coast for 
more than 20 years. 'The association not only furnishes technical 
assistance along production lines to its members, but also 
supplies them with bookkeeping and accounting service" (l1a). 
In 1935 it reached a peak of 8.0 million pounds (9a) . The three 
principal cooperative sales agencies are now marketing about 
6 percent of the nation's cheese production, a marked decline 
since 1930's figure of 10.4 percent. 
The A. & P. had about the same number of stores in 1936 
as in 1930, slightly over 15,000, and enjoyed about three times 
as large a volume of sales as its nearest competitor, Safeway. 
By 1938, however, A. & P.'s number of units had dropped to 
13,300 stores, largely as a result of the anti-chain taxation of 
recent years, the substitution of super-stores for ordinary 
stores, and the closing of unprofitable units. Safeway had 3,370 
stores in 1936, a 20 percent gain over 1930. Kroger had 4,212 
retail units in 1936, a decline of 25 percent compared with the 
peak year of 1929. This decline was due to retrenchment, 
which included closing unprofitable or duplicating stores. First 
National had 2,556 stores in 1936, a decline of 4 percent since 
1930 (2c). 
Corporate chains in 1934-35 still bought most of their cheese 
supplies from dairy corporations and packers--46.9 million 
pounds from the former and 15.0 million pounds from the 
latter. This represented a total of 61.9 million pounds or about 
10.5 percent of the nation's cheese production (la). It will be 
interesting to see if the leading chain organizations show a 
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more marked tendency to integrate completely back to the 
cheese-supply areas-including their own processing facilities-
as the basic patents on the process expire. 
At the present time practically all sales of Twin cheese on 
the Wisconsin Cheese Exchange are made by and between 10 
members, most of whom represent the large-scale distributors. 
According to the federal trade commission, "All who buy or 
sell on the exchange are dealers in or purchasers of bulk cheese. 
No dairy farmers or bulk-cheese manufacturers are represented 
on the board, except insofar as the integrated companies such 
as Kraft-Phenix and subsidiaries are manufacturers, as well as 
purchasers and users, of bulk cheese" (62b). Sales on the ex-
change in recent years have been limited , with 150-200 boxes 
(10,500-14,000 pounds) a typical week's turnover. 
During 1935, practically all the Twin cheese was offered f01" 
sale by Pauly and Pauly (Swift subsidiary), Straubel (Kraft-
Phenix ), Lakeshire (Borden), and Blodgett (Armour). It was 
purchased, with few exceptions, by Plymouth Cheese Corpora-
tion and the Bamford, Jacquot, Deland and Winnebago Cheese 
companies. With one exception (which proved to be a "wash" 
sale) all Daisies were offered by Winnebago Cheese Company 
and taken by A. & P. 
The only other Wisconsin cheese exchange, the misnamed 
Farmers' Call Board, is still in operation. "The buying and 
selling on the board purports to be by auction and by competi-
tive bidding between dealers. And that it is such in fact is 
insisted, pugnaciously, by the dealers, almost without excep-
tion .. . [Nevertheless] the prices follow quite faithfully the 
base price fix ed between dealers on their own exchange each 
week, just an hour earlier . . . [a study] of the sales on the 
board, showing the same dealer buying the cheese of the same 
group of factories, not only week after week but year after 
year, is convincing. And the weakness ... of the excuse ... 
advanced by the dealers, that the sellers choose to sell steadily 
to , the same buyer, but adds to our conviction" (62a). Dow 
Cheese Company, a Cudahy subsidiary, was active on this 
board. 
In fig. 2 the weekly quotations established on the Wisconsin 
Cheese exchange for" Twins" are shown for 1936-38. The great 
price stability of the Twins has been tabulated (table 2) for these 
3 years according to the number of weeks a particular quota-
tion remained unchanged. Since the price is established for a 
week at a time, 52 changes a year are possible. In 1936, how-
ever , the price established in 1 week changed in the n ext suc-
cessive week only five times. The price twice remained un-
changed for periods of 3 weeks, twice for 4 weeks, and once 
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Fig. 2, Ruling price of cheese, Twins, Wisconsin Cheese Exchange, Ply-
mouth, Wisconsin, by weeks, 1936-38. 
each for periods of 5 and 7 weeks. Between Oct. 15, 1936, 
and April 2, 1937, the price remained unchanged for 24 weeks. 
During 1936 prices changed only 15 times out of a possible 52. 
In 1937 prices remained by far the most stable of any of the 
3 years, since but nine price changes occurred in the 52-week 
period. The price did not change in any 2 successive weeks 
during the year, and remained unchanged between April 16 
and July 23 (14 weeks) and between Oct. 15 and Dec, 17 (9 
weeks ) . Five quotations ruled for 2-week periods and two 
for 3 weeks at a time, In 1938 prices changed more than during 
either of the two previous years-21 times in 52 weeks. Twelve 
of these 21 changes came after Aug. 20, before which the price 
remained unchanged for the 12 weeks beginning May 27. The 
date of Aug, 20, 1938, marked the beginning of operations on a 
new basis. 
"The Wisconsin Cheese Exchange on Friday, August 20, 
transacted business for the first time under its new bylaws. 
Big increases in volume of cheese handled and number of 
people attending indicated a live interest in the operation of 
the board under its new rules." Eleven carloads-225-250 
thousand pounds-were offered compared with 3,5 thousand 
pounds offered the previous week. Of the offerings 90 thousand 
pounds were sold compared with 3.5 thousand pounds in the 
previous week. 
"Those wishing to sell cheese on the exchange may, under 
TABLE 2. FREQUENCY OF OCCURRENCE OF VARIOUS PERIODS OF UNCHANGED PRICE, TWIN CHEESES, WISCONSIN CHEESE 
EXCHANGE, BY SEASONS AND BY YEARS, 1936-38 (58). 
N umber of times price remained uncha.nged for period given in column 1 in 
Number of 
consecutive we.eke 1936 1937 1938' 
single price ruled 
April 1 to Rest of Total for April 1 to Rest of Total fDr April 1 to Rest of J anuary 1- August 20 Total for 
October 1 year year October 1 year year October 1 year August 20 Dec. 31 year 
1 4 5 4 6 2 8 10 
2 1 2 3 2 5 1 5 3 3 6 
3 3 4 2 2 2 2 2 
4 2 2 2 1 2 3 
5 1 1 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 1 t 
12 
13 It 
14 1 
.Since August 20, 1938, tbe Wisconsin Cheese Exchange has been operating under new rules designed to be mnre competitive (see text). Therefore data 
since August 20 are kept separate for observation. 
tBetween Oct. 15, 1936 and April 2, 1937 (24 weeks) the price remained unchanged at 16 cents. 
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the new regulations, come to the meeting and tell what they 
have to offer and the price they expect to receive; those wishing 
to buy may attend and state what cheese they want and how 
much they'll pay for it." The blackboard was to contain the 
two old columns for" bids" and" offers" and a third-" com-
pleted sales "-was to be added. The open session was to be 
40 minutes long for bidding and selling, with a final 10 minutes 
to clear the board (63). 
Because of this development the year 1938 is divided into 
two periods, Jan. 1 to Aug. 20 and Aug. 20 to Dec. 31, 
in table 2. From Aug. 20 on there were 12 price changes 
out of 18 possible, easily the largest frequency of change 
during any similar period during the 3 years. Apparently 
a considerable increase in the flexibility of cheese prices has 
taken place during the past few months, especially since in 
the previous 2 years the winter season was one of greater sta-
bility than the spring and summer months. During approxi-
mately the same August-December period in 1936 and 1937 
there were three and five changes, respectively, of 18 possible. 
Whether the increased trading on the Exchange will mean 
a closer approach to truly competitive conditions than the ques-
tionable behavior of the past decade or more remains to be 
seen, although the very great concentration in the industry 
makes such an outcome seem highly improbable, to say the 
least. It is interesting to note that the Farmer's Call Board, 
which purports to be an independent exchange meeting im-
mediately after the Wisconsin Cheese Exchange, established 
identically the same prices for cheddars both before and after 
Aug. 20 and the same prices for Twins except on Sept. 23 (12% 
instead of 12 cents) and on Nov. 4 (11~ instead of 11 cents). 
The tendency for price stability to be r elatively greater in 
certain seasons than in others has already been mentioned. 
Cheese production is highly seasonal, 60-65 percent being pro-
duced in the 6 months between April and September inclusive, 
with May, June and July the peak months. During this period 
the major part of the year's production is marketed and sold 
on the Exchange. For this reason data in table 2 have been 
divided according to two seasons during the 3 years. If 
we eliminate 1938 because of the change in Exchange pro-
cedure, we find that, in 1936 and 1937, only two of the six 
periods of prices unchanged for 5 weeks or more occurred in 
the period of heavy production between April and September. 
On the other hand, 15 of the 20 periods when prices changed 
within 1 to 4 weeks were during this season of heavy produc-
tion. The biggest exception to this general tendency was the 
14-week period without price change during the spring and 
summer of 1937. 
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In order to check whether or not the inflexibility of prices 
on the Wisconsin Cheese Exchange was a relatively new devel-
opment, the period 1918-38 was divided into seven 3-year 
periods. Within each of these periods ,the frequency of occur-
rence of various periods of unchanged price was tabulated in 
table 3. The frequency distributions present ed in fig. 3 are 
based on this tabulation. 
Examination of these data reveals clearly the growing inflexi-
bility of prices during the post-war period .. The average period 
during which a single price ruled increased from a low of 
1.25 weeks in 1921-23 to a high of 3.25 weeks in 1936-38. In 
fact, if 1938 is omitted because of the change in Exchange pro-
cedure, the average period for 1936-37 was 4.0 weeks. P r ice flexi-
bility increased slightly between 1918-20 and 1921-23, at a time 
when our previous analysis indicates that the increasing com-
petition of processors and chain stores was first felt. By 1927-
29, however, there had been a marked trend toward less flexible 
prices, during a period iIll which considerable concentration took 
place in the cheese industry. The degree of fl exibility showed 
little change between 1930 and 1935, but showed a further 
sharp decrease during the past 3 years. 
TABLE 3 . FREQUENCY OF OCCURRENCE OF VARIOUS PERIODS OF 
UNCHANGED PRICE. TWIN CHEESES, WISCONSIN CHEESE 
EXCHANGE, BY 3-YEAR PERIODS, 1918-38 (58). 
Number of consecutive 
k . I . ul d wee B BlDg e prIce r e 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
A verage period without 
price change (weeks) 
Number of times price remained unchanged for period 
given in column 1 in 
1918-20 1 1921-23 
---------------
1924-26t 1927-29 1930-32 1933-35 1936-38 
88 102 45 21 31 29 15 
26 19 19 19 11 16 13 
3 3 7 8 2 6 8 
1 2 7 2 6 2 5 
- - - 7 4 3 1 
-
- - 1 3 3 -
- - - - - 1 1 
- - 2 - 2 - -
- - 1 - 1 - 1 
.-- - -
-
- -
-
- - - 1 1 - I' 
- - - - - - 1 
- -
- 1 - 1 I" 
- - - - - - 1 
- - - - - -
-
- - - - - 1 -
------------
------
I 1. 30 1. 25 1.94 2 .60 2.57 2.52 3 .25t 
"Between Oct . 15, 1936, and April 2, 1937 (24 weeks), the price remained unchanged at 16 cents. 
tBetween May 3, 1924, and March 26, 1926, there were no quotations for Twins, so that the 
price of Single Daisies was used instead. 
tIl 1938 i. omitted because of change in Exchange procedure, the average for 1936-37 becomes 
4.00 weeks. 
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Fig. 3. Frequency of occurrence of various periods of unchanged price, 
Since butter prices were prevented by government price-peg-
ging from reaching their natural competitive level on the butter 
exchanges, off and on, in every year 1930-38, except in 1935 and 
1936, it is probable that some of the stability in cheese prices 
since 1929 was at times the result of the artificially-maintained 
stability in butter prices. Examination of the course of cheese 
prices during periods of price-pegging on the butter exchange, 
however, shows no consistent coincidence between periods of sta-
bility in the prices of the two products. The average period dur-
ing which a single cheese price ruled even in the 2 years 
1935-36, when there was no butter-price-pegging, however, was 
2.7 weeks, which was a slight increase over an average of 2.6 
weeks for 1927-29, the last period without any artificial control 
of butter prices. Thus, we can be sure of the growing inflexibility 
of cheese prices for 1918-29, but can only say that during 1930-38 
the stability of cheese prices (apart from any adificial influence 
from butter prices) probably increased still further. There ap-
pears to be a prima facie inference that this marked and growing 
stability of prices-in light of the conditions under which they 
are established-has not reflected comparable stability in supply 
and demand conditions. 
The leading figure in the industry, J. L. Kraft, expressed his 
views of the cheese pricing mechanism in 1933 as follows: 
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"The price of cheese has been maintained more in keeping with its 
market position than butter or condensed milk. In the early days there 
were a large number of cheese dealers in Wisconsin and New York 
State, probably two or three hundred. The method of pricing was upon 
various call boards scattered throughout [these] states. Gover'nment 
statistics as to stocks on hand, etc., were not available and these dealers, 
who were mostly local cheese makers, developed into cheese dealers by 
agreeing to sell the output of their neighbors' factories. They did not 
have adequate business training, and the weekly call boards were a 
means of working off personal grudges more than to establish a market 
in keeping with the trend. 
"Therefore, all of these markets fluctuated widely, sometimes a dif· 
ference of half a cent a pound being established between one week's 
market and the next. 
"The wide fluctuations in price front week to week made it impossible 
jor the dealers to clo business in a business·like way or take a pro ft. 
Therefore, over a period of time all of this type of cheese dealers failed 
or voluntarily went out of business, and the cheese business drifted into 
the hands oj packers ancl a limitecl number of other dealers who were 
soundly financed and used sound business practices. 
"For the past few years a fair price has been established on the 
Plymouth Call Board in Wisconsin, which, to a very large extent, has 
been the ruling price throughout the country, or in other words, the 
basic price from which to figure. This price has not been esta blished by 
agreement but rather by sort of a tacit or mutual understanding as to 
w hat a fair relationship or fair value for the product should be, basec! 
upon statistical information and the law of supply and demand. 
During this period, the price to the farmer has been equal if not better, 
on the average, than the price which either butter or condensed milk 
has brought and has paid the farmer better returns than anything he 
has been able to raise on his farm (62b). 06 
This letter has been quoted at some length since it brings out 
several important points. First, as Kraft intimates, the chief 
competition which the present concentrated cheese industry 
must meet is that of alternative uses for the farmers' milk. 
There is no doubt that these alternatives do provide a minimum 
level below which cheese prices cannot fall if cheese production 
is to be maintained. But white condensed milk and butter do 
compete with cheese for the use of milk, the former products 
do not by themselves, in most communities, insure adequatr. 
competition within the upper and lower limits they impose 
upon the price of milk destined for cheese production. Let us 
examine this further. 
Wisconsin leads in the production of both cheese and con-
densed milk and is the third state in the production of creamery 
26 Quoting from letter to Charles J. Brand, June 20, 1933. My italics. 
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butter. If any area exists where competition among the dif-
ferent manufactured uses of milk is keen, it should be here. 
This type of competition is somewhat limited, however, by the 
localized manufacture of the several dairy products. "The 
[Wisconsin] condensery area tends to form a secondary belt 
lying in general between that of market milk production in 
Southeastern Wisconsin and the cheese area to the west and 
north. It has expanded steadily and in so doing it has en-
croached primarily upon the regions of cheese production. 
The condensery industry is not a pioneer industry such as the 
butter or cheese industries have commonly been. It has fol-
lowed these industries after large volumes of milk have been 
available and ... good transportation .. . [has developed] ... 
[In expanding since the War ], it has tended to draw r·athe?-
heavily on the othe?' types of production, particulady cheese, 
which, in tur'n, has encroached somewhat upon the butter areas 
for· its milk supply" (83a) (italics added). 
"While there ar e regions in the state which market the bulk 
of the milk production through condenseries, the industry is 
not limited by the boundaries established by other milk uses 
for the condensery industry can usually compete readily with 
cheese and butter where the supply of milk is adequate . .. " 
(83b) . Historically, when a condensery has moved into an area 
previously devoted to cheese or butter, it has been only a matter-
of time before the cheese or butter factories were forced to 
Close. The reason, of course, is that condensing represents a 
more valuable use of milk than cheese-making, so that the con-
derise(y can readily offer a higher price for milk than the 
cheese fa·ctory. As to relative prices, " . . . market milk prices, 
represen.ting the highest use for milk, have been substantially 
above prices paid at cheese factories. Condensery prices occupy 
a position midway between cheese and market milk quota-
tions." Prices paid at Wisconsin condenseries averaged 13 
percent higher than prices at cheese factories in both 1926~30 
and 1931-35. In the former period the average prices paid were 
$2~07 and $1.83, and in the latt er period $1.14 and $1.01, at 
condenseries and cheese factories, respectively (84). ' Part of 
the differential between condensery and cheese-factory' prices 
niay represent additional costs for hauling milk to condenseries, 
which draw from a large area, compared with hauling to cheese 
factories, which are rarely located over 2 miles from the 
patrons' farms . While the condensery r egions are not definite 
geographically, overlapping to a considerable extent in regions 
where other types of milk utilization are also important, the 
heaviest concentration of farms producing milk for conden-
series is found in areas no longer of much importance fQr butter 
103 
or cheese production. The effects of the competition of con-
denseries upon cheese factories, therefore, is relatively slight 
except in certain outlying parts of the condensery areas where 
hauling costs to the condensery are sufficiently large compared 
with those to the nearby cheese factory to offset the price ad-
vantage which the condenseries enjoy. This competition is 
probably more important in setting the minimum price which 
condenseries can pay and still get enough milk away from the 
cheese factories, than in affecting the price the latter must pay, 
since milk for cheese (and butter) production is to some extent 
a 1'esidual supply.27 
Furthermore, the supply of milk for cheese and butter is, if 
anything, the larger-and the necessary price hence lower-
insofar as r estrictive price and production policies are followed 
by the highly-concentrated condensed milk industry, in which 
six companies handle 60-65 percent of the nation's supply (28c). 
These companies are Carnation, P et, A. & P., Borden, National 
Dairy Products and Armour, the last three also b eing among 
the six largest distributors of butter and of cheese. Such re-
strictive policies in this industry are obscured by two factors: 
The trend toward increasing per capita consumption of evapo-
rated milk since the War, and the increased demand for 
evaporated milk as a substitute for the more expensive fluid 
milk, especially during the depression. The rapid expansion 
of chain stores into the manufacture of evaporated milk, how-
ever, (2b, 2c), is strong evidence that this was a highly profit-
able alternative to payin!S prices dictated largely by the manu-
facturers of the nationally advertised brands. This undoubtedly 
improved the chains' bargaining power and brought lower 
prices to the consumer of the nation's evaporated milk. The 
chain-store organizations now manufacture about 14 percent 
of the nation's evaporated milk, most of it gained during the late 
'twenties at the expense of the standard-brand companies who 
chose to pursue a rigid price policy at the expense of increasing 
volume. Since 1933, however, the national advertisers have fol-
lowed a more aggressive price policy in the hope of increasing 
their volume once more.28 
We may conclude, therefore, that the condensed milk in-
dustry competes with the cheese industry in the sense that the 
supply available for cheese (and butter) depends upon the 
volume of milk purchased for condensing purposes. The more 
27 Cf. John D. Black: "Butter a nd cheese are the final claimants of an 
milk tha t is not u sed as fluid milk, cream, concentrated milk a nd ice cream" 
(81a) . 
28 Cf. Black, (81b): "At present [19 35] the policy of the evaporated milk 
industry is to keep prices down a nd to expand consumption." The aggressive-
n ess of the ch a in stores was probably the most important factor in bringing 
about lower prices in the industry. 
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restrictive the policies in the condensed milk industry, the 
greater the amount of milk available for cheese (and butter) 
manufacture, and hence the lower the price which needs to be 
paid for milk intended for cheese production. If the present 
more aggressive policies continue in the condensed milk in-
dustry, on the other hand, the level of the price of milk for 
cheese will probably be raised by a smaller residual milk sup-
ply. It is doubtful, however, if aggressive policies will con-
tinue indefinitely in an industry so concentrated as the con-
densed milk industry in spite of the entrance of the chain stores 
into the manufacturing end of the business. It is probable that 
the condensed milk industry competes with the cheese industry 
chiefly on the basis of the longer-run utilization of milk 
(a trend or cyclical influence) rather than on a spatial basis-
that is, through drawing from identical areas with cheese-
which latter would reflect itself in short-run (day-to-day and 
week-to-week) relationships of prices. 29 
What of the competition between butter and cheeee in the 
use of the residual supply of milk ~ Here again we find con-
siderable localization of production, for both butter and cheese. 
Wisconsin cheese production is centered in three major areas: 
the lake shore, north central and southwestern sections. 
"Creameries in Wisconsin are widespread, and form an im-
portant outlet for milk. The manufacture of butter has often 
been the leading industry in the beginning of the dairying in 
many communities. Other outlets have come with the develop-
ment of better transportation. Butte?' prodt~ction has given way 
to other tyq)eS! ,-of prodt~ction, such as cheese 1naking and the 
condensery industry. Some creamery butter production is re-
ported in all Wisconsin counties, the important areas being west-
ern, southwestern, and central Wisconsin. 
"Butter production ... still holds an important place in the 
large portion of the state where a number of different outlets 
are available for milk, [but] it forms practically the only avail-
able outlet in many localities of western Wisconsin, particu-
larly hilly regions where transportation facilities are less de-
veloped ... This western butter region forms a part of the large 
butter area in the United States which is found in the Upper 
Mississippi Valley regions of Wisconsin, Minnesota, and Iowa" 
(83c) (italics added). 
The chief butter and cheese areas of Wisconsin are surpris-
ingly well-delineated, even within the southwestern area in 
which both butter and cheese production are important. Hence, 
in a large part of the state, competition between butter and 
2. A brief discussion by the author of the economic aspects of the patenting 
of college research results, with special application to condensed milk, ap-
peared recently (90). 
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cheese for the milk supply is not nearly so direct as one would 
expect, considering the importance of both in the state as a 
whole. Few plants produce both butter and cheese. 
Furthermore, butter, from a short-run viewpoint, at least, 
involves a different type of farm organization (since skimmilk 
is available for feeding) than either cheese or condensed milk, 
for both of which whole milk is required. Another difficulty is 
that of making a direct comparison between returns from the 
two outlets due to the lack of exact knowledge of how to value 
the skimmilk fed on the farm. Since cream for butter is more 
concentrated, it does not require such frequent or costly de-
livery. A producer's shift from one type of dairy outlet to 
another (as from a creamery to a cheese factory) may take 
place relatively slowly in the short period. The present trend 
toward whole milk creameries, which churn butter and dry or 
make casein from the skimmilk, will lessen this rigidity in 
changing the type of outlet. It has the disadvantage, however, 
of making the Wisconsin farmer even more dependent on the 
prices of dairy products than ever before, since livestock pro-
duction is partially eliminated as a by-product of dairying.3o 
Finally, butter bears the brunt of all surpluses of milk, since 
it is the residual use of all milk not used for other dairy prod-
ucts. Such surpluses, especially in depression, are partly a 
result of the decreased consumption of other dairy products, 
especially fluid milk and cheese.31 The result is that butter often 
may appear to be an equally or more unsatisfactory outlet lor the 
producer's milk. While their control is not so great for butter 
as for cheese, one should also remember that the same large 
companies offer a leading outlet for either product, particularly 
Armour, Swift, Cudahy, National Dairy Products (Kraft-
Phenix) and Borden. 
For these reasons, the effects of the competition of butter 
and condensed milk with the cheese industry for the Wisconsin 
milk supply should not be exaggerated. On the other hand, 
however, it should be said that, undoubtedly, one of the reasons 
large dairy corporations have been going south for part of 
their supplies of milk is that the lack of alternative outlets in 
that region means a cheaper supply. Kraft's geographical ex-
pansion was explained as follows in 1928: "In the United 
States, the wide seasonal changes in milk prices are being 
30 "In the 7 years from 1929 to 1936, the number of Wisconsin plants manu-
f acturing dried a nd powdered skimmilk increased from 57 to 106, and the 
number producing casein from 176 t o 401." (88l-
3 1 Cf. Black (81c): "Cheese consumption fe ll off with the onset of the de-
pression because m os t of our popula tion does not consume ch eese as a staple 
food, nor consider it a cheap source of nouris hment ,vhen incomes are re-
duced." 
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partly overcome by developing large sources of supply in the 
south as well as the north ... This Kraft-Phenix extension of 
the dairy interests of the south in particular may ultimately 
reach great proportions, with resultant benefit to the com-
pany" (35m) .32 
Returning to Kraft's letter (p. 101), it may be said to reveal 
the typical industrial belief in the desirability of a stable price in 
order "to do business in a businesslike way," and in the 
" sound business practices " which accompany a more stable 
price when concentration in an industry becomes marked. We 
have seen how much in keeping with Kraft's ideas the prices 
on the cheese Exchange have been. 
Finally, it brings out the hair-line quasi-legal distinction 
in the industrialist's mind between setting price by "agree-
ment" and by "tacit or mutual understanding." The real 
point at hand is .the fact that only the buyer of cheese-the 
large-scale distributor- is party to the decision as to what the 
"fair" price should be. The "law of supply and demand" is 
doubtless important in the decision of the large cheese dis-
tributors as to the" fair" price of cheese, but there seems to be 
prima facie reason to raise the question whether that famous 
economic law as interpreted by these distributors is the most 
desirable from the social viewpoint, either for the milk pro-
ducer or the consumer. Some theoretical aspects of this ques-
tion are considered in the next section. 
The channels of pTimaTY distribution, that is, the first 
agencies to which manufacturers sell or transfer their cheese, 
were first covered in 1935 by the Census of Distribution. Use 
of this type of information proved satisfactory for butter (53b), 
since the number of hands through which butter passes from 
factory to consumer is relatively small. Information on the 
first agency receiving butter from the factory is sufficient to 
indicate roughly the probable channels through which the 
product is destined to move. For cheese, however, the distribut-
ing channels are more complicated and longer. The common 
intervention of the assembling dealer between the small coun-
try factory and subsequent distributors leaves in doubt the 
later flow of the product as between large-scale distributors 
and old-line wholesale channels, since both use such dealers-
either subsidiary or independent-for the assembly of the 
cheese in the country. The Census of Distribution shows that, 
of total cheese sales of manufacturers in the United States in 
1935, 67.9 percent moved through "wholesalers and jobbers." 
(Appendix table 7.) Virtually all of these are what may more 
accurately be called" assembling dealers," engaged in assewbly 
02 Quoting from prospectus of Tobey a nd Kirk, N . Y. Stock Exchange. 
107 
rather than dispersion of the product. Another 16.4 percent 
moved to "manufacturers' own wholesale branches," most of 
which again were probably subsidiary assembling dealers 
rather than wholesale dispersing agencies. Of the remaining 
cheese sales, 8.6 percent moved direct to retail stores (including 
chains), 3.4 percent direct to household consumers, and 2.5 
percent to industrial and large users. Finally, 1.2 percent 
moved from manufacturer direct to final consumer through 
the manufacturer's own retail stores, most of which were 
probably members of chain-store organizations. For example, 
A. & P. had three cheese factories in 1937 (5). Thus only 15.7 
percent of the nation's cheese moved directly all the way from 
factory to r etailer and large-scale or household consumer (56). 
Because of the shortcomings of these Census data, it is better 
to turn to other data that became available in a recent pub-
lication of the federal trade commission (47) .33 The commis-
sion presents data concerning the sources of supply and chan-
nels of distribution for the 4-6 leading cooperative dairy mar-
keting associations, the 8-10 largest dairy corporations, and the 
10 meat-packers most important in the distribution of cheese. 
Figure 4 presents the picture of the marketing channels for 
cheese as based primarily on the commission's data for 1934-35. 
Although the commission figure .3 are limited to the 22-26 organi-
zations just mentioned, these organizations handle the bulk 
of the nation's cheese-probably 85-95 percent. Their quan-
titative use of the various channels may therefore be taken as 
representing virtually complete coverage of the distribution by 
large-scale operators. The census data are used only for the 
cheese which did not move through any wholesale channels 
before reaching the retail store or the consumer. The rest of 
the quantitative measures are from the trade commission's 
report, except in the few cases where estimates involving ad-
justments in the commission's data were necessary.34 The small 
amount of cheese apparently not covered · by the commission 
figures or the Census direct-sales was assumed to move through 
the old-line wholesaler-wholesale grocer channel, since it un-
doubtedly was distributed by small operators. 
As may be seen in fig. 4, by far the greatest p1"oportion of the 
nation's cheese moved thrOt~gh tJv.e 8-10 leading dairy corpOTa-
tions and the 10 leading meat-packers. The large distributors 
received nearly one-half of their cheese direct from local fac-
tories-no doubt through subsidiary agencies which performed 
the assembling function. A somewhat smaller proportion they 
obtained through presumably independent assembling dealers. 
Roughly one-ninth of their cheese was produced in their own 
•• ""e ,,-ppendix tables 3-6. 
3' For details of adju stments made in the commission data, see appendix B. 
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Fig. 4. Marketing channels for cheese, 1934-1935. 
factories. The small remainder was purchased through mar-
keting cooperatives and brokers. There was, however, considC1'-
able diffC1'ence between the dairy cOl'porations and the meat-
packers in the ownership of the assembling agency, The 8 lead-
ing dairy corporations obtained 67.2 percent of their cheese 
purchases direct from local factories and only 21.7 percent 
from independent assembling dealers. The 10 meat-packers. 
on the other hand, received only 18.4 percent of their purchases 
direct from local factories, while they depended upon assem-
bling dealers for 64.9 percent (appendix table 5). The meat-
packers received 14.6 percent from" marketing cooperatives" 
compared with 10.2 percent for the dairy corporations. As is 
noted in appendix B, the commission used the term "market-
ing cooperatives" so broadly that many local cooperative 
cheese factories were included. For our purpose these are more 
properly classified with other local factories, so that the exact 
interpretation of the commission's figures is not clear. How-
ever, the differences in assembling agencies for the corpora-
tions and packers are too great to be significantly changed by 
the "cooperative" item. 
In the sale of their product, the lal'ge distl'ibntors fOtmd theil' 
chief outlet through theil' own integrated agencies dil'ect to 
l'etailel's or large.-scale nsers. Their direct outlets took about 
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85.5 percent of their cheese. Of these direct outlets, "route 
customers" (chiefly hotels, restaurants, institutions and inde-
pendent retail stores) took 60.7 percent, chain stores 12.1 per-
cent, and voluntary chains 1.4 percent, other dairy products 
companies 10 percent, and government agencies 1.3 percent 
(appendix table 6). Regular old-line wholesale outlets handled 
a total of only 12.5 percent of the large distributors' cheese, 
of which wholesale grocers were most important with 6.7 per-
cent. Dairy products wholesalers handled 5.4 percent and 
brokers 0.4 percent. Other outlets took the remaining 3.2 
percent. 
On the disposal of their product, again, the dairy corpora-· 
tions differed considerably from the meat-packers. The first 
difference was in the use of regular wholesale channels. The 
10 dairy corporations sold 15.4 percent of their cheese through 
wholesalers, wholesale grocers and brokers, compared with 9.7 
percent for the meat-packers. This indicates that the meat-
packers are more completely integrated in selling, although the 
dairy corporations are more fully integrated in purchasing, 
cheese. The brokers were a more important agency to the cor-
porations (0.9 p ercent of sales) than to the packers (neglig-
ible). Of the corporations' other wholesale outlets, 10.3 percent 
went to dairy products wholesalers and 4.2 percent to whole-
sale grocers. Comparable figures for the packers were 0.6 per-
cent and 9.1 percent, respectively. The greater importance of 
the wholesale grocers than the specialty wholesalers as a packer 
outlet is further evidence of the greater degree of integration 
in packer distribution, since the wholesale grocers were a step 
further along the old-line channel of distribution. 
The second i?1tp()rtant difference was in the r'elative irnp01--
tance of chain organizat'ions and independent stores as retail. 
O1~tlets. Of sales ,to retail stores, the dairy corporations sold 
84.3 percent to chain stores, 8.5 percent to voluntary chains, 
and 7.2 percent to independents. The meat-packers sold only 
7.1 percent of their direct-to-retail sales to chain stores, 1.7 
percent to voluntary chains and all of 91.2 percent to inde-
pendent grocers. The importance of chain stores to the dairy 
corporations and of independents to the packers was also ob-
served in the writer's study of butter marketing. 
" Route customers" took 46.1 percent of the corporations' 
cheese anq 74.7 percent of the packers' product. Only 1.9 per-
cent of the corporations' total sales, however, went to inde-
pendent grocers while 71.8 percent of the packers' total cheese 
sales went to these grocers. The term "route customers" in· 
cludes not only independent grocers but also homes, bakeries, 
Institutions, restaurants and hotels. Sales to homes and large 
users accounted for 44.2 percent of the corporations' total 
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sales but only 2.9 percent of the packers' sales. The sales of 
cheese from milk wagons of the large corporations direct to 
homes cannot be separated out of this figure . Government 
agencies took another 2.2 percent of the corporations' cheese 
and 0.5 percent of the packers '. 
Sales to other milk companies (omitted in the construction 
of fig. 4 as probable duplicating sales) amounted to 14.7 percent 
for the corporations and 5.5 percent for the packers. Sales to 
other outlets accounted for 1.2 and 2.6 percent for t he cor-
porations and packers respectively. 
Having examined differences between the two classes of 
large distributors, we may return to fig. 4 to see that about 
two-thirds (67.7 percent) of the country's cheese moved direct 
thq'ough integrated channels from these large distributors to 
the retailer or large user. 
The marketing cooperatives handled about 8 percent of the 
country's cheese. Practically all of this came from their local 
member factories. Of the sales of six cooperatives included in 
the commission's study, 47.3 percent was taken by "route 
customers, " 14.5 percent by voluntary chains, 8.0 percent by 
chain stores, 1.6 percent by milk products companies (prob-
ably mostly large distributors), 2.2 percent by govern-
ment agencies, and 7.2 percent by other distributors and con-
sumers. Regular wholesale channels-all classified as wholesale 
grocers-received only 19.2 percent (appendix table 4). The 
marketing cooperatives, however, were somewhat more de-
pendent upon old-line wholesale channels as an outlet than the 
large corporations (15.4 percent) and the packers (9.7 percent). 
About 5.8 percent of the nation's cheese reached the retailer 
direct from the factory, 1.2 percent direct to the consumer 
through the manufacturers' own retail stores, and 3.4 percent 
direct from factory to consumer. 
Of the total cheese distr ibuted, the old-line wholesaler channel 
brought only 14.1 percent to the retailer or large-scale user, and 
brokers another 0.4 percent-a total of 14.5 percent .for non-inte-
grated channels. And of this, only an estimated 2 percent of 
total cheese production moved all the way from local factory to 
consumer through independent agencies-assembling dealer, spe-
cialty wholesaler, wholesale grocer and independent retailer. 
Probably 51.7 pm"cent of the nation's cheese now passes 
th1"ough completely integrated channels all the way from the local 
cheese fact01'y to the retailer or large ttser.35 Another 4.6 percent 
passes through integrated channels even one step fU1"ther-to th~ 
35 The total of the percentages of direct-to-retail sales of: Marketing· 
cooperatives (5.4), distributor's-factory-to-re t a il sales (5.8) and that part 
of la rge di s tributors' direct (integrated) purchases estimated to pass on to the 
retailer through integrated channels (37.8 + 8.9 - 6.2, estimated through old-
line wholesale channels, = 40.5) , or 51.7 percent. 
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consumer-either dij'ectly fr01n the factory or via the manufac-
turer's own retail stores. Finally, abm~t 29.3 percent more is in-
tegrated all the 'way to the j'etailer except for an indJependent 
dealer who performs the assembly function between the local fac-
t01'Y and the retailer, 
The position of the processing factory has been omitted in 
this marketing picture since the data on which it is based did 
not consider separately the 40-50 percent of the cheese which is 
processed. Processing of the raw cheese may come between the 
large distributor and any of his sources of supply shown in 
fig. 4, An interesting incident was recently reported to the author 
by a person who had visited a processing factory of one of 
the patent holders, Here he found identical cheese being put 
up under 17 different brands, including not only the company's 
but also those of packers, leading cooperatives and other 
cheese distributors.36 This was undoubtedly a result, partially 
at least, of the patent situation. 
A lthough the large distributors have tended to integrate 
more completely in selling than in buying since the War, the 
trend toward acquiring subsidiary assembling dealers has been 
important. For example, in 1929 the Foreign Type Cheese 
Dealers' Association of Wisconsin had eight members, all origi-
nally independent,37 But Silcox (54) has observed that "the 
membership of (this) association is , , . being seriously af-
fected by the elimination of small dealers and merging of 
larger dealers. In fact, late in the fall of 1929, there were only 
two locally owned independent cheese houses" out of the eight 
members. Three of the eight were subsidiaries of Kraft-Phenix. 
Little has been said in this report on grading cheese. In the 
early history of the American cheese industry before modern 
transportation and cold storage facilities were available, the 
season's production was kept in the curing room of the factory 
and was not marketed until it was well cured. But marketing 
methods are now different. Cheese distributors in producing 
sections and terminal markets have provided facilities for hold-
ing cheese while it is being cured or ripened. Therefore, cheese 
is now usually marketed by factories, and often by country 
dealers, in a green state. 
36 The informant has since been much amused at the stubborn partisanship 
which housewives of his acquaintance show for one or another of these 17 
brands, all of which flowed out of the same processing equipment in rapia 
succession. 
87 An observer of the Department of Agriculture In 1913 noted a trend in 
this direction at even that early date: "Buyers of domestic Swiss cheese are 
located in small towns of the producing territory. Formerly there were many 
independent buyers. but a number are now combined to form a large com-
pany, the combination probably being made to eliminate competition. There 
are still a few independent buyers, one or two doing a very large business 
throughout the producing area. Some have close business connections with 
large New York and Chicago houses" (50). 
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Commercial grading of cheese has been based on the personal 
preference of the grader as well as on the demands of particulal' 
markets. The finer distinctions of quality generally have been 
given minor consideration. Ordinarily, cheese that has a firm 
body, a mild or sharp clean flavor, desired color and good finish , 
has been graded "good" to "fancy." Preference in body and 
color differs widely in the various consuming markets. Under 
such conditions, the grading certificate for a lot of cheese should 
not only state the score but also fully describe all the character-
istics that determine the various market preferences, such as 
approximate degree of flavor (mild or sharp), color, and char-
acter of texture and body (55). 
During 1938 the cheese industry was getting restive as some 
of the patents on processed cheese expired or neared termina-
tion. s8 A series of articles in the National Butter and Cheese 
J oumal by C. R. Barker heralded this event: 
'''There ,are different ways of making process cheese in the United 
States today. Essentially preparation consists of a cleaning of the 
cheese, removing bandages, paraffine, etc., grinding the cheese, heating 
in a jacketed container with agitation, and filling into the proper con-
tainers, . . . 
"There are various patents in process cheese, ' some in jacketed kettles, 
some in vacuum, and a process of treating cheese which consists of pass-
ing a stream of cheese through a chamber, admitting steam to the 
chamber to reduce the particles of cheese to substantially a liquid state, 
and momentarily exposing all particles of cheese to the steam. 
"The process patents for cheese made in a jacketed kettle have ex-
pired, and this process cam now be used by others, providing you have 
another method Of pacToaging other than the foi l lined box, for this 
patent does not ea;pire until Decernber 13, 1938, 
"We have completed a vast amount of work on the steam jacketed 
kettle to determine what are the objections to this process. There are 
no serious objections aside from some cooking losses , . . [but] the 
losses in a handling of a kettle are much higher than would ordinarily 
be expected," 
Barker pointed out that, in the jacketed kettl e process, there is 
an evaporation loss of 111.~ percent and a loss in weight after the 
cheese leaves the kettle of about 1 percent, On the other hand, 
"in the continuous type process there is a larger saving, for the con-
struction of [the] machine and the use of direct steam [are such that] 
we only clean [away the rind coating which forms inside] after the 
day's work is complete. This is an advantage of the direct process for 
this saving will average around two percent, . . . " 
38 Cf. the following statement by John Brandt, president of Land O'J,akes : 
"As I understand it, the Kraft-Phenix patents cannot be renewed and their 
patents expir e some time this year, There is no question but what they 
h,we enjoyed a very marked advantage over other cheese distributors in the 
fact that they control these patents," (Letter of March 6, 1938, to a uthor.) 
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"[The] overrun on the jacketed kettle 
be from five to seVen percent on cheddar. . 
[with] daily runs will 
. With the continuous 
direct steam process, the overrun will be from two to three percent 
higher than these figures. It is these figures that have made processing 
of cheese a veryJ profitable industry for those w ith patent protection. 
With the expiration of these patents this field will receive attention 
from other lar;g'e food 1nanufacturers. 
"Another advantage is that the inferior grades of cheese, called unde1'· 
grades, can by proper handling and blending, be used to advantage; in 
fact, it is the large proportion of inferior cheese that first attracted at-
tention in this industry. It requires care and knowledge to use under-
grades to advantage so as not tOo affect either flavor or body of the 
cheese being processed" (69). 
"Due to patents on the use of direct steam in the manufacture of 
process cheese, we cannot use direct steam in making process chEese at 
the present time. However, we can use the old style, upright kettle 
and this is the means various firms are discussing as a means of enter-
ing this field" (70) (my italics) . 
Thus the patents on the continuous direct-steam process, 
which have not yet expired, have important technical advan-
tages over the process which is at last available for use by other 
manufacturers. These promise to offer obstructions to effective 
competition for some years to come. The possibility of using 
inferior grades of cheese also is of great importance since it 
means cheaper raw materials accompanied by prices exacted 
on the final product which are higher than can ordinarily be 
obtained for the highest-quality bulk cheese. 
The same writer has defended the patenting of processed 
cheese in these words: 
"One of the largest of the process cheese manufacturers had a definite 
goal. In order to assure it he knew that protection would be 
necessary. For the penny wise and pound foolish individual will throw 
anything on the market and call it process cheese. This protection he 
obtained by patents on his product , And as a r esult the cheese industry 
was saved for the dairy farm. Perhaps a number of individuals in the 
cheese industry did not fare so well but one only has to look at our 
history of export cheese to realize how short individuals in the cheese 
industry are. Now with the expiration of numerous process cheese 
patents, reason and judgment are necessary if we are not to allow a 
few penny-wise individuals to injure the cheese industry" (70) .a" 
While Barker's Ylarning as to the dangers of short-sighted prac-
tices is w ell-taken, it is extremely doubtful if the motives lead-
'" In the 1890's the sizeable U nited States exports of c h eese fell to nothing 
becau se of the w idespread a nd sh ort- s igh t ed u se of skimmilk in producing a 
c heese whic h was s ubsequently mislabeled "whole-milk c heese." This is the 
"export cheese" situa tion to w hic h Barker referred. 
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Fig. 5. Consumption of cheese per capita, United States, by years, 1925-37. 
ing to the successful applications for the several basic patents 
were so beneficent as he seems to imply. Nevertheless, one 
should recognize that the great concentration in the ch eese in-
dustry is no doubt partly responsible for the marked increase in 
per capita consumption in the United States, especially since 
1932. The annual per capita consumption by years since 1925 
is shown in fig. 5 (and appendix table 2). Consumption reached 
a level of 4.77 pounds per capita in 1926 which was not again 
equaled until 1934. Between 1926 and 1928 consumption fell to 
4.51 pounds, probably reflecting the increasing claims made on 
the milk supply by fluid milk, cream and evaporated mille In 
1929 consumption rose to 4.67 pounds and remained at about the 
same level in 1930. By 1932 it had reached a low of 4.38 
pounds, evidence that cheese is not a staple food in the Ameri-
can diet in time of depression. Efforts on the part of the large 
cheese distributors, especially processors, to maintain resale 
prices were probably an additional factor . 
Between 1932 and 1936, however, consumption expanded by 
23 percent, reaching an all-time high of 5.39 pounds in 1936, 
falling only slightly to 5.35 pounds in 1937. A good share of 
this recent increase is probably a result of the large-scale maga-
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zine and radio promotion of an attractively packaged product. 
especially by Kraft-Phenix. This increase in demand has prob-
ably resulted, however, largely from increased product differen-
tiation and advertising outlays rather than from price competi-
tion. 
A recent Wisconsin report points out that" retail prices of 
cheese have not consistently followed the trend of factory 
prices. . This matter is an important one from the stand-
point of its effect on the market for Wisconsin cheese. Usually 
it is assumed that when the price of a foodstuff falls very low, 
consumers r ecognize it as an unusual bargain and are encour-
aged to buy more, thus preventing a glut in the market and 
starting prices upward again. But when the public does not 
get the benefit of low prices paid to farmers for milk and to 
cheesemakers for cheese, then naturally the public has no in-
ducement to increase consumption" (67) .40 This is especially 
true at times when prices of other food products are falling. 
While Barker has defended the patenting of cheese41 he has 
also presented elsewhere a very excellent statement of the ill-
effects of these same patents: 
"To compare the marketing cost for butter with the cost of marketing 
cheese and milk, the producer gets about 70 percent of the final retail 
price in the case of butter, about 50 percent in the case of cheese, and 
only about 40 percent in the case of milk. This is a very marked varia-
tion. . . ' . butter passes through the hands of [several] middlemen, 
and yet is marketed on a smaller margin than any commodity I know of. 
"In the case of cheese we have a very different condition. Through 
patents, advertising, and efficient distribution systern, the bulk of this 
business is in the hands Of one firm. Not that they are not efficient but 
the consumer lvas to pay entirely too much for the smaller packages of 
cheese as quarter ·and half pound packages, and this is worse in the case 
Of certain cheese foods. These products should be manufactured and 
distributed . . . for several cents per package below that existing at 
present. In tall: ing with the president of a large corporation, [I was 
told] that he was aware of this condition and that his firm would like 
to enter this field, but due to patents and fear of patent infringement h e 
hesitated to do so. He was not afraid of the competition or that he 
would not eventually win out, but he was afraid of wh'at would happen 
to his firm's credit at the banks, if his, a large nationally known or .. 
ganization, were to become involved in the courts with another large 
nationally known organization. 
"It is this fear that bars an increased consurnption of cheese, for if 
we are to increase consumption and consumer demand, the price of the 
'0 Report of findings of Don Anderson of the D epartment of Agricultural 
Economics, Univ. of Wiscon s in. 
"Supra, p. 113. 
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smaller package must be lower. The majority of consumers prefer in-
dividually packaged goods and are not attracted by goods in bulk. 
Children prefer the so-called cheese foods . . . [for] which the con-
sumer pays [a] ridiculously high [price] compared with the actual cost. 
"The cheese field, offers an excellent opportunity to increase consu1np-
tion of dairy prod,ucts providing the fear of patent infringe?nent is re-
?noved. In the matter of [cheese] spreads there is no reason to hesi-
tate for one should be able to build an excellent business in this field 
and as is well known these products are 90 percent by-products of the 
dairy industry, therefore the farmer' is certain to benefit" (71) (italics 
added). 
The past decade, then, has seen a marked concentration of 
distribution of processed cheese in the hands of a very few 
firms. Such competition as has remained in spite of the patents 
has been as little on a price basis as control of resale prices and 
" cooperation" with competitors would allow. In spite of what 
were apparently excessive margins, the entry of other distributors 
has been prevented by the fear of patent suits and the expenses 
and bad publicity which would result. Competition has, therefore, 
been primarily one of differentiating the product through br:and-
ing, packaging in fancy cartons and costly glass-ware and enor-
mous outlays for sales promotion. As a result the consumer prob-
ably has received an increasing proportion of cocktail glasses and 
Bing Crosby's wit for his cheese-dollar, and a declining propor-
tion of cheeseY The higher prices4 3 may have served only to 
cover the higher costs of sales and distribution and perhaps 
monopoly profits instead of being passed back to the producer 
in the form of higher prices for his milk. 
How strong has the trend toward concentration been during 
the post-war period? In 1918 the four largest meat-packers 
were distributing 48.5 percent of the nation's cheese. Armour 
was first with 20.1 percent of total American factory production 
in that year. Swift followed with 16.7 percent, while Cudahy 
and Wilson sold 6.2 and 5.5 percent respectively. The two larg-
est companies distributed 36.8 percent. 
In 1934-35 the four largest companies-which still included 
Armour and Swift in second and third positions r espectively-
distributed 70.1 percent of total cheese production, nearly twice 
as large a share as in 1918 for the same number of companies. 
" it is n ot the writer's intention t o deny that the consumer gets a certain 
satisfaction from these extra "services," but the important point is that he 
does not have the alternative of doing without them a t a lower price, if h e 
so chooses . 
• 3 Cf. Chamberlin (41a): "Prices (although inevitably higher than under 
pure competition) may be either higher or lower than they would b e without 
a dvertising. If the elasticity of the demand c urves r emain s approxima te ly 
the same [as before the shift induced by advertisin g ], the price will be 
higher. . . . But if the selling costs are not great . . . a nd if, as a 
result of the advertising, demand curves becom e very much more e lastic, . . . 
prices will be lower. . . . The effect of advertising . . . depends upon 
the f acts o f the case." 
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Fu;rthermore, a single company, National Dairy Products 
(through its Kraft-Phenix subsidiary), sold nearly as large a 
proportion (32.1 percent) as did the two largest companies com-
bined in 1918. Armour and Swift handled 28.7 percent of the 
nation's cheese in 1935 as compared with 36.8 percent in 
1918, so that their relative position had shown a decline of some 
importance. "National Dairy Products Corporation is the out-
standing cheese producer of the country, and . . . it, if act-
ing together with Armour and Swift, would be in a position to 
control, in a large measure, the price of cheese in this conn-
try" (60a). These three companies handled 60.8 percent of all 
cheese in 1934-35. If Kingan and Cudahy (both packers) are 
added, the six companies handled 79.6 percent, a very marked 
concentration. If figures were available on the volume of 
processed cheese only, by companies, they probably would show 
that National Dairy and Borden together distribute a very large 
percentage of the nation's supply, since the meat-packers have 
continued of importance chiefly in the distribution of bulk cheese. 
SUMMARY 
By the early part of 1931-38 large-scale sales promotion of pro-
cessed cheese in attractive packages was showing very marked re-
sults. Between 1929 and 1931 processed cheese expanded from an 
equivalent of 13.9 to 40.5 percent of American cheddar cheese pro-
duction, and had reached over 50 percent by 1937. Processing 
margins were very wide in 1929-31 but narrowed markedly in 
1932-37 with a further rise in the relative importance of 
processed cheese. Since efforts to set up a cheese marketinL:1; 
agreement under the AAA failed, government aid to producers 
was limited to a small volume of cheese purchases for relief. 
National Dairy Products Corporation (Kraft-Phenix) is still 
by far the largest distributor of cheese, although its share of 
domestic cheese production dropped sharply from 47 to 32 per-
cent in 1932-34. It still buys most of its bulk cheese, only 15 
percent being produced originally in its own factories. Na-
tional Dairy expanded considerably between 1930 and 1936, 
:luring which time it acquired 62 additional companies, about 
one-third of them for its cheese division. 
Borden, the second largest dairy corporation, showed little 
tendency to expand after 1930. In 1934 it was the fourth larg-
est cheese distributor (9.3 percent of domestic production), 
probably second to Kraft-Phenix in volume of processed-cheese 
sales. Kraft-Phenix and Borden held the basic . patents on 
processed cheese. Considerable evidence exists of their non-ag-
gressive price policies 'which took the form of exchange of in-
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formation and "cooperation" with competitors, strict control 
of resale prices and a philosophy of "live and let live." Com-
petition was largely confined to large-scale advertising. Theil' 
only serious sales problem came from chain stores, which were 
large enough to bargain favorably with the large distributors. 
The chain stores' position was weakened, however, by the fact 
that the distributors held basic patents which prevented the 
chains from doing their own processing-a weapon the threat 
of which would have greatly improved the chains' strength in 
bargaining had it been available. In 1934 the, three dairy 
corporations most important in cheese (exclusive of packers) 
distributed 42.7 percent of domestic production. The 10 most 
important corporations distributed only slightly more. 
Armour and Swift ranked second and third to Kraft-Phenix 
in 1935, distributing 14.9 and 13.8 percent, respectively, of do-
mestic production. They were probably the two most impor-
tant bulk cheese distributors. Kingan and Cudahy ranked 
fifth and sixth. These four packers distributed 38.2 percent of 
the domestic production, while the 10 leading packers distributed 
42.7 percent. 
The National Cheese Producers' Federation suffered a sharp 
drop in business in 1931 and 1932 as a result of enormous losses 
on large inventories during a falling price level. This meant 
previous overpayments to the member factories, which proceed-
ed to withdraw from the Federation in large numbers. In 
1934 the Federation became a member of Land 0 'Lakes, a large 
butter cooperative federation, with selling facilities largely inte-
grated through to the retail store. The three principal coopera-
tive sales agencies are now distributing about 6 percent of do-
mestic production compared with 10.4 percent in 1930. 
Bulk cheese prices continue to be established on the two Ply-
mouth exchanges, in spite of repeated recognition of the obvious 
lack of competition on the boards. A study of these prices dur-
ing the post-war period indicates that they have become in-
creasingly inflexible. Even during the season of h eavy market-
ing, prices sometimes continue unchanged for 12-14 weeks at a 
time. In the late summer of 1938 n~w rules of trading on the 
'Wisconsin Cheese Exchange were 'set up, designed to increase the 
volume sold at the weekly meetings. Prices have been more flexi-
ble since then. The very marked concentration in the industry 
makes it seem unlikely, however, that the results will guarantee a 
competitive price to the producer. 
The chief competition the cheese industry has to meet is not 
within the industry itself. This competition is with the butter 
and condensed milk industries for the use of the milk supply, 
This competition still leaves a significant range within which 
monopolistic elements in the cheese industry can work against 
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the farmer who sells his mill{ to the cross-roads cheese factory. 
A study of marketing channels for cheese in 1934-35 shows 
that about two-thirds of domestic cheese production moved 
through integrated channels from the dairy corporation or meat-
packer direct to the retailer or large user. Some 52 percent 
passed through channels integrated all the way from the coun-
try cheese factory to the retailer or large user, while 29.3 per-
cent more reached the retailer through integrated channels 
after the intervention of an independent assembling dealer in 
the country. Nearly 5 percent moved from the local factory 
to the consumer-either direct or through the manufacturer's 
own retail stores. 
The old-line wholesale channels apparently brought only 14.5 
percent of the cheese to retailers and large users. Only 2 per-
cent of domestic cheese moved all the way from local factory 
to consumer through independent agencies. Thus wholesale 
channels now play a very minor role in cheese distribution. 
Since 36 percent of butter moved through wholesaler-jobber 
channels in 1935 (53), it may be seen that cheese is far less de-
pendent on wholesalers than butter. 
At the present time the cheese industry is becoming restive, 
since some of the basic patents have expired. The large dis-
tributors, however, still hold patents on later processing equip-
ment which gives them great technical advantages over com-
petitors. The enormous good-will they have built up for their 
products through extensive differentiation in packaging and 
advertising is also likely to be an important barrier to the 
growth of other processors, even though the latter can now 
legally enter the field. The most important potential develop-
ment is probably the entry of the chain stores into the cheese 
processing field, especially if the large distributors continue 
to insist too much upon dictating resale prices. 
Concentration in the cheese industry has increased greatly 
since 1918. In that year the four largest meat-packers domi-
nated cheese distribution, handling 48.5 percent of the nation's 
volume. In 1934-35 four companies distributed 70.1 percent of 
domestic production, nearly 50 percent more than the four 
leading companies of 1918. Armour and Swift declined 
somewhat in importance during the post-war period, but still 
ranked second and third in importance. A single company 
now distributes one-third of the country's cheese, or nearly as 
much as the two largest companies in 1918. The six largest 
companies now distribute about 80 percent of the nation's cheese 
production. Since the six largest butter distributors handle 
about 38 percent of the country's butter and the six largest 
condensed milk manufacturers about 60-65 p ercent of total 
condensed milk production, it is readily seen that among the 
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leading manufactured dairy products,44 concentration has pro-
ceeded furthest in cheese. 
v. SOME THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS* 
"The frigid theories of a generalizing age." 
-Disraeli (80e). 
What are some of the theoretical effects of monopoly ele· 
ments upon the farmer ~ This section may be looked upon as 
(1) an exercise in the technique of the theory of monopolistic 
competition as applied to the buying side, and (2) an effort to 
mise some questions which must be answered before the com-
petitive aspects of the cheese industry haV'e been fully and satis-
factorily treated. 
Only one comparison will be made here, namely, that be-
tween cheese prices to farmers when there is pure competition 
in the industry and prices when there is pure monopoly or 
oligopoly, with particular emphasis on the results when-per-
haps because of advertising and product differentiation-there 
has been a considerable increase in demand. This seems to be 
the most important single problem, since we have seen that 
while a large number of firms were manufacturing processed 
cheese in the early 'twenties this business later became con-
centrated in the hands of only a very few firms. Furthermore, 
the demand for cheese has apparently increased in recent 
years, and we have recognized that this increase may be partly 
attributed to the advertising and promotion of these few firms. 
Is the farmer likely to gain or lose by such an incre:u~ e in 
demand, if it is accompanied by greater concentration of con-
trol in the industry? Let us examine some of the theoretjc~ 1 
concepts involved in studying such a problem, while recognizing 
that the analysis presented here is highly theoretical, and that 
much empirical work would have to be done before any great 
significance could be attached to the results to which our theo-
retical discussion leads. 
Let us assume for simplicity that all cheese reaches the con-
sumer in processed form, although we have seen that much of 
the nation's cheese actually is sold to the consumer in bulk. 
In fig. 6, the derived average revenue curves (DAR and D' A'R') 
represent the derived demand schedules for bulk cheese before 
and after an increase in demand, while the derived marginal 
• The reader not interested in the more theoretical aspects of the problem 
may wish to omit pp. 121-126 . 
.. With the possible exception of ice cream. 
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Fig. 6. Diagram for considering the theoretical effect of an increase in con-
sumers' demand for processed cheese upon the processor's demand for bulk 
cheese, under monopolistic and competitive conditions. 
revenue curves (DMR and D'M'R') are marginal to their respec-
tive average curves.45 
These particular curves are drawn relatively elastic at higher 
prices while becoming somewhat inelastic as output increases. 
They are, of course, purely hypothetical. Their shape will not, 
however, affect the qualitative nature of our conclusions. 
It is further assumed that the factors of production are used 
in the same proportions (for any given output) under pure 
monopoly and pure competition which will be our initial com-
parison, so that the derived marginal and average revenue 
<5 More specifically, derived average "event<e is the average revenue from 
the processed cheese (that is, its demand schedule) manufactured from a unit 
of bulk cheese (the raw material) less the average cost of other factors em-
ployed per unit of bulk cheese in the manufacturing process. Thus, the origi-
nal market demand curves for processed cheese (not shown in fig. 6) would 
lie above the derived curves (DeAR and D'eA'R') by a distance, at any given 
volume, equal to the average cost of the other factors (including entrepreneur-
ship) used in processing that volume. The shape of such a derived demand 
curve depends upon the sha pe of the market demand curve for the final prod-
uct and the shapes of the supply curves of the other factors used in the 
process. 
Derived marginal reven,<e is the addition to total revenue which results 
from processing an additional unit of bulk cheese, with the appropriate addi-
tion . to other factors employed in processing, less the addition to the total 
cost of these other factors. It bears the ordinary marginal relationship to 
derived average revenue. Cf. Joan Robinson (45a). 
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curves are the same for both. The demand curve for bulk 
cheese of the industry under competition is then given by the 
derived average revenue curves; under monopoly, since the 
industry is a unit of control, the demand curve is given by the 
derived marginal revenue curves of the industry.46 The monop-
olist's demand curve for cheese is thus marginal to the com-
petitive demand curve (45b). 
The average cost (AO) curve is the supply curve of cheese 
to the industry, and the marginal cost (MO) curve represents 
the marginal cost of cheese to the industry. These hypothetical 
curves are drawn relatively flat at lower volumes of cheese, 
indicating considerable elasticity of supply, but become quite 
steep with growing volume, since this probably becomes in-
creasingly costly as more and more has to be bid away from 
other uses of the milk supply, such as evaporated milk and 
butter. 
With these conditions in mind, let us first consider the de-
rived demand curve DAR and its marginal curve DMR. If we 
initially assume perfect competition, output would be 00, 
defined by the intersection of the derived average revenue and 
supply (average cost) curves, and the price of cheese would 
be OK. There would be no monopoly profits. Now let us 
imagine that a monopolist takes over complete control of the 
industry, so that he is the only buyer of bulk cheese and the 
only seller of processed cheese. Under the given demand con-
ditions as reflected by the derived revenue curves DAR and 
DMR, we would expect him to restrict his volume somewhat 
below the competitive output 00. In fact, he would choose 
the volume OA, determined by the equality of the marginal 
cost and derived marginal revenue from bulk cheese. The 
price of bulk cheese would fall to AF and the monopolist would 
enjoy surplus profits of EFGH. But suppose that our newly-
established monopolist, instead of accepting existing demand 
conditions, believes he will make larger profits if he seeks to 
increase the demand for processed cheese by offering the con-
sumer increased" services" in the form of a more attractive or 
useful package or by advertising extensively. The resulting 
increase in demand is represented by a shift of the DAR and 
DMR curves to the positions of D' A'R' and D'M'R'. The addi-
tional . costs (other than those of the raw material) required 
in manufacturing and selling the increased output now in de-
mand have already been accounted for in deriving the new 
curves. In order that the second output may be one of equi-
.v .., ·ur a n individual unit of control the r e is no such thing as a demand curve. 
but it is convenient to call the price a t which a given volume of bulk cheese 
would be purchased if the supply of cheese were perfectly e lastic a t that 
price, "the demand price" for that volume of ch eese, and to call the curve 
connecting the demand price (in this sense) a nd the volume of cheese the 
"demand curve" for ch eese. cr. Joan Robinson (45j). 
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librium, let us further assume that, of all the possible varia-
tions in product, amounts of selling outlay and selling price, 
the new output will be one of highest-profit -combination of 
these three variables (41b). 
The new monopoly output will be OB, the price of bulk 
cheese BL, and monopoly profits increased to 'LMNP. The com-
parable competitive output would be OD, the price of bulk 
cheese DQ. Thus, for the two monopoly outputs, the excess of 
the derived average revenue from a unit of bulk cheese (what 
it is worth to the monopolist) over its average cost increases 
from GF to LM while the average cost (the price to the far-
mer's cheese factory) increases by only SL. This result, how-
ever, is contingent upon the particular elasticity of the derived 
demand curve in its new position (D' A'R') assumed. For GF 
might conceivably be greater than LM if the new demand were 
somewhat more elastic than the old, since it is the-areas LMNP 
and EFGH (total monopoly profits) which are of importance to 
the monopolist rather than merely their vertical dimension (per 
1mit monopoly profit). 
So long as LMNP is greater than EFGH we know that it will 
pay the monopolist to make the additional outlays per unit of raw 
material as well as the additional costs of manufacturing and sell-
ing-including advertising-which are necessary to induce the as-
sumed increase in demand for the final product. In the illus-
tration used here, monopoly profits increase considerably from 
EFGH to LMlNP when the increase in demand is induced and 
met. Under the conditions assumed, a perfect monopolist 
would, even after covering increased costs of packaging and 
advertising by charging higher prices47 to the consumer (al-
ready allowed for in the derived curves of fig. 6), share with 
the farmer only a part of the increase in revenue attributable 
to the farmer's product after paying for all other necessary 
costs. The surplus would thus be retained by the monopolist 
as monopoly profits. Under pure competition the whole ex-
cess would be shared between the consumer and the producer. 
Since the monopolist is assumed to have no competitors, his 
excessive profits-maintained, say, by a basic patent-will not 
attract other processors, so that competition cannot force the 
price to the farmer up to the competitive price (OK or DQ. 
depending on demand), where derived average revenue and 
average cost are equal and all monopoly profits are eliminated. 
In absolnte terms the farmer is ultimately better off under 
the monopolist than under pure competition under the original 
demand conditions, since he now receives a price of BL, which 
exceeds the former competitive price OK by TL. This is the 
more realistic comparison. In relative terms, however, the far-
.7 But see footnote 43 once more. 
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mer is considerably worse off, since, while h'e now receives only 
a fraction of the net value of his product to the monopolist 
(BL relative to BM), he formerly received (under our assump-
tions of pure competition) the full net value of his product 
(OK). Under the new demand conditions he would receive 
a price of DQ for his product if pure competition still existed. 
Much, therefore, depends upon whether the larger number of 
small firms which formerly existed would have been able to 
induce the same increase in demand. However, in order for 
the farmer to receive the equivalent of the new monopoly 
price BL under purely competitive conditions, the shift in the 
demand would not have had to be nearly so great as the 
shift under monopoly pictured in fig. 6, since it would only 
need to shift far enough to pass through the point L instead 
of the point Q. Suppose that, under pure competition, the 
demand curve could be shifted by joint advertising beyond L 
but not so far as Q (simply due to the difficulties of getting 
so many firms together on a joint enterprise). Then there might 
be something to be said for granting a monopoly for a limited 
number of years (as a patent does in theory), if, at the end 
of that period, competition could be counted upon to eliminate 
excessive profits and increase output to OD and the price of 
bulk cheese to DQ. In actual practice, however, the forces 
favoring the perpetuation of monopoly seem to militate against 
such an outcome. 
Numerous objections can be raised to the assumptions under 
which this analysis has proceeded. First of all, we are com-
paring two equally unreal extremes-perfect monopoly and 
perfect competition. In such a comparison, only one motive 
is needed for creating a monopoly when perfect competition 
exists-the possibility of raising prices by restricting output. 
In the imperfect markets of the real world, since individual 
firms do not grow to their optimum size, a second motive also 
exists-the possibility of lower costs by improving the organi-
zation of the industry (45c).48 The chief objection, however, 
concerns our assumption that average cost to the monopolist 
and the competitive industry are the same for any given output. 
Except in certain unusual cases, the proportions of the factors 
used under monopoly and under competition in producing a 
given output will not be the same. When the proportions are 
different, average cost to· the monopolist will be less than aver-
age cost to the competitive industry, since his demand for the 
various factors of production is tempered by the fact that 
he recognizes and allows for his own influence on their prices 
48 For still other objections, see Joan Robinson's chapters 14 and 24. 
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(45d) .49 Under these conditions, the monopolist's derived aver-
age and marginal revenue curves would lie above their com-
petitive positions of fig. 6 (since average other-costs already 
deducted would be less) and monopoly outputs would be some-
what greater than OA and 013. If the change in the propor-
tions of factors made by the monopolist is sufficiently great, 
his demand curve for bulk cheese (DMR or D'M'R') may 
actually lie above the competitive demand curve (DAR or 
D' A'R') . Then, if the supply of cheese is sufficiently elastic, 
the output will be greater under monopoly than under com-
petition (45i). 
"The inaccuracy of our comparisons will be greater the 
greater is the difference between average cost under monopoly 
and under competition. They will therefore be more inac-
curate the greater the technical possibilities of variation of the 
proportions of the factors, and the greater the divergence be-
tween the elasticities of supply of the separate factors; that is 
to say, the greater the scope for improvement upon the com-
petitive costs." The analysis is based on a period long enough 
for the proportion of factors to be altered as far as technically 
possible (45f) . 
Our assumption of a shift in demand induced by an improved 
product (or" services") or by advertising is valid if such shift 
is aimed at increasing the agg1'egate sales of processed cheese, 
in which case it would be equally profitable for some corporate 
body acting jointly on behalf of the competitive industry and 
for the monopolist (45g). Here we are stretching the meaning 
of "perfect competition" somewhat,50 but probably not enough 
to matter a great deal. 
Let us now-for simplicity-retain the assumption that the 
factors of production are used in the same proportions (for any 
given output) under monopoly and competition, while recog-
nizing its obvious shortcomings, and consider the case of a 
few large firms, instead of one, which together sell (and hence 
buy) the entire output of the industry. "Perfect competition 
among buyers requires that the numbers of buyers composing 
a market shall be large .. and that sellers are indifferent as 
to whom they provide with their wares" (45h) . 
•• Technically speaking, the extent to which he can allow for his influence 
on the various factor prices in c hoosing the lowest cost combination depends 
on the elasticity ot substitution of one factor for another (as capital for 
labor). This is measured by the change in the ratio of the quantities of the 
factors which occurs when the ir relative prices a lter (45k). Only if the 
proportion of (say) capital to labor is fixed, will he have no leeway in choos-
ing the most economical proportions of these factors. 
GO Chamberlin (41c) says: "A single wheat farmer or a single oran ge 
grower does not advertise to increase the consumption of his product. Ad-
v{'rtising takes place here, if at all, only by cooperation between all producers, 
which coope,-atio", gives co'ltditions ot monopolistic competition, the whole 
body ot sellers acting as 0"'''. i", competing tor their ma1'ket with sellers ot 
other goods" (my italics). As for improvement of product, a parallel in-
stance might be an industry-wide effort to put out a higher-quality (though 
standardized among the competitive producers) product by which total con-
sumption would be increased, 
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Let us assume further that-while competition is not perfect 
in our example since there are but few buyers-the sellers are 
indifferent as to whom they sell their bulk cheese, and that the 
buyers and sellers are in full communication with each other 
so as to constitute really one market.51 
The buyers are assumed to be completely independent. But, 
in the nature of the case, their fortunes are not independent. 
Each is forced by the situation itself to take into account the 
policy of his rival in determining his own, even though no 
agreement exists between them. 
Using the D' A'R' and D'M'R' aurves and the average and mar-
ginal cost curves of fig. 6, a static analysis analogous to that 
of Chamberlin (41e) would show that if each of the few buyers 
neglects his indirect influence on bulk-cheese prices, each de-
termining upon his policy as though his competitors were un· 
influenced by what he did, the results will vary, depending 
upon further circumstances. If each assumes his competitors' 
purchases to be unchanged, the equilibrium price is continually 
higher than the monopoly price as the buyers are more 
numerous, ascending to the purely competitive level only when 
their numbers are infinite. If each assumes his competitors' 
prices will not change, and if competitive bidding continues 
until no further price change can be made without disadvan-
tage to someone, the equilibrium price is the purely competitive 
one for only two buyers, and, of course, for any greater number. 
If the full power of the buyer to alter his price, even to the 
disadvantage of the seller, is recognized, however, price will 
oscillate over an area which becomes narrower and approaches 
more closely the purely competitive figure as the number of 
buyers becomes larger. 
If buyers neglect both their indirect and direct influence 
on price, the outcome will be the purely competitive price, 
regardless of numbers. 
If, however, buyers have regard to their total influence upon 
price, the price will be the monopoly one. Independence of the 
buyers and the pursuit of their self-interest are not sufficient 
to raise it. Only if the number is large enough to render 
negligible the effect of an adjustment by anyone upon each of 
the others is the equilibrium price of bulk cheese the purely 
competitive one (41f). 
In the situation pictured in fig. 6, an agg1'essive policy by one 
of a few buyers would, through inevitable retaliation, force the 
price of bulk cheese to rise near or equal DQ, the competitive lev-
el. Since such aggressive policies are certain to result in a de-
crease in profits to the individual buyer, however, no one will be 
aggressive and, although the buyers are entirely independent, the 
51 These assumptions are analagous to Cha mberlin's assumptions on the sell-
ing side (41d). 
127 
equilibrium price is the same as if there were a monopolistic 
agreement between them, that is, BL. 
It is not possible, nor is it intended, to conclude from this 
exercise in theory that the great concentration in the cheese 
industry has resulted in such hypothetical p1w6-monopoly 
prices, either to the consumer or to the producer. So far as the 
market is imperfect, true self-interest requires the neglect of 
the indirect influence of one 's actions to a degree depending 
upon the degree of imperfection. Furthermore, uncertainty 
as to what a competitor's reaction will be, as to his rationality, 
as to the probable incursion upon his market, and as to the 
time-lag between one's action and his competitor's reaction 
may render the outcome indet erminate (41g ) . It must be re-
membered that a study of a market dominated by a few firms 
introduces all the dangers of the sampling of small numbers. 
"All market situations must be approached on their own merits 
... Weare in the r ealm of things where individual decision 
plays an enormously important role. The capricious and ... 
irrational or mistaken judgment of one member of a market 
may be far more important than all of the theoretical generali-
zations there are.' ' 52 Furthermore, the analysis has been based 
on purely hypothetical demand and supply curves and static 
conditions. We have ignored the competition of cheese sold in 
bulk form and of other substitute foods and the competition of 
other dairy products. The economies of large-scale production 
and merchandising also need to be more fully considered. 
Nevertheless, this bulletin has shown that the dominant firms 
have sought to maintain resale prices of processed cheese by 
"controlled distribution" and that policies of "sane and civil 
cooperation" and" live and let live" between competitors have 
been the accepted philosophy of the industrial leaders in recent 
years. These facts give strong weight to the possibility that 
prices to the consumer have been held at an excessively high 
level, although further study needs to be made of the effects 
of the elasticity of actual market demand curves and of the 
effects of the large chain stores' power in bargaining with the 
large cheese distributors on prices to the consumer. It also has 
been shown that bulk cheese prices are determined on an ex-
change where a ridiculously small volume of cheese is sold 
under questionable auspices at a markedly stable price. 
The circumstances surrounding the Plymouth exchanges make 
it quite possible that the farmer selling milk for cheese r eceives 
a price which is held at an · unduly low level by the large 
interests involved. 
Thus, considerable evidence has been presented in this study 
pointing to important monopoly elements in the cheese indus-
try. The chief purpose has been to trace the development of 
02 Galbra ith, J . K . L e tter of J a n. 18, 1 939, t o the a uthor . 
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concentration in the industry, the changes which this has 
brought about in marketing channels, and the primary forces 
r esponsible for such concentration. This bulletin has brought 
together material concerning the conditions in the cheese mar-
ket and, to some extent, the policies of the leading firms. An 
analysis of the 1'esults of these policies and possibilities of im-
provement in these results, however, is beyond the scope of this 
bulletin, although enough questions have undoubtedly been 
raised to indicate the need of such an analysis at the present 
time. 
VI. ECONOMIC APPRAISAL 
"The best·laid schernes 0' mice and men 
Gang aft a·gley." 
-Robert Burns (80f) . 
In the preceding bulletin in this series (53c) the writer 
traced the important factors which led to the more direct dis-
tribution of butter during the post-war period. The same 
factors were largely responsible for the similar trend in cheese 
distribution during this period. As the previous bulletin 
showed, direct 'I1ta1'keting carne fil'st in 'I1tant~factured (non-agl'i-
cultural) P1'OdA~cts. As manufacturing companies grew in size 
and financial power, their management turned more and more 
to market control. Increasing importance of product differen-
tiation and branding brought increasing dissatisfaction with 
prevailing methods and channels of distribution carried on by 
independent jobbers, who were often unable or unwilling-
because they handled many different products or brands, in-
cluding, perhaps, some of their own-to promote the sale of 
the manufacturers' product in sufficient volume. As a result 
the function of demand creation was taken over by many large 
manufacturers. As chain store organizations developed, offering 
large outlets, direct selling became more feasible, such selling 
having developed earliest in those industries where the unit 
of sale was large. Direct selling was expected to give better 
control over quality of service, general policy and prices than 
could be obtained through the jobber. Once demand creation 
was taken over, only the work of physical distribution and 
some phases of risk-bearing and financing were left for the 
wholesaler. But even these were gradually encroached upon as 
manufacturers' financial resources grew large and they sought 
to relieve themselves of dependence on middlemen by duplicat-
ing the jobber's facilities. They established branch houses 
and sales agencies, thereby assuming responsibility for the 
other functions previously performed by the jobber, in the 
hope of either better promotion and service or lower cost.53 
.3 Cf. Clark, Fred E., Princ iples of M ark e ting. 1922. pp. 168-84 and 271-92. 
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At the end of the War the movement toward ?no?'e direct 
marketing of agricultural p?'Odt~cts was just getting tlnder way 
because of the smaller size of the units which bought and sold 
and the lack of standardization of farm products at or near 
the point of production. As a result a large part of the services 
of assembly, grading, reinspection and reselection were of necessi-
ty performed by the independent wholesaler and jobber. Manu-
factured products, on the other hand, were generally stand-
ardized by their very process of production. 
Direct ma?'keting of cheese was can'ied on chiefly by O?'gani-
zations most closely app1'oximating the large non-ag?'icultural 
companies in size, 1'esources and standardizing facilities. 
As we have seen, the meat-packers were already using the 
more integrated channels in 1918. The packers consisted of 
already large-scale units of great financial resources and had 
succeeded in developing well-known Jines of produce through 
their own long-time program of demand creation and market 
control. The packers were aided, of course, by their elaborate 
meat distributing system, the fuller utilization of which made 
desirable the production and distribution of cheese and other 
produce items requiring the same assembling, transporting, 
storing, financing, standardizing and merchandising facilities. 
The post -war period saw a continued increase in the importance 
of the packers (although th~ir position relative to total do-
mestic production declined) , contributing, through their 
growth to the trend toward more direct marketing. 
The great post-war increase in di1'ect marketing of cheese was 
largely brought about by the development of still other organiza-
tions of size, financial strength and standardization compamblc 
with tlw se of the inwustries in which direct marketing had made 
early lieadway. The most important contributing factor was 
the development of processed cheese. For the first time cheese 
became a standardized product, easily adaptable to packaging, 
brandi ng, and advertising, instead of a bulk product notorious-
ly vari able in grade, flavor, color and texture. The result was that 
the nEl()d for the wholesalers' once-vital functions of' grading, stan-
dardizmtion and selection was eliminated, insofar as cheese was 
processed. Large volume made possible scientific laboratory con-
trol OVer processing, which enables processors to use an important 
am01l1nt of off-grade raw material and still turn out a palatable, 
stan ;ardized product. The increasingly large volume of the pro-
cesso s also favored" the establishment of their own assem-
bling and buying subsidiaries at the expense of independent coun-
try dlealers. The processors continued to use wholesale channels 
to s 1 their product for a few years after certain of the wholesal-
ers' il'unctions were no longer needed. Then they began to supple-
men the sales efforts of their wholesale distributors and, with 
still larger gains in volume made possible by acquisitions and 
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mergers and with growing financial strength, they took over 
the sales promotion functions completely. 
The existence and further development of such extensive dis-
t1-ibuting facilities for cheese during the late 'twenties made di-
versification economically desirable. The expansion of the lead-
ing cheese processors and other dairy concerns into large dairy 
corporations was partly, at least, a result of the need for mak-
ing fuller use of integrated marketing facilities by selling not 
only increasing volumes of cheese but also many related prod-
ucts, thereby offsetting the disadvantages of relatively small 
units of sale. The large processors were by 1930 performing 
practically every important marketing function-including as-
sembly, storage, standardization, financing, risk-bearing, and 
sales promotion. The many supplementary and complementary 
relationships among dairy and poultry products in production, 
assembly and distribution were an important factor leading to 
the riEe of these great companies. The leading processors 
themselves, having diversified to a considerable extent, were 
ultimately taken over by still larger corporations. 
Development of more integrated marketing of cheese by chain 
stores and producers' cooperatives was somewhat prevented by 
the patent situation. Chain stores were growing very rapidly in 
the post-war period and tended to go direct to the producing 
areas for their supplies of farm products by setting up their 
own buying departments. This was generally true for butter. 
There was a strong and increasing demand for processed 
cheese, however, and since the basic patents held by the lead-
ing processors prevented the chains from either entering the 
processing field or using the threat as a bargaining weapon, the 
chains were forced to depend upon the processors for the 
processed product. Hence a number of them did not handle a 
sufficient volume of bulk cheese only to buy direct. Instead, 
they depended increasingly upon processors and packers (direct 
distributors) for their supply at the expense of old-line whole-
salers. Thus the chain-store development did contribute indi-
rectly to the trend toward direct marketing. With the expira-
tion of the basic patents on processing, however, the chains 
may be expected to develop their own direct buying and 
processing facilities to a greater extent. 
With the increasing size of laTl~e cooperative sales agencies, 
especially after 1920, many small local production units were 
united into still other large-scale organizations, which were able 
to take over the functions of assembly, storage, standardization 
and quality-improvement. The cheese cooperatives, however, 
continued to be relatively weak financially and-prevented by 
patents from entering processing- their very fine bulk product 
was still not suitable enough for standardization and demand 
creation to compete favorably with processed cheese. Although 
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they replaced the assembling dealer, some of the cooperatives 
still depended upon other agencies-especially packers, process-
ors and chain stores-for the subsequent distribution of their 
product. Still their development was important enough to 
divert considerable volumes of cheese from wholesalers to more 
direct channels. 
Post-war concentration in the cheese industry was largely due 
to monopolistic elements- especially to patents. Even economies 
of scale alone-without patent rights-tend to lead to monopo-
ly. The limit to decreasing costs resulting from economies of 
large-scale marketing is remote. Robinson has said that, 
" There is good reason for thinking that in many industries, 
where by the nature of the product a firm must market its own 
produce through a sales organization which extends far 
towards the final consumer, that organization will continue 
to yield economies with further expansion after all the techni-
cal economies have been secured, and after the limits of efficient 
management are approached" (44). Here we run into the 
dilemma which brought on the famous" cost controversy" of 
the 'twenties: "The persistence of decreasing costs for the in-
dividual firm over a wide range of output is . . . one of the 
forces tending to oligopoly or monopoly when the demand is 
not large enough to retain a large number of firms in competition 
at optimum output" (43). The existence of large-scale econo-
mies has tended persistently to result in firms in all industries 
so large that ultimately market control rather than low cost be-
comes the major consideration. In an industry so concentrated 
as the cheese industry, the movement toward integration and 
more direct marketing did not necessarily come as a result of 
lower distribution costs. It was only necessary that these costs 
were not increased by integration so much as to cancel the ad-
vantages gained from greater control of resale prices and sales 
promotion. If costs were lowered, so much the better. Til e 
standardization of cheese through processing. by eliminating 
the need for the most important services of the cheese whole-
salers, made possible lower costs of integration than if processed 
cheese had never been introduced. But the monopoly element 
of price-control increasingly held the center of the stage rather 
than competitive cost. 
While the economies of large-scale distribution probably 
would have led, over a period of years, to a greater concentra-
tion in processed cheese than existed in the period of the early 
'twenties, such concentration was certainly greatly hastened 
and enhanced by the legal monopolies bestowed upon a few se-
lect processors. These patents made high margins possible 
without fear of the entry of meat-packers, chain stores, coop-
eratives or other organizations into processing. The several 
processors favored by patents could not long be expected to 
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compete. Combination-unless it had been prevented by gov-
ernment action-was inevitable. Kraft and Phenix each was 
able to acquire a large number of companies who were actual 
or potential competitors before the courts established the 
validity of their patents. Then these two large companies com-
bined and formed a "monopoly of monopolies " at least for a 
decade or more. A decade of extensive advertising and product 
differentiation-unimpeded by effective competition-can build 
"goodwill" until it becomes a great barrier to the entry and 
growth of other firms, even after the expiration of the original 
patents makes such entry legal7;y possible. By 1930 the basic 
patents were held by the nation's two largest dairy corpora-
tions, National Dairy P roducts and Borden. The marked 
tendency toward combination in many industries during the 
'twenties-even where patent rights were not involved-was 
to an important extent monopolistic in character . In the cheese 
industry, patent rights assured monopolistic combinations the 
strength of their positions. 
The outcome of the patent developments in the cheese industry 
lends weight to the growing recognition that O1W patent laws aTe 
in need of Tevision. It is beyond the scope of this study to de-
termine what these revisions should be. A few suggestions may 
be in order, however, largely drawn from Vaughan's book, The 
Economics of the Patent System. The present patent laws tend 
to promote and perpetuate monopolistic concentration in indus-
try. It is to alleviate this outcome that revision is necessary. 
In the first place, the Patent Office should subj ect applications 
for patents to greater scrutiny than in the past to determine the 
true novelty or originality of the product or process which it is 
proposed to patent. As one member of the cheese trade stated , 
it is possible that the processing of cheese was not really a valid 
subject for patent- in spite of court decisions to that effect-
since" we have always had Welsh rarebit," which embodies the 
same procedure of heating to a plastic condition as did the very 
simple patented process. Too many patents are granted. "A 
slight improvement or a somewhat different way of accomplish-
ing a particular result, may be patented in the United States" 
(91g). As Vaughan has stated, the number of patents should 
be reduced by making it harder to get them. "Claims should 
be broader and few er in number; every claim of a patent should 
be more fundamentally differentiated from the claims of other 
patents" (91g). 
S.econd, the Patent Office should assume the responsibility of 
issuing a patent that" carries with it the pTima facie force and 
effect of a valid patent, [with] the burden placed upon him who 
would infringe that patent to establish its invalidity.' ' 54 This 
suggestion is contingent upon the first. As long as patents are 
54 This was s u ggested by President Taft (House Doc. No. 749, 62nd Cong., 
2nd Sess.) in 191 2. Quoted by Vaughan (91h). 
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issued on very narrow claims, the chance that the patent-holder 
may be unable to establish validity in the courts may be socially 
desirable. But the delays and costs of litigation are an enor-
mous economic waste, and the Patent Office should be in a 
better position to establish validity than the courts, which are 
definitely not capable of such decisions either from a technical 
or economic standpoint. If the Patent Office did its job thor-
oughly, litigation would be held at a minimum. The Patent 
Office should recognize the economic as well as the technical 
aspects of the powers it grants. The Supreme Court stated in 
an early decision: " It is undeniably true, that the limited and 
temporary monopoly granted to inventors was never designed 
for their exclusive profit or advantage; the benefit to the public 
or community at large was another and doubtless the primary 
object in granting and securing that monopoly. "55 The social 
welfare must be the primary criterion of the Patent Office. 
Third, it is possible that 17 years is too long a period for an 
exclusive monopoly to be granted. Ten years might be much 
more sound from an economic point of view. To a similar sug-
gestion Chamberlin has added that" the wastes of advertising, 
about which economists have so often complained, would be 
reduced, for no one could afford to build up goodwill by this 
means, only to see it vanish through the unimpeded entrance of 
competitors. There would be more nearly equal returns to all 
producers and the elimination of sustained monopoly profits" 
(89a). When a considerably longer period of favor is expected, 
firms can grow enormously within an amazingly short time by 
combination. For example, Phenix became part of Kraft-
Phenix, and Kraft-Phenix part of National Dairy Products-
each very much larger than the preceding firm-within the 
3 years 1928-30. If litigation were to a large extent curtailed, 
10 years would be relatively less short than it at first appears. 
For example, the basic patents held by Kraft and Phenix were 
granted in 1919 to 1921, but their validity was not established 
until 1927, so that only 9-11 years of exclusive rights remained. 
Even this expectation was enough to bring about the enormous 
combinations already noted. 
Fourth, combination leading to the concentration of patent 
rights relating to a particular process or industry into a single 
company should be prevented by procedure under the anti-
trust laws. In addition, Vaughan has justly suggested that 
"the existence of a monopoly of this sort should furnish a de-
fense for the infringement of its patents; in fact, their cancel-
lation deserves favorable consideration" (91j). The tendency 
toward such combination of patents has brought a number of 
other social evils, among which suppression of improved pro-
cesses is important. While the philosophy of the patent laws 
has been based upon encouragement and reward to the inven-
66 Kendall v . Winsor, 21 How. 322, 327-328. Quoted in Vaughan (9li). 
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tor, the development of monopolistic combinations has tended 
to have the opposite effect. The independent inventor may be 
faced with a single buyer for his innovation. If, on the other 
hand, he is employed by the combination, he is usually bound 
by contract to surrender inventions to his employers (91k ) . 
It may be argued that large-scale industry is inevitable and 
that patents serve merely to bring about such concentration 
sooner, perhaps with less social loss than if competition had 
been allowed to run its course, leaving a long list of business 
fatalities by the wayside. This argument would have force 
only if one were certain that those companies favored by 
patents would be the moct efficient in other r espects (which 
does not n ecessarily follow) and that they would pass on to the 
consumer the benefits of lower cost in the form of lower prices. 
The ideally best solution of our whole industrial structure 
would probably be the very marked concentration of produc-
tion and distribution within an industry, it unrestrictive price 
and production policies on the part of such firms could be 
assured. If this is impossible under private management, how-
ever, the better alternative may be smaller firms which, in spite 
of higher costs, charge prices more commensurate with these 
. costs-prices which may still be lower than those of the larger 
firms because monopoly profits have been eliminated. This is 
especially true because it is a matter of common knowledge 
that monopoly breeds inefficiency. If prices fail to fall, costs-
whether economically justifiable or not-tend to rise to meet 
the monopoly prices. 
This bulletin, having shown some of the probable anti-social 
effects of our patent system in the cheese industry, cannot be 
better concluded than to quote the final words of Vaughan's 
study of the patent system as a whole: 
"That our patent system has promoted inventions, but not 
in the manner intended by our forefathers, seems certain. The 
industrial monopoly based on patents seeks to continue its 
power by means of professional inventors employed in its lab-
oratories, by contracts with other employees to receive their 
inventions, and by the acquisition of patents from other 
sources. 56 In many instances the exploitation of patents in 
furthering industrial monopoly is the chief incentive to inven-
tion. The patent law is an immediate source of encouragement 
and an ultimate source of discouragement to the outside in-
ventor. The evils connected with our patent system reduce his 
patent in most instances to a mere deception. The wealthy cor-
poration and not the inventor, as a rule, derives substantial re-
turns from patents.57 The social costs of the present patent 
5. See Appendix A , p. 142, for a list of r ecent Kraft-Phenix patents. 
57 J . L . Kraft, founder of the Kraft Cheese Co. a nd original grantee of the 
basic patent on processed cheese, apparently did succeed in receiving most 
of the fruits of his patent. More recent developments by Kraft-Phenix h ave 
come from employees in their la boratories, however. 
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situation-industrial monopoly, suppression of patents, dis-
couragement of invention, and waste of human and material 
resources-offset considerably, if not completely, any good de-
rived from patents. And yet the fundamental idea which under-
lies the granting of patents is sound. The problem is to alter 
the patent and other laws, and their administration, in the light 
of modern conditions, so that they may encourage invention 
to the greatest extent and at the least cost to the people" (9U). 
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APPENDIX A 
SOME IMPORTANT PATENTS ON CHEESE 
1. KRAFT CHEESE COMPANY 
The first important patent on processed cheese, to the author's knowl-
edge, was granted to J. L. Kraft on June 6, 1916. A digest of this patent 
follows (39a): 
"Process of Sterilizing Cheese and an Improved Product Produced by 
Such Process ... 
. "1. The improved process of rendering cheese of the Cheddar group 
permanently keeping, which consists in heating and melting the cheese, 
actively stirring it while melted, and while thus maintained in homo-
geneous condition raising its temperature to such degree as to effect 
complete sterilization and then inclosing it in protective containers 
under sterilized condition. 
"2. The improved process of rendering cheese of the Cheddar genus 
permanently keeping, which consists in heating it to approximately 
175 0 F., retaining it at such raised temperature for a substantial period, 
agitating or stirring the cheese during the treatment with heat, and 
finally placing it while sterile in suitable sterilized hermetically sealed 
containers. . 
"3. As a new article of manufacture, completely sterilized cheese of 
the Cheddar genus. 
"4. As a new article of manufacture, a hermetically sealed completely 
sterilized package of cheese of the Cheddar genus. 
"5. As a new article of manufacture, a hermetically sealed completely 
sterilized package of non-liquid homogeneous cheese of the Cheddar 
genus." 
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On December 23, 1919, a "reissue" of the Kraft patent was made on 
the basis of a number of additional claims, among which were: 
"6. As a new article of manufacture, a packaged product, comprising 
homogeneous sterilized cheese of the Cheddar genus, inclosed in a 
hermetically sealed container. 
"15. The improved process of rendering cheese of the Cheddar genus 
permanently keeping, which consists in comminuting the cheese, heat-
ing the same to approximately 175 0 F., maintaining at least said tem-
perature for not less than 10 minutes, actively stirring the material 
during said heating to prevent disintegration and effect homogeneity 
and inclosing the same in hermetically sealed containers." (39b). 
This was apparently the basic patent upon the strength of which 
Kraft was able to rise to so strong a place in the industry. The broad 
nature of the patent, especially in Claim 1, should be noted. 
At the same time Kraft was granted another patent: 
"Process for Treating Cheese. 5 claims. 
"5. In the art of mixing cheese to secure uniformity of the same in 
its constituent parts, the improved process which consists in introduc-
ing into a mixing receptacle, quantities of cheese from sundry batches 
of the same variety, but non-uniform in character, gradually heating 
and actively stirring the mass until it has attained a temperature of 
between 125 0 F. and 145 0 F., and when it has reached a plastic, uni-
formly blended condition, arresting the treatment, and subsequently 
reforming the treated material into cakes of the desired shape and 
size" (39c). 
On Aug. 24, 1920, Kraft was granted a patent on: 
"Process of Sterilizing and Packaging Che2se. 
"The process of putting up cheese of the Cheddar genus, which con-
sists in melting the cheese, actively stirring the cheese during melting, 
and while melted and maintained at a t emperature of between 120 0 F. 
and 150 0 F. until brought to a stably-homogenized condition, then plac-
ing it in suitably sealed containers and subjecting it to a temperature 
in excess of 160 0 F. maintained for a period of not less than fifteen 
minutes." (39d). 
On Dec. 13, 1921, Kraft received still another patent: 
"Process of Preparing Cheese. 
"The improvement in the art of preparing cheese of a normally solid 
variety, which consists in comminuting previously manufactured cheese, 
stirring and heating the same until the mass has attained a uniform 
consistency and is capable of flowing to assume the form of a con-
tainer, and inclosing a definite portion of the fluid mass, while still 
heated, in a rectangular mold lined with metal foil, forming on cooling 
a finished mercantile unit from which the retailer may cut slices or 
sections of like area and thickness to suit the particular weights de-
sired by the customer" (3ge) . 
2. PHENIX CHEESE COMPANY 
The earliest patents found by the author to have been issued to 
Phenix Cheese Company were granted in February and September, 
1921, under the title: "Cheese and Process for Sterilizing the Same." 
The method of treating cheese described in these patents consisted in 
grinding the cheese, adding to it a small proportion of either sodium 
phosphate or an alkaline citrate, heating, sterilizing and pouring into 
container. The resulting new article of manufacture under the first 
patent was a cheese "of Swiss genus." A second patent was identical 
except that the resulting product was "of Camemb3rt genus" instead 
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of Swiss. (39f). The Kraft patents had all been applied to cheese "of 
Cheddar genus." 
Phenix's most important basic patents were issued, not on cheese, 
but on packaging machinery. In February, 1924, a patent was granted 
on a "feed hopper for plastic materials." (39g). In July two more 
patents were issued, one on a "package machine for plastic materials," 
the other on a "folding mechanism for packaging machines." (39h). In 
September another patent was granted on a "packaging machine." (39i). 
3. r. C. POPPER 
The patent which the Wisconsin Cheese Producers' Federation was 
found to be infringing was granted to 1. C. Popper on April 29, 1924: 
"Method of Treating Cheese and Product Therefrom. 
"I. An uncooked cheese having its butter fat globules of substantially 
uniform size evenly distributed throughout and compacted into a sub-
stantially solid mass. 
"2. An improved method of treating cheese which consists of ex-
pressing it through a perforated plate under high pressure, thereby to 
shred the same, thereby breaking up the large butter fat globules so 
that all globules will be more or less uniform in size, thereafter com-
pacting the cheese in its shredded shape into a solid mass and discharg-
ing it in the form of a continuous r ibbon of predetermined transverse 
area and automatically cutting the ribbon' into predetermined lengths." 
(39j) . 
4. BROOKSHIRE ( L AKESHIRE) CHEESE COMPANY 
( BORDEN SUBSIDIARY ) 
In January, 1925, a patent on a "cheese treating apparatus" was 
granted to Wheeler and Scott: 
"Cheese treating apparatus comprising the combination of an open 
trough, a lid covering the rear portion of said trough, means for feeding 
comminuted cheese into the front end of the trough, an agitating 
conveyor adapted to progressively feed the cheese toward the rear end 
of the t rough, and means for subjectin g the cheese to the direct action 
of a heated fluid in the open space between the cheese and the lid 
during a portion of its passage to the rear end of the trough, said space 
being open to the atmosphere to allow observation and prevent the de-
velopment of pressure upon the cheese." (39k) . 
In August, 1927, Wheeler and Scott were granted a second patent, 
which they assigned to Brookshire (Lakeshire) Cheese Company: 
"Process for Treating Cheese. 
"The process of treating cheese which consists in passing a stream of 
cheese through a chamber, admitting steam to said chamber at a tem-
perature adequate to reduce particles of said cheese to substantially a 
liquid state ... and momentarily exposing substantially all particles 
of said cheese to the steam." (391). 
One or both of these patents proved to be of a bas ic nature, enabling 
Lakeshire to hold the rights to the continuous process cooker. Lakeshire 
had been sued for patent infr ingement by both Kraft and Phenix, the 
suits being filed on Dec. 16, 1!'124.68 Lakeshire was later acquired by 
Borden. 
u' Kraft Cheese Compan y vs. Brookshire Cheese Company with regard t o 
a lleged infringem ent of the following Kraft pa t ents (see text a bove) : Re-
issue 14,777; 1,323,8 69; a n d 1,400,171. 
Phenix Cheese Company vs. Brookshire Cheese Compan y w ith regard t o 
a lleged infringement of Phenix p a tents (see text): Reissu e 15,648; 1,389,577 ; 
a nd 1,389,095 (39m). 
142 
5. SWIFT AND COMPANY 
On Jan. 6, 1925, Swift and Company was granted fo'ur interrelated 
patents covering (a) low temperature emulsification of cheese; (b) 
emulsification and pasteurization of cheese; (c) process of making 
pasteurized loaf cheese; (d) apparatus for pasteurizing cheese. No 
attempt is made to treat these separately, only one of Swift's claims 
being given here: 
"The process of preparing cheese which comprises cutting and grind-
ing the ordinary types of cheese, mixing them in the desired propor-
tions with or without the addition of condimental substances, emulsify-
ing the mixture at a low temperature under pressure, passing the 
emulsified product in a continuous manner through a pasteurizing 
apparatus in which it is rapidly heated to a pasteurizing temperature 
by intimate contacts with heating surfaces for a very short period of 
time, and conveying the resulting cheese in a substantially continuous 
line into the packages." (25a). It is these patents which apparently 
were not broad enough in their validity for Swift to defend them in 
court against the prior claims of Kraft and Phenix. 
6. VELVEETA CHEESE COMPANY (KRAFT-PHENIX SUBSIDIARY ) 
On J an. 13, 1925, the Velveeta Cheese Company received patents on 
the apparatus and process for treating cheese in the following way: 
"A process of remaking cheese characterized by cutting solid cheese 
into pieces, grinding or comminuting the cheese, introducing dried 
steam under a partial vacuum to heat the cheese mass, but without 
pasteurizing the same, stirring and opening the cheese mass to distri-
bute the cheese therein, and pouring the cheese- mass in molds after 
it has reached a stringy ccnsistency." (39n). Velveeta was later ac-
quired by Kraft. 
7. KRAFT-PHENIX CHEESE CORPORATION 
Kraft-Phenix Cheese Corporation has received a large number of 
cheese patents since it was formed by merger . Among these the follow-
ing may be listed: 
Patent on "cheese and process of preparing same." (390). 
Patent on "packaging method and apparatus." (39p). 
Patent on "apparatus for treating cheese." (39q). 
Patent on "apparatus for heat treating cheese." (391'). 
Patent on "treatment of cheese." (39s). 
Patent on "process for the treatment of cheese." (39t). 
Patent on "processed cheese and method of preparing the same." (39u). 
Patent on "box lining machine." (39v). 
In recent years it has received numerous other patents on other 
products, such as eggs, mayonnaise, casein, and shortening. 
8. OTHER RECEN'l' PATENTS 
Other recent patents include a continuous processing machine granted 
to Doering of Chicago in March, 1931 (39w); a cheese processing ma-
chine to Lakeshire (Borden subsidiary) in August, 1933 (39x); and a 
method of producing "an improved emulsified unpasteurized cheese 
product" to Swift and Company in July, 1935. (25b). 
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APPENDIX B 
METHOD OF CALCULATING RELATIVE IMPORTANCE OF 
DIFFERENT CHANNELS OF DISTRIBUTION (fig. 4) 
In determining the quantitative importance of each marketing chan· 
nel, the commission's original volume data-not its percentages-were 
used in each case, the following adj ustments in these data being made. 
The percentage handled by large distributors (dairy corporations and 
packers) was calculated from these commission data, except that a 
deduction was made for all sales by either corporations or packers to 
"milk products manufacturing and processing companies," since this 
item was believed to represent mainly sales within the "large distribu-
tors" group itself and hence involving double counting. The result was 
80.6 percent of the nation's cheese as the approximate proportion 
handled by large distributors. The proportion bought by these distrib-
utors through brokers (0.8 percent) and obtained from assembling deal-
ers (31.8 percent) was based directly upon the commission's volume 
data. 
The volume of cheese bought from marketing cooperatives by the 
large distributors apparently included a considerable part from those 
local cooperatives which had no overhead marketing organizations, 
since it far exceeded the sales of six leading cooperatives to such large 
distributors. In order to estimate the volume taken only from such 
marketing organizations, the difference between total purchases and 
sales of the four to six cooperatives (appendix tables 3 and 4) pI us sales 
to "milk products manufacturers" and to "other" distributors was cal-
culated. Since the commission did not include Tillamook or St. Law-
rence County (N.Y.) Cooperative, 11 million pounds were added to ac-
count for the volume of these cooperatives, their later channels of 
distribution being asstt1ned to be the same as those cooperatives in-
cluded by the commission. 
Hence all percentages as to distribution of marketing cooperatives, 
were based on commission data, corrected for the addition of these two 
cooperatives. The remainder of the volume bought from "Marketing 
Cooperatives" by the large distributors was considered to be from local 
organizations and was added to the volume purchased from other "milk 
products manufacturing and processing companies" (38.1 + 172.0 mil-
lion pounds) to give an approximate 37.8 percent purchased direct from 
local factories (whether independent or cooperative). 
The figure for the proportion received by large-scale distributors 
from their own factories was estimated by deducting total sales of the 
large distributors, and the item of duplication mentioned in the second 
paragraph above from their total purchases (519.7 - 416.4 - 51.9 mil-
lion pounds) which left 51.4 million pounds or 8.9 percent. The per-
centage moving from the factory directly to retailers was taken from 
the census figure (7.4 percent), after deducting the percentage which so 
moved from marketing cooperatives. 
Only 2 percent of the nation's cheese was not accounted for by either 
the Census direct-sale figures or the commission data. This was as-
sumed to move from local factory through assembling dealer, whole-
saler and wholesale grocer to the retailer. Commission data on sales 
to government agencies were in each case included in direct sales since 
such agencies are properly classified as large users. All other percen-
tages were based on the commission's volume data after making the 
above-mentioned adjustments. 
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APPENDIX TABLES 
TABLE 1. DOMESTIC PRODUCTION AND NET IMPORTS OF CHEESE IN 
UNITED STATES (EXCLUSIVE OF COTTAGE, POT 
AND BAKER'S CHEESE), 1920-37 
Domestic Importst Exportst 
production* 
Year (millions of lbs.) (millions of lbs.) (millions of lbs.) 
calendar year year beginning July year beginning July 
1920 362.6 16.6 10 . 8 
1921 355.9 34.3 7.5 
1922 370 . 0 54 . 6 8.4 
1923 394.7 67.0 3.9 
1924 413.9 61.5 9.4 
1925 443.5 62.4 4.1 
1926 427.4 89.8 3.8 
1927 406.7 75.4 2.9 
1928 437 .5 84.6 2.6 
1929 484.0 78.3 2 .3 
1930 500.4 58.0 1.7 
1931 492.3 57.2 1.6 
1932 483.9 55.9 1.3 
1933 543.1 46.9 1.3 
1934 579.2 48.4 1.3 
1935 620.6 49.4 1.1 
1936 642.0 65.7# 1.1# 
1937 649.0 -- --
*Annual production reports on manufactured dairy products issued by Division of Dairy 
and Poultry Products, Bureau of Agricultural Economics (82). Beginning in 1929 figures 
are more complete, 80 allowance should be made for this when comparing production since 
1929 with that of earlier years. 
tAgricuitural Statistics, 1938. Table 539, p. 389. 
tIbid., Table 538, p . 387. 
#Preliminary. 
TABLE 2. CONSUMPTION* OF CHEESE, TOTAL AND PER CAPITA, UNITED 
STATES, 1925-37. 
Year 
1925 
1926 
1927 
1928 
1929 
1930 
1931 
1932 
1933 
1934 
1935 
1936 
1937 
Conswnption 1------------------
Totalt 
(thous. of lbs.) 
538,426 
551,371 
533 . 281 
537,162 
563 ,329 
569,336 
557,476 
547,815 
567,455 
615 ,052 
671 ,363 
690,435 
690,491 
Per capita 
(pounds) 
4.72 
4.77 
4.54 
4.51 
4.67 
4.65 
4.51 
4.38 
4.53 
4.87 
5.28 
5.39 
5.35 
*Consumption of cheese is calculated from production, foreign trade, and domestic stocks. 
tAgricuitural Outlook Charts, 1939: Dairy Products . p. 16 (87) . Figures beginning with 
1929 are more complete and allowance should be made for this in comparing data since 1929 
with those of previous years. 
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TABLE 3. CHEESE RECEIPTS AND PURCHASES (OTHER THAN COTTAGE, 
POT AND BAKER'S) OF FOUR COOPERATIVE MILK AND MILK 
PRODUCTS MARKETING ASSOCIATIONS,' BY SOURCES 
OF SUPPLY, CALENDAR OR FISCAL 
YEAR, 1934 OR 1935'*. 
Sources of supply 
I 
Percent 
Pounds of total 
Received from-
Members 22,751.326 70.66 
Non-members --- ---
Total 22,751,326 70.66 
Purchased through or from-
Milk and milk product, manufacturing 
and processing companies 8,539,079 26.52 
Wholesale assemblers and merchants 645,744 2.01 
All other sources 261.561 .81 
Total 9,446,384 29.34 
Total receipts and purchases 32 , 197,710 100.00 
*Federal Trade Commission. Agricultural income inquiry. Part I. 1938. Table 306, p. 1051. 
Ilncludes cheese receipts and purchases of the following associations: Dairymen's League 
Coopera.tive Association, Tnc.; Consolidated Dairy Products Company; Land O'Lakes 
Creameries, Inc.; and Challenge Cream a,nd Butter Association. 
20j the four reporting receipts and purchases of chee~e, one reported for the calendar year 
1934, one for the calendar year 1935, one for the fiscal year ended Mar. 31, 1935, and one 
for the fiscal year ended Oct. 31, 1935. 
TABLE 4. SALES OF CHEESE (OTHER THAN COTTAGE, POT AND BAKER'S) OF 
SIX COOPERATIVE MILK AND MILK PRODUCTS MARKETING 
ASSOCIATIONS,' BY CHANNELS OF DISTRIBUTION, 
CALENDAR OR FISCAL YEAR, 1934 OR 1935'. 
Channels of distribution 
Milk and milk products wholesalers 
Wholesale grocers 
Milk and milk products manufacturers and proeessors 
Cooperative marketing associations 
Cooperative and voluntary chains 
Chain grocery stores 
Route customers3 
Federal, state, or municipal governments 
All other consumers and distributors 
Total sales 
Pounds 
2,323 
5,819,898 
495 ,641 
65,170 
4,377 ,397 
2,437,641 
14,328,457 
1 ,097,918 
1,678,825 
30.303,271 
Pprcent 
of total 
0.01 
19 .21 
1.64 
.21 
14.45 
8.04 
47.28 
3.62 
5.54 
100.00 
*Federal Trade Commission. Agricultural income inquiry. Part I. 1938. Table 309, p. 1056. 
lIncludes cheese sales of the following cooperatives: Dairr.men's League Cooperative Assoc-
iation, Inc.; New England Dairies , Inc.; Twin City MIlk Producers Association, Consol-
idated Dairy Products Company, Land O'Lakes Creameries, Inc.; and Challenge Cream 
and Butter Association. 
20f the six cooperatives reporting sales of cheese, three reported for the calendar year 1934, 
one for the calendar year 1935, one for the fiscal year ended Mar. 31, 1935, and one for the 
fiscal year ended Oct. 31, 1935. 
3Includes route sales to homes. bakeries, institutions, hotels. restaurants and retail stores 
other than chain stores and cooperative and voluntary chains. 
TABLE 5. CHEESE PURCHASES (OTHER THAN COTTAGE, POT, AND BAKERS') OF EIGHT MILK AND MILK PRODUCTS MANUFACT-
URING AND PROCElSSING COMPANIES' AND 10 MElAT-PACKING COMPANIES,' BY SOURCES OF SUPPLY, 
CALENDAR OR FISCAL YEAR 1934 OR 19353*. 
8 milk and milk 10 meat-packing 
Sources of supply products companies companies Total 18 companies 
Pounds" Percent of total Pounds I Percent of total Pounds Percent of to!.al 
Wholesale assemblers and merchants 42,386,760 21 .67 143 ,173.813 64.86 185, 560,573 44.57 
Milk and milk products manufacturing 
'67.15 and processing companies~ 131. 332. 129 40,664,243 18.42 171 ,996,372 41. 31 
Marketing cooperatives& 19 ,843, 751 10.15 32,326.889 14.64 52.170 ,640 12.53 
Brokers and commission houses 1,116.115 .57 3.594.495 1.63 4,710 ,610 1.13 
All other sources 906,499 .46 1,000,000 .45 1 ,906,499 .46 
--- --- ---
Total cheese purchasE's 195,585,254 100 .00 220.759,440 100.00 416,344,694 100.00 
*Federal Trade Commission. Agricultural Income Inquiry. Part 1. 1938. Table 313, p. 1064. 
IIncludes the following companies and their subsidiaries: National Dairy Prod"ucts Corporation; the Borden Company; Beatrice Creamery Company; the 
Fairmont Creamery Company; Golden State Company. Ltd.; Western Dairies, Inc.; Creameries of America, Inc .; American Dairies, Inc. 
'Includes the following companies and their domestic subsidiaries: Swift and Company; Armour and Company; Wilson and Company, Inc.; the Cudahy 
Packing CompalW ; Hygrade Food Products Corporation; Kingan and Company, Inc.; George A. Hormel and Company; the Rath Packing Company; 
Jacob Dold Packing Company; and John Morrell and Company. 
30£ the eight milk and milk products manufacturers and processors, five reported purchases for the calendar year 1934; two for the fiscal year ended Feb. 
28, 1935 and one for the fiscal ycar ended March 31, 1935. Of the ten meat-packing companies, nine reported purchases for the fiscal years ended from 
Oct. 26 to Nov. 2,1935; one reported purchases for the fiscal year ended Oct. 27, 1934. 
foOf the eight milk and milk products companies, two reported approximate quantities purchased . 
5Includes all companies engaged in processing milk and milk products, except marketing cooperatives. 
'Includes cooperatives that physically handle some or all of the milk and milk products which theif sell. 
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TABLE 6. SALES OF CHEESE (OTHER THAN COTTAGE, POT, AND BAKERS') OF 10 MILK AND MILK PRODUCTS MANUFACTURING 
AND PROCESSING COMPANIES,' AND 10 MEAT-PACKING COMPANIES,' BY CHANNELS OF 
DISTRIBUTION, CALENDAR OF FISCAL YEAR 1934 OR 19353*. 
• 10 milk and milk 10 meat pa.cking 
Challnel of distribution products companies4 compames Total 20 companies 
Pounds Percent of total Pounds Percent of total Pounds Percent of total 
-
Brokers and commission houses 2,219,785 0.87 50,000 0.02 2,269,785 0.44 
Milk and milk products wholesalers 
(excluding wholesale grocers) 26,283,601 10.32 1,630,500 .62 27,914,101 5,37 
Wholesale grocers 10,712,233 4.21 24,214,750 9.14 34,926,983 6 .72 
Milk and milk products manufacturing 
and processing companies fl 37,396,1.12 14 .69 14,527,298 5.48 51,923,450 9.99 
Chain drug stores 1.204,847 .47 1,204,847 .23 
Cooperative and voluntary chains 4,046.718 1.59 3,300,223 1.25 7 ,346,941 1.41 
Chain grocery stores 46,862,739 18.41 14,958,502 5.64 61,821,241 11.90 
Route customers ll 117,254,1127 46.06 198,083,645' 74.73 315,337,757 60 .68 
United States Government 5,519.566 2.17 1,330,367 .50 6,849,933 1.32 
All other consumers and distrihutors 3.090.028 1. 21 6,005,504' 2.62 10,055,532 1.94 
--- ------ --- ---
Tobal sales of cheese 254,589,7.81 100.00 265,060,789 100.00 519,650,570 100.00 
-
*Federal Trade Commission. Agricultural Income Inquiry. Part I. 1938. TabJe 318. p. 1072. 
'Includes the following companies and their subsidiaries: National Dairy Products Corporation; the Borden Company; Beatrice Creamery Company; 
the Fairmont Creamery Company; Carnatioa Company; Pet Milk Company; Golden State Company, Ltd .; Western Dairies, Inc.; Creameries of 
America. Inc.; American Da.iries. Inc. 
' Includes the following companies and their domestic subsidiaries: Swift and Company; Armour and Company; Wilson and Company, Inc .; the Cudahy 
Packing Company; Hygrade Food Products Corporation; Kingan and Company, Inc.; George A. Hormel and Company; the Rath Packing Company; 
Jacob Dold Packing Company; and John Morrell and Company. 
'Of the ten milk and milk products companies, seven reported sales for the calendar year, 1934; two for the fiscal year ended Feb. 28, 1935 and one for the 
fiscal year ended March 31, 1935. The ten meat-packing companies reported sales for the fiscal years specified: nine reported purchases for the fiscal years 
ended from Oct. 26 to Nov. 2, 1935; one reported purchascs for the fiscal year ended Oct. 27, 1934. 
40f the ten milk and milk products companies, two reported approximate quantities Bold. 
'Includes processors of milk and cream and manufacturers of butter, cheese, condensed and evaporated milk, ice cream and all other milk products. 
6Includes ronte sales to homes, bakeries, institutions, restaurants and stores other than chain stores and cooperative and voluntary chains. 
'Includes 4,783.632 pounds sold to independent retail grocers. 
'Includes sales of 190,370, 67~ pounds to independent retail grocers and meat markets; 2,310,000 pounds to hotels, restaurants. hospital. and institutions 
and 169.000 pounds to railroad commissaries. 
'Includes 2,000.000 pounds sold to baking and biscuit companies and export. of 1,012,800 pound •. 
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TABLE 7. PRIMARY CHANNELS OF DISTRIBUTION OF MANUFACTURERS! 
CHEEi?E SALES.* 
Cheeset 1935 
I 
Amount Percent Percent N umber of plan t. 
Channels of primary distribution of net sales total distributed 
of 2,575 cheese factories (000) net sales sales Selling 
100. 0 Total exclusively 
Total for industry 135,011' 100 .0 
To own wholesale branches 18,785 13.9 16.4 94 37 
To industrial or other large users 2,846 2.1 2.5 218 36 
To wholesalers and jobbers 77 ,964 57.8 67.9 2,241 1,803 
To own retail stores 1 ,327 1.0 1.2 28 9 
To retailers (including chains) 9,846 7.3 8.6 248 51 
To household consumers 3,900 2.9 3 .4 245 8 
---- -- -- - -
Total (distributed) sales 114 ,668 85.0 100.0 
---- -- -- - -
Transfer to other plants 
in own organization 19,749 14.6 141 82 
Sales not allocated 
to usual channels 594 0.4 35 13 
Sales negotiated through agents, 
brokers, commission houses 3 ,414 2.5 105 56 
*U .S. Dept. Commerce. Bur. of Census. Distribution of Manufacturers' Sales. 1935. Table 1 
t&'~~;"s of Manufactures reported preliminary value of 598,950,000. 
'Includes $7,278,000 purchased merchandise without processing, chiefly milk and cream.' 
APPENDIX TABLE 8. COMPARISON OF PROCESSED CHEESE AND AMERICAN 
CHEDDAR (BULK) CHEESE: PRODUCTION AND SELLING 
VALUE FOB FACTORY 
Blended cheese and cheese spreads (000)*1 Selling value, f. o. b. factoryt 
(cents per pound) 
Percent of U . S. 
cheese production of Blended American ,Percentage 
Year Production . cheese and cheddar of price of (thous.lbs.) All cheese cheese (bulk) bulk to price 
American (excluding spreads cheese of processed 
cheddar cottage, pot. cheese 
and bakers') 
---
1929 51,377 13.9%' 10.6% 30.50 20.5c 67.2% 
1931 151.708 40.5 30.8 19.2 13.0 67.7 
IP33 t -- -- -- 10.7 --
1935 198.738 45 . 0 32.0 18.6 14.3 76.9 
1937 256.403** 51.6 39.5 19.2 15.7tt 81.2 
• U. S. Dept. Commerce, Biennial Censuses of Manufacture for 1929, 1931. 
1933, 1935 and 1937, under "food preparation not otherwise classified." In 
calculating percentages, production figures of Bur. of Agr. Econ. (appendix 
table I) were used in preference to Census production data, since the two were 
divergent. 
t Calculated by dividing "value of products" by "production" as reported by 
Census of Manufactures. The census of manufactures has defined "value of . 
products" as follows : "[Beginning in] 1931 . . . the amounts under this 
heading are the selling values. f. o. b. factory, of all products manufactured 
during the census years whether sold or in stock, and consequently the total 
value of products covers cost of production (including overhead expenses) 
and profits, except in cases where the factories are operated a t a loss. It also 
covers selling expenses except for those . establishments which maintain sep-
arate sales departments, in which cases the values at which the products are 
turned over to the sales departments are reported. 
"For 1929 the value of products was .. . the selling value, j : o. b. factory, 
of products shipped or delivered during the year . . . " (Biennial Census 
of Manufactures, 1931, p. 9). 
Since the processors doubtless had the ir own integrated sales departments, 
these data apparently represent only the manufacturing margins for these 
companies, not combined manufacturing-and-distributing margins. 
t The census did not report this item in 1933 . 
•• Of this, 244,315 thousand pounds were blended or processed cheese a nd 
12,088 thousand pounds were cheese spreads, with average values of 18.7 and 
29.8 cents a pound, respectively. '~' his reveals the very high margins on cheese 
spreads. 
tt Since data for 1937 censu s a r e not yet available, the average price of 
twins on the Plymouth exchange fOr 1937 is used here. In earlier years the 
exchange quotation a n d the Census aver age-va lue corresponded c lose ly. 
